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ABSTRACT 
AN EXPLORATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COUNSELOR MORAL JUDGMENT AND 
COUNSELING BEHAVIOR: 
A PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS 
(September 1984) 
Theodore Taranto, B.A., University of Massachusetts 
M.Ed., University of Massachusetts, Ed.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor Allen Ivey 
This study explores the relationships which may exist between the 
professional behavior demonstrated by counselor trainees in an analogue 
counseling interview and the style of moral judgment preferred by these 
counselors. Parent research for this study is found in the work of 
Allen Ivey, Lawrence Kohlberg, and James Rest. Counseling behavior was 
described using the Microcounseling Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. Moral 
judgment was identified by the Defining Issues Test. Subjects were 
forty undergraduate students. Data on counselor professional behavior 
were generated from ten-minute audio taped interviews conducted by these 
students. The interviews were coded as provided for in the 
Microcounseling Taxonomy. This provided clear quantitative information 
describing subjects' counselor behavior. Moral judgment scores were 
defined as the relative usage of Kohlbergian levels 5 and 6 or 
"principled" arguments as allowed by the Defining Issues Test. One 
moral judgment score, called the ?% score, was obtained for each 
subject. Resultant data were analyzed with the pearson r correlation 
coefficient and the t test. One hypothesis was subjected to the chi 
square test. 
Parametric analysis of data yielded two significant results. The 
use of "Helpee"-focused skills and the age of the counselor trainees 
correlated significantly with the use of principled moral arguments. 
Nonparametric analysis of one hypothesis using catagorical variables Hi 
and Lo moral judgment and Attending and Influencing skill usage also 
demonstrated an association. Other hypothesis testings proved not 
significant. 
Conclusions from the experiment are suggestive, not definitive. 
Certain methodological flaws may have been responsible for this. Also 
possible is that no relationship between the variables exists. 
Replications of the study, which remedy the methodological flaws, need to 
be completed. Should these prove equally non-conclusive, the profession 
of counseling is encouraged to consider the theoretical practicality and 
moral soundness of professional counseling given that no relationship 
between professional behavior and moral judgment can be found. 
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CHAPTER | 
INTRODUCTI ON 
Goals of this Study 
This study examines the relationships that may exist between demon¬ 
strated moral judgment of the counselor trainee and the counseling 
behavior that that trainee exhibits in an analogue counseling interview. 
The study will use established psychometric instruments to generate 
appropriate quantitative and qualitative data. Data so generated will 
allow correlations between the two variables to be computed. Any mean¬ 
ingful relationships so uncovered can then be discussed for their impact 
on the fields of both moral judgment and counseling. 
Specifically, this study will seek to answer the following general 
questions: 
1. Do counselor trainees who differ in their level of moral 
judgment conduct themselves differently in an analogue counseling 
interview? 
2. What, if any, reliable relationships exist between demonstrated 
moral judgment and counseling behavior? 
The general premise that arises from these questions is: Counselor 
trainees with higher moral judgment scores will employ patterns of 
counseling skill usage in a counseling interview different from those 
with lower moral judgment scores. 
Technologies presently exist that are capable of describing moral 
judgment and counseling behavior. Further, extensive research has been 
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done in each of these areas (Ivey and Authier, 1978; Rest, 1979). 
This study brings together these technologies and these bodies of 
research for the purpose of defining and describing the relationships 
that may exist between counselor trainee moral judgment and counselor 
trainee behavior. Included in this chapter will be the following two 
sections: (a) a statement regarding the involvement of values in the 
practice of counseling and counselor education and the consequent need 
for this study and (b) an introductory statement regarding the measure¬ 
ment of each of the two variables addressed in this study. 
General statement of the issue of Values in Counseling 
and the need for this study: 
Real and vital issues have a nagging habit of resurfacing. The 
impact of counselors' personal values in their work is such an issue. 
One example of this issue resurfacing is in an invited response to a 
Personnel and Guidance Journal article written by Kohlberg and Wasserman 
(1980). The stimulus article treats a psychoeducationaI guidance model 
based on cognitive developmental moral judgment. 
In this article Kohlberg and Wasserman encourage counselors and 
other school personnel to take a much more active role in the moral 
development of school age children. They suggest using a clear, test¬ 
able framework based on Kohlberg's approach to cognitive developmental 
moral judgment. Results reported in this article indicate real oppor¬ 
tunities for children's moral growth by following their suggestions. 
Ivey, in his response to Kohlberg and Wasserman (Ivey, 1980), is 
provided with a clear vantage point from which to explore basic concerns 
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regarding the relationship between a counselor's values and work. 
Essentially, in this article Ivey examines a basic tenet of the 
counseling profession by asking the question: "Should we as counselors 
and counselor educators attempt to remain professionally neutral in the 
face of frightening moral and social problems around us, or should we 
structure our profession so as to instill a set of defensible human 
values which will help to remedy these problems?" This article makes 
the point that decisive committed action founded on considered moral 
principles is not only appropriate for counselors but essential for us 
as professionals and for our changing profession. In his article Ivey 
approaches the values in the counseling issue from a broad social 
perspective. He sees the counselor as an integral member of the social 
framework and therefore partly responsible for the nature of that 
framework. 
In "Maximal Ethics in Counselor Education," Engles (1981) calls for 
committed professional action to insure that counselor values are con¬ 
sistent with client and social needs. Engles addresses the need for 
more value-conscious counselors by advocating a direct and significant 
incorporation of ethics study into counselor education. He cites model¬ 
ing, active discussion, and didactic education as methods of infusing 
ethics and values into counselor behavior. 
Few would disagree with Engles' assertion that ethics should be an 
integral and important part of a counselor education program. Yet 
today, injecting ethics per se into counselor education may not be 
sufficient to clarify the responsibilities of counselors. Recent appli 
cations of theoretical models of influence to applied psychology have 
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uncovered the tremendous potential for influence inherent in the coun¬ 
seling relationship. Much of this research is brought together in an 
article titled, "How Counselors InfIuence CIients", (Senour, 1982). 
This article reviews studies that document counselor influence as a 
function of role, exchange, imitation and attribution theories. Senour 
concludes that counselor influence is very powerful and must be ex¬ 
plained in terms that are larger than those describing professionally 
defined ethical behavior. To Senour, this potential influence in 
counseling relationships requires that counselors personally explore 
their own values, morals, and inner selves. She claims that the real 
issue is not that influence is present and should be externally molded, 
but that counselors should strive to influence their clients in ways 
that are authentic, are personally defensible, and result from serious 
personal introspection. 
These three writers see the influence of personal values in 
counseling from three different points of view. Ivey sees this 
influence as a social concern of counselors and calls for social action. 
Engles sees it primarily as a professional issue. His remedy is to 
circumscribe influence by professional ethics. Senour sees the 
influence of personal values as a personal issue requiring a personal 
response. Clearly, differences in emphasis, goals, and probably defini¬ 
tions exist here. Yet, the immediacy expressed by these writers 
indicates that the issue of counselor values and their impact on 
counselor behavior is a current and important topic requiring meaningful 
discussion. 
Interest in the interface of values and behavior in applied 
psychology is not new. The question was prominently raised as far back 
as the Skinner/Rogers dialogues of 1956 when the ethics of "imposing 
general values in therapy" were attacked and defended. Since that time 
the values issue has come and gone and come again. A truly comprehen¬ 
sive work was published in 1964 by London. This book, The Modes and 
Morals of Psychotherapy, analyzes the theory as well as the techniques 
of several major schools of psychotherapy as a function of therapist, 
institutional and social values. Much like the three recent articles 
mentioned above, London outlines his views dispassionately. 
Another scholarly classic treating the values and counseling link 
is a 1976 work by C. Marshall Lowe. This book, Value Orientations in 
Counseling and Psychotherapy, systematically documents the philosphical 
framework from which various major schools of applied psychology spring 
The text neither takes a position nor makes a claim for the adequacy of 
any single methodology; rather, it limits itself to a complete, 
dispassionate analysis of the value basis of counseling. 
Yet, this is not the only way that writers express their views of 
values and counseling. In addition to a variety of calls for more 
general awareness of the influence of values in counseling as Ivey, 
Engles, Senour, London, and Loew have made, an increasing number of 
writers has moved from the theoretical explication of the values in 
therapy issue and have begun to advocate clear personal values as an 
integral part of the counseling process. 
Many examples of this advocacy exist. They range from very expan 
sive to very specific values. Some are generally accepted in the coun 
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seling profession, and others are con+roversia I. Two that have become 
so accepted that they require little discussion can serve as examples of 
the hidden yet powerful effect of counselor values on counselor behavior 
in counseling situations. These are the values addressing the aims of 
Liberal Humanism and the values addressing the need for the eradication 
of sexism and racism. 
The first of these is perhaps the most durable; the notion of 
humanism has been a consideration in the counseling profession since its 
inception. Today, calls for counselor commitment to humanism are no 
less visible than formerly, but today they are made with a new sense of 
urgency. Current and recent exponents cal I for a renewed avowal of 
humanistic principles and dedication to action grounded in humanism. 
These writers claim that a commitment to humanistic principles rather 
than the previously sanctioned neutrality to all such value stands is 
absolutely required in today's world. They do this not only because of 
the claimed inherent morality of humanism, but also because humanism 
appears to them to be the only basis for actions that can insure the 
survival of mankind (Carkhuff, 1972; Hosford and Zimmer, 1972). 
Racial and sexual attitudes are also singled out as critical oppor¬ 
tunities for counselor commitment (Kincaid, 1969; Banks, 1972; Sue, 
1977). As with humanism, neutrality to racial and sexual discrimina¬ 
tion, many believe, perpetrates these social ills (Pietrofsa and 
Carlson, 1973). Counselors are exhorted to avoid this neutrality and to 
employ counseling interventions designed to eradicate racism and sexism 
in their clients. Again, as with instilling humanistic values, an 
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urgency pervades their thinking. Yet the message is clear. Counselor 
advocacy of harmony among the races and between the sexes is an 
appropriate and necessary activity in counseling. 
These and other writers challenge counselors and counselor educa¬ 
tors to investigate the essential elements of the values issue in coun¬ 
seling and to erase once and for all the lingering notion of "value 
freedom" in the practice of counseling. This challenge, in short, is an 
advocacy of the exact opposite of "value freedom." These writers 
challenge counselors to be personally committed to authentic values and 
to express those values in their behavior as counselors. 
As sentiments applauding committed, principled action in counseling 
appear with greater frequency, it becomes clear that counselor education 
must play a part in maintaining its goal of producing effective 
counselors who are equipped with the skills and attitudes necessary to 
reach professional excellence. If advocating authentic values and their 
consequent action is one of these goals, then counselor education should 
be prepared to reach it. 
The examples above of the call to counselors to values advocacy are 
only the beginning of a long list of advocacy demands made on the 
professional counselor. Issues that attract partisan support abound in 
the world today. Many of these issues trouble clients enough for them 
to seek the help of counselors. For example, in one's personal life, 
abortion, sexual preference, euthanasia, and other topics are heavily 
laden with values. Similarly, in our social lives, overpopulation, 
pollution and the threat of nuclear war require a clear understanding of 
the values involved. Often, these issues and their associated values 
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are integral parts of the therapy interaction. 
We know for sure that in professional work the counselor influences 
the client. Yet we do not know with any surety how that influence is 
affected by the counselor's basic value positions. Could it be that 
counselors, when required to address these value-laden issues profes¬ 
sionally, are not aware of their own value positions and of the impact 
that these positions have on their counseling behavior and thereby on 
the client? Taken one step further, we do not know how that influence 
is affected by the counselor's basic way of approaching these highly 
charged values issues. Put into the fundamental context and basic terms 
of this study, we do not know the impact on counselor behavior of that 
practitioner's preferred style of moral judgment. 
As the "advocacy" discussion above implies, many have skipped this 
first step. Even the foremost exponent of moral judgment research, 
Lawrence Kohlberg, has not addressed this question. His two entries 
into the area of moral development in counseling (Kohlberg, 1975a; 
Kohlberg & Wasserman, 1980) have advocated moral development as a 
professional activity of counselors but have failed to address the moral 
development of the counselor as a person or as a professional. 
From this omission it appears prudent for research in that area to 
begin by backing up one step. Surely, moral values considerations are a 
legitimate part of counselor activity. Now it is important to begin at 
the real beginning: the moral judgment of the counselor and the behav¬ 
ioral effects and implications of his capabilities. The research 
reported in this thesis could be that beginning. 
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Measuring Moral Development and Counselor Behavior 
Moral judgment is a current topic in psychology. The area of 
investigation, though ignored for many years, now is heavily researched. 
For the last 15 years that research has been dominated by the cognitive 
developmental moral judgment approach developed by Kohlberg and others 
of the so-called "Harvard" and "Minnesota" groups. 
Counselor behavior has similarly been extensively studied. Promi¬ 
nent among researchers in this area are those who have analyzed the 
complex activity of counseling by looking at its component parts. In 
this study, microcounseling, the current front-runner among these 
attempts, will be employed as a means of defining and describing coun- 
se I or-tra i nee behavior. 
The goals of this study of moral judgment and counselor trainee 
behavior will be achieved through an analysis of data gathered using 
objective, valid, and reliable measurement instruments. Although 
complex in their development, these instruments are operationally 
straightforward. Each instrument possesses the following positive 
characteristics: 
1. Each al lows a complete analysis of one of the two variables 
within the theoretical framework of moral judgment or counselor 
behavior. 
2. Each has quantifiable results allowing for defensible 
statistical manipulation of data. 
3. Each has been widely field-tested and has shown both 
reliability and validity. 
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4. Each allows standardized administration and ease of repli¬ 
cation. 
The performance of the counselor trainers who are the subjects of 
this study is examined by an analysis of counseling skills usage as 
measured by Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills developed by Allen 
Ivey (1971). This taxonomy of counselor skills is the result of 
research efforts aimed at examining the complex activity known as 
"effective counseling" (Ivey, 1971, Ivey and Authier, 1978). In these 
works, "effective counseling" has been analyzed so as to determine the 
component and essential skills involved. The skills employed in this 
study are the six (6) "attending skills" and the five (5) "influencing 
ski I Is." 
The attending skills are: 
1. Closed questions 4. Paraphrases 
2. Open questions 5. Reflections of feeling 
3. Minimal Encourages 6. Summaries 
The infl 1uencing skills are: 
1 . Se1f-disclosure 4. Expressions of feeling 
2. Directions 5. 1nterpretations 
3. Expressions of Content 
Additional dimensions of effectiveness used in this study are: 
1. The focus of the above skills , (Ivey and Authier, 1978) 
2. An independent measure of overall quality developed for this 
study: The Quality Score. 
For additional analysis, sex, age, and counseling experience levels of 
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the subjects are considered. 
Although both microskills and moral judgments each have been exten¬ 
sively researched, there are no known data relating the two classifica¬ 
tion systems. Research focusing on microskills has covered a wide 
spectrum, ranging from the original identification of the basic skills 
of "helpers," (Ivey, Normington, Miller, Morrill & Haase, 1968) to the 
development of novel applications of the taxonomy and training modality 
such as social skills training for psychiatric patients (Donk, 1972). 
Yet the body of research is lacking in the area examining the relation¬ 
ship between microskills usage and cognitive and or personality 
variables (Ivey, 1971; Ivey & Authier, 1978). 
The concept of moral judgment used in this study originates in the 
work of Kohl berg (1958, 1969, 1976) who has defined and refined the 
three levels and six moral judgment stages found in all subject 
popuI at ions. 
These levels and stages are as follows: 
Level 1. The preconventional level: The good is what I like and 
want. 
Stage 1. The punishment and obedience level: Good is rewarded, bad 
is punished. 
Stage 2. The instrumental, relativist orientation: Good is equated 
with fair give-and-take. 
Level 2. The Conventional level: One is actively loyal to one's 
social order. 
Staqe 3. The interpersonal concordance or "good boy" - "nice girl" 
orientation: I do what family and society expect of me in 
order to be good. 
Stage 4. Law and order: Good is defined as adherence to the fixed 
rules and laws of society. 
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Level 3. The postconventionaI autonomous or principles level. 
Stage 5. The social contract, legalistic orientation: The good 
(right) is what is constitutionally and democratically 
agreed on. Agreed upon external principles define the good. 
Stage 6. The Universal Ethical Principle Orientation. The right is 
defined by appeal to accepted and self-chosen ethical prin¬ 
ciples characterized by universality and consistency. 
The definition of moral judgment that originates in the above research 
and the definition used in this study is the following: 
The style of developmental moral judgment that a counselor 
trainee chooses to employ when making hypothetical moral 
choices from among issues of justice. 
In this study linking moral judgment with counselor trainee behavior, 
counselor trainee moral judgment is quantified and fixed within the 
empirically established parameters established by Kohlberg. This is be 
done using the survey instrument devised by James Rest; (1964), the 
Defining Issues Test. 
Research in moral judgment has been wide. It has included the 
general developmental theories of both John Dewey and Jean Piaget and 
specific work of Kohlberg (1958, 1969, 1971) and Rest (1974, 1976, 
1979). Yet like the microskills work, this body of literature has also 
been found lacking in a key area: in this case, the relationship of 
moral judgment to behavior (Rest, 1979). By relating moral judgment 
level and microskills usage among counselor trainees, this study might 
begin to remedy gaps in these two bodies of Iiterature. 
To accomplish this and to test the general premise as stated above, 
seven (7) specific research questions have been formulated that utilize 
the technologies mentioned above. These, expressed as null hypotheses, 
are the follow ing: 
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Hypothesis 1. There is no significant difference in the number of 
different microski Ms used by counselors who have scored higher or lower 
on the Defining Issues Test. 
Hypothesis 2. There is no significant difference in attending 
skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
Hypothesis 3. There is no significant difference in influencing 
skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
Hypothesis 4. There is no significant difference in the use of the 
focus dimension between counselors who have scored higher or lower on 
the Defining Issues Test. 
Hypothesis 5. There is no significant difference in specific 
microskills usage between those who have scored higher or lower on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
Hypothesis 6. There is no significant difference in overall 
quality of counseling between counselors who have scored higher or lower 
on the Defining Issues Test. 
Hypothesis 7. There are no significant sex differences or age 
differences or level of counseling experience difference between 
counselors who have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test. 
The next chapter, Chapter II, reviews the literature treating the 
theoretical and research aspects of the moral judgment approach and the 
Microski Ms Taxonomy employed in this study. That chapter includes: 
first, a summary of the historical development of the moral judgment 
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approach used in this study; second, a complete description of that 
approach as described by Kohlberg; and third, a review of the Iiterature 
surrounding the Defining Issues Test, an instrument that incorporates 
Kohl bergian principles and provides this study with a method of 
investigating counselor trainee moral judgment. Following these 
sections on moral judgment are descriptions of the theory and research 
attendant to the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. A final 
section ties these two bodies of literature together. 
Chapter III describes the research questions addressed in this 
study and the experimental methods and procedures followed to address 
those questions. Chapter IV outlines results and Chapter V discusses 
implications and limitations of the present study and considers 
suggestions for future research in this area of counselor moral judgment 
and counselor behavior. The final chapter provides a summary of the 
entire study. 
C H A P T £ R II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
1ntroduction 
This review of the literature in the two areas of cognitive devel¬ 
opmental moral judgment and the microcounseling methodology of describ¬ 
ing counselor behavior takes two broad views. The first of these looks 
at the literature describing cognitive developmental moral judgment as a 
theoretically sound, valid, and researchable concept in theoretical and 
applied psychology. This view encompasses three parts: 
1. An historical summary of developmental modes of moral judgment. 
2. A description of Kohlberg's developmental approach to cognitive 
moral judgment. 
3. A description of the Defining Issues Test, the instrument used 
in this study to quantify counselor trainee moral judgment. 
Each of these three parts includes several sections and subsections that 
amplify the topic addressed. 
The second broad view in this review looks at the Microskills 
Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. This view shows that the instrument 
is theoretically sound, valid and reliable as a method of describing 
counselor behavior. This part includes six sections. 
1. Introduction 
A description of methods of skills training for counselors. 
1 5 
2. 
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3. A description of the microcounseling method of counselor 
training and the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. 
4. A review of microcounseling and Microskills Taxonomy research. 
5. A summary of the four parts above. 
6. The Microskills Taxonomy as used in this study. 
A concluding statement in this review ties together these two bodies of 
research so that the goals of this study are addressed. 
Part 1 
Historical summary of developmental models of moral judgment: 
from Dewey to Kohl berg 
The modern investigation of moral thinking and moral behavior began 
in the early part of this century with the work of Dewey. Charac¬ 
teristic of research at that time, his work reached conclusions and 
findings through speculative analysis of observed phenomena in the 
naturalistic setting. Through an analysis of this type, Dewey postu¬ 
lated a framework describing the development of an individual's moral 
thinking ability and consequent behavior. This framework consisted of 
three levels of morality through which each person could pass during 
his/her lifetime. The three levels are the following (Dewey, 1964): 
1. The preconventionaI . or egocentric 
2. The conventional.or ru'es oriented 
3. The autonomous.or principled 
In the Dewey scheme of development, an individual moved from one 
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level to another as a result of experience in the world. Acquiring high 
level thinking processes and displaying consequent principled behavior 
occurred as a natural result of experiences appropriate to that thinking 
and acting. 
Other theorists chose other explanations to explain the acquisition 
of differential moral thinking abilities, for example, learning 
theorists have explained moral development in the social learning terms 
of the stimulus response paradigm. Psychoanalytic theorists account for 
it as a result of ego and superego functions. 
These and other explanations have been offered to explain moral 
thinking variance. Many theories, especially the learning and 
psychoanalytic, are still current. Yet the most successful current 
approaches to this area are those which focus, as did Dewey’s, on the 
developmental nature of moral judgment. The most influential of these 
is Jean Piaget's. 
Piaget's work adds to Dewey's speculations by incorporating a more 
methodologically defensible research model into the search for an 
explanation of the process of the development of moral thinking. This 
model included a specific interview procedure for use with children. 
The procedure consisted of questioning young children in a naturalistic 
setting (marbles playing) about what rules where required to insure 
fairness in that setting. These dialogues allowed Piaget to identify 
sequential levels and stages of moral growth. His work in moral devel¬ 
opment concentrated on children 4-13 years old (Piaget, 1965). This 
research has allowed later workers to construct the the following 
developmental structure: 
1b 
The Premoral Stage, in which there is no 
The Heteronomous Stage, where the right was 
3. From ages 8-12: The Autonomous Stage, where the purpose and 
consequence of following rules are considered and obligation is based on 
reciprocity and exchange. 
(Kohlberg, 197b, p. 177) 
The major distinction between Piaget and other investigators of 
moral thinking was that Piaget demonstrated that perception of morality 
was a cognitive function. That is, the individual’s thinking processes 
intervene between perception of a psychological event and a judgment 
about the rightness or wrongness (i.e., morality) of the event. 
Further, Piaget demonstrated that the thinking process changed 
qualitatively for an individual as that individual grew older. These 
changes account for the stages of development. 
Piaget is truly the architect of what is now called cognitive 
developmental moral reasoning theory. The structure and method outlined 
above have provided a theoretical and methodological basis on which 
others can and have built additional theoretical and applied models. 
This has been accomplished in the following ways: 
1. By defining the theoretical construct of moral reasoning and 
acknowledging it as a researchable problem area in psychology. 
2. By introducing reliable research methods with which to 
investigate this problem area. 
3. By researching this problem and uncovering highly descriptive 
information about moral reasoning. 
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Piaget's theory, method and findings have paved the way for others 
to follow. Those who have gone on with this work have used the 
Piagetian theory, methodology and data to introduce an approach to under¬ 
standing moral reasoning in both children and adults. Further, research 
in this area has made the transition from purely theoretical investi¬ 
gation to applied areas, opening up practical opportunities and thereby 
expanding both the knowledge and the questions surrounding developmental 
moral judgment. 
The person most responsible for the growth of this research in 
America is Kohlberg. His elaboration and modification of this earlier 
work has been extensive. In particular his contribution has been to add 
a tremendous bulk of research to Dewey's notion of "levels" and to 
Piaget's concept of "sequential stages" in moral development. This 
research has found agreement with the Dewey levels and has refined each 
of Piaget's three stages to describe a more extensive developmental 
framework. The complete sequence of Kohlberg's six stages is described 
below. 
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LeveI 1. 
Stage 
Stage 
Level 2. 
Stage 
Stage 
Level 3. 
Stage 
Stage 
KOHLBERG'S SIX STAGE MODEL 
The PreconventionaI level: The good is what I like 
and want. 
1. The punishment and obedience level: Good is rewarded, 
bad is punished. 
2. The instrumental, relativist orientation: Good is 
equated with fair give-and-take. 
The Conventional level: One is actively loyal to one's 
social order. 
3. The interpersonal concordance or "good boy" "nice 
girl" orientation: I do what family and society expect 
of me in order to be good. 
4. Law and Order: Good is defined as adherence to the 
fixed rules and laws of society. 
The Postconventional, autonomous or principles level. 
5. The social contract, legalistic orientation: The good 
(right) is what is constitutionally and democratically 
agreed on. Agreed upon external principles define the 
good. 
6. The Universal Ethical Principle Orientation. The 
right is defined by appeal to accepted and self-chosen 
ethical principles characterized by universality and 
consistency. 
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These characteristics are basic to Piagetian theory and the Kohlbergian 
approach to cognitive developmental moral judgment and will be explained 
further in Part 2. 
Summary of the history of developmental explanations of moral reasoning. 
The present approach to developmental moral reasoning has its roots 
in the work of Dewey and, to a much larger extent, in that of Piaget. 
Consequently, present research in moral reasoning is dominated by 
cognitive explanations of how people acquire knowledge about right and 
wrong. This nearly exclusive emphasis on thinking capacity has 
surpassed the psychodynamic and operant conditioning models of applied 
epistemology. 
Additionally, Kohlberg's research efforts have yielded the 
following characteristics of the concept of "stage" in cognitive moral 
deveIopment: 
1. The stages are "structural wholes." That is, individuals are 
consistent in moral judgments and have the option to apply judgments at 
their highest level in all areas of their lives. 
2. Movement along stages is always (except with trauma) forward 
and adheres to the sequence without skipping any stages. 
3. Stages are "hierarchical integrations." That is, one stage 
includes the others that precede it. Additionally, individuals prefer 
to function at the highest level that they can understand. 
Kohlberg is today the acknowledged leader among cognitive psychologists. 
His developmental model with its stages of development has been highly 
22 
researched, widely promulgated, and considerably controversial. His 
theoretical perspective on moral judgment, in general, and his approach 
to cognitive developmental moral judgment, in particular, form the basis 
for the research on moral judgment and counseling behavior treated in 
this study. 
The following five sections of this review look at Kohlberg's 
approach to cognitive developmental moral judgment. First, the theory 
is described. Second, key concepts of that theory are analyzed. Third 
studies done to demonstrate those concepts that are reviewed. Fourth, 
criticism of the theory and method underlying the approach is cited. 
The fifth section summarizes the other four. 
Part 2 
Kohlberg's approach to cognitive developmental moral judgment. 
Section 1: Background of the theory and methodology. 
The Kohlbergian notions of moral judgment are thought to be a 
beginning of the second phase of research in this area. The first phase 
ended with Piaget's early, pre-1940 work. For a considerable period 
after that, interest in moral judgment (and other so-called "mental 
functions") was low. In its place were investigations of more directly 
observable concrete behaviors. Kohlberg's 1958 dissertation renewed 
interest in moral reasoning as a cognitive function with study poten¬ 
tial. His dissertation began as a replication of Piaget's 1932 work 
with marble playing behavior of children. In his study, Kohlberg used a 
different data gathering system and subjects who were older than 
Piaget's. 
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Piaget's technique for gathering data involves questioning young 
children in the naturalistic setting about what rules were required to 
insure fairness in that setting. Kohlberg modified this approach by 
presenting his (older) subjects with a hypothetical story or vignette in 
which a moral dilemma was clearly described. After the subject read the 
dilemma he/she was asked to say what should be done and why. The 
questions were designed to lead to an interview and dialogue format of 
interaction. In this way, each subject could exhibit a pattern of 
responses that when codified would reveal a favored style of judgment 
about questions of morality. Two of Kohlberg's dilemmas are as follows: 
Heinz and the Drug Dilemma 
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of 
cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might 
save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same 
town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, 
but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him 
to make. He paid $200 for radium and charged $2,000 for a 
small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went 
to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could get 
together only about $1,000, which was half of what it cost. He 
told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to 
sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, 
"No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from 
it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to 
steal the drug for his wife. Should Heinz have done that? 
Was it wrong or right? Why? 
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The Captain's Dilemma 
In Korea, a company of Marines was way outnumbered and was 
retreating before the enemy. The company had crossed a bridge 
over a river, but the enemy were mostly still on the other 
side. If someone went back to the bridge and blew it up as 
the enemy were coming over it, it would weaken the enemy. 
With the head start the rest of the men in the company would 
have, they would probably not escape alive; there 
would be about a 4-to-1 chance he would be killed. The 
captain of the company had to decide who should go back and do 
the job. The captain himself knew best how to 
lead the retreat. He asked for volunteers, but no one 
volunteered. If he went himself, the men world probably not get 
back safely, for he was the only one who knew how to lead the 
retreat. Should the captain order a man to go on this very 
dangerous mission or should he go himself? The captain final¬ 
ly decided to order one of the men to stay behind. One of the 
men he thought of was one who had a lot of strength and 
courage; but he was a bad troublemaker. He was always steal¬ 
ing things from the other men, beating them up, and shirking 
his work. The second man he thought of had gotten a bad 
disease in Korea and was likely to die in a short time anyway, 
though he was strong enough to do the job. Should the captain 
have sent the troublemaker or the sick man? Why? 
(Rest, 1979, p.8) 
Kohlberg's findings were an expansion of Piaget's ear Iier work. As 
was stated earlier, six stages emerged from the dialogues replacing the 
three stages revealed through Piaget's interrogative methods. Further, 
information generated through Kohlberg's dialogic technique concerned, 
a. how rules are known and shared, and (b) the central concepts of 
This information is determining moral rights and responsibilities, 
presented below. 
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Stages of Moral Judgment 
Stage 
How Rules are known & shared Central concept of determining 
moral rights and responsibilities 
Stage 1 The caretaker makes known certain 
demands on the child's behavior. 
The morality of obedience: "Do 
what you're told." 
Stage 2 Although each person is under¬ 
stood to have his own interests, 
an exchange of favors might be 
mutually decided. 
The morality of instrumental 
egoism and simple exchange: 
"Let's make a deal." 
Stage 3 Through reciprocal role taking, 
individuals attain a mutual 
understanding about each other 
and the on-going pattern of 
their interactions. 
The morality of interpersonal 
concordance: "Be considerate, 
nice, and kind, and you'll get 
along with people." 
Stage 4 Al1 members of society know what 
is expected of them through 
public institutionalized law. 
The morality of law and duty to 
the social order: "Everyone in 
society is obligated and protec¬ 
ted by the law." 
Stage 5 Formal procedures are institu¬ 
tionalized for making laws, 
which one anticipates rationale 
people would accept. 
The morality of societal concen¬ 
sus: "You are obligated by what¬ 
ever arrangements are agreed to 
by due process procedures." 
Stage 6 The logical requirements of non- 
arbitrary cooperation among 
rational, equal, and impartial 
people are taken as ideal cri¬ 
teria for social behavior that 
rational people would accept. 
The morality of non-arbitrary 
social cooperation: "How rationale 
and impartial people would organ¬ 
ize cooperation is moral." 
(Adapted from Rest, 1979, pp. 22-23) 
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As will be pointed out throughout the following sections on the 
Kohl berg i an approach, some of the theory and much of the methodology are 
in dispute. Information on the approach is presented in detail here 
because it forms the foundation for another second phase effort. This 
research, done by Rest and the so-called Minnesota group, counters much 
of the criticism leveled at Kohlberg in ways that require a thorough 
understanding of key theoretical concepts. The next section will 
present these key concepts. 
Section 2: Key Concepts in the theory of cognitive moral judgment 
I ntroduction. Because Kohl berg's approach to moral judgment 
generates from Piaget's early work, it necessarily includes several 
complex methodological considerations. Many of these are beyond the 
scope of this study. Yet for the purposes of this study, one central 
methodological issue should be kept in mind: That moral judgment as 
defined in the Kohlberg approach applies only to concepts of justice or 
fairness in interpersonal interactions. Taking this delimitation into 
account eases confusion that might occur if morality and morals in 
general were to be considered. An additional issue concerning "what is 
to be measured" also must be addressed. 
The question of what is to be measured. In the Kohl berg i an stage 
concept of moral development, a critical point of departure exists 
between it and other theories that seek to explain moral development 
through an analysis of reported or actual behavior. That point of 
departure is the emphasis on qualitative rather than quantitative 
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descriptions of behavior. For example, Kohlberg contrasts this approach 
with behavioral and psychometric views on this dimension and finds a 
fundamental difference. He finds that where the latter views people as 
an aggregate of quantifiable traits, actions or behavioral bits, the 
former chooses to measure the qualitatively different patterns and 
organizational forms employed by the individual under study (Kohlberg, 
1969). In short, the Kohl bergian cognitive developmental approach looks 
at what is being done or reported and is not concerned with tallies or 
the quantifiable amplitude of that action on those reports. 
Essential characteristics of stages of moral development. Earlier 
in this review, three characteristics of the stages of moral development 
were listed. These were first reported by Piaget (1965), and later 
Kohlberg (1958) integrated them into the cognitive developmental moral 
judgment appraoch. These three characteristics are central to an under¬ 
standing of the "stage theory" as postulated by Kohlberg and will be 
explained in detail here. They are important because they are necessary 
conditions to an acceptance of stage and developmental theory as it is 
expressed by Kohlberg. This is so because each of these characteristics 
are conditions that must be met before any exhibited pattern of 
individual behavior is called developmentaI Iy different from another 
pattern of that individual's behavior. That is, before a person can be 
said to have achieved any specific stage of moral development, the 
concepts of morality at that stage must meet the following three tests. 
(1) The stage is a "structural whole." That is, individuals are 
consistent in moral judgments and have the option to apply judgments at 
their highest levels in all areas of their life. 
This test of the stage concept essentially says that individuals 
can be stage typed, that is, that an individual will invariably use the 
same moral arguments in any and all moral choice he/she is required to 
make. Further, it states that the moral arguments will be the highest 
level of arguments of which the individual is capable. These arguments 
become the characteristic moral reasoning style of the individual and 
allow for stage typing. 
Stage typing does not necessarily mean that individuals will always 
behave as a function of one moral reasoning style. Clearly, situational 
factors can militate against a congruence between moral reasoning and 
moral acting. Yet, Kohlberg maintains that the individual will 
understand moral arguments at that stage and have the option for 
behavior that results from that set of moral arguments. Whether this 
option is exercised as an individual's choice is poorly researched in 
the Kohlberg literature. This topic is treated again in several places. 
In particular it is mentioned again when critical differences between 
the Kohlberg formulation of moral judgment and the Rest formulation are 
explained. The latter of these is the formulation central to the 
present research. 
The structura I wholes concept was originally a theoretical 
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conclusion. Experimentation has not consistently borne out this 
theoretical conclusion (Rest, 1979). In effect, stages have not been 
verified as defined by Kohlberg. Consequently, the notion of stage 
typing is called into question, and there is a good deal of controversy 
over whether stages as discrete steps in a developmental process 
actually exist. Recourse to Piaget is of Iittle help. For although his 
theoretical conclusions clearly indicate levels of development (both 
logical and moral), his early work voids embracing a stage model of 
development. Later work by Piaget (1960) accepts the stage concept more 
firmly. Yet, little evidence has been shown to support it. Never¬ 
theless, Kohlberg has accepted this notion of stage and consequent stage 
typing. As a result, he has been criticized for building on a weak 
foundation. This issue is treated in greater detail in later sections 
that describe the literature on the Kohlberg approach and instrumen¬ 
tation for this study. For the purposes of this discussion of the 
structural wholes criterion, "stages," although seen by Kohlberg as 
discrete steps along a linear developmental path (sometimes called 
"simple stages"), can also be seen as a continuous progression. 
Kohlberg's adherence to the former view has earned him 
methodological and theoretical criticism. Further it should be kept in 
mind that the structural wholes controversy applies just to the 
question of whether an individual applies only his/her highest level of 
development, not to whether or not the acquisition of higher levels of 
cognitive or moral judgment is developmental per se. The next two key 
concepts of the theory address this developmental issue and allow for a 
more indeterminate definition of "stage." 
(2) Movement along stages is always (except with trauma or error) 
forward and adheres to the sequence without skipping any stages. 
This criterion of the stage concept refers to the invariant 
sequencing of stages. Kohlberg claims that only "obvious errors in 
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observation or ... dramatic regression inducing stress or damage" 
(KohI berg, 197b, p .39) can account for any divergence from the 
invariant forward stage movement. Reasons for this are also found in 
the theoretical conclusions associated with the Piagetian concepts of 
concrete and formal operations. In that scheme, once fully developed, 
the latter supersedes the former in function and automatically becomes 
the cognitive organization of choice. That is, the person who can think 
abstractly will choose abstract thought over concrete thought in situa¬ 
tions that allow abstract thought. Kohlberg (1969) and Kohlberg (1976) 
have demonstrated that moral development occurs with the same invariant 
sequencing. For example, if a person has the cognitive ability to judge 
moral questions by appealing to democratic principles (Stage 5), he/she 
will not be able consistently to return to a "me-first" (or Stage 2) 
mode of moral judgment. 
Demonstration of this notion of invariant sequencing in the 
Kohlbergian approach is accomplished using longitudinal studies. These 
will be reviewed later. 
(3) Stages are "hierarchicaI integrations." That is, one stage 
includes the others that precede it. Additionally, individuals function 
at the highest stage that they can understand. 
This key concept in the cognitive developmental moral judgment 
approach follows directly from the last. It treats both the method of 
change from one level to another and the individual's preferred level of 
operation. The general notion of change involves the following. An 
individual will experience change or moral development movement when a 
novel experience establishes a disequilibrium within his/her existing 
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cognitive moral judgment structure. Since a natural tendency toward 
equilibrium is believed to exist in all individuals (Piaget, 19bb), the 
novel experience must be dealt with in order to achieve that equili¬ 
brium. And since some stage is already operational, the individual must 
employ that stage to bring about new patterns of thought. The old stage 
or pattern of thinking will be re-worked to reduce the disequilibrium 
until a new equilibrium is reached. The result will be a new cognitive 
structure that includes and reintegrates the old structure (Rest, 1979, 
p. 219). 
Preferred usage at the higher level of understanding logically 
follows these other concepts. The cognitive developmental moral judg¬ 
ment approach claims that the equilibrium reached through restructuring 
a previously operational stage would be undermined by the use of argu¬ 
ments at any lower stage. This would generate disequilibrium. Conse¬ 
quently, the moral judgment that an individual uses is that which is the 
most adequate for maintaining cognitive equilibrium, the judgment that 
reflects the highest level or developmental stage understood by that 
individual (Kohlberg, 1969). 
Summary 
The Kohlberg approach to cognitive developmental moral judgment 
freely adopts the cognitive developmental model put forth by Piaget. 
Central to that model are the notions of stage, sequence and consequent 
development. The Kohlberg approach advances Piaget's earlier work 
because it incorporates a more flexible and more objective data 
gathering system. Since this more usable system is appropriate for 
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people of all ages and from all backgrounds, the opportunity to generate 
large amounts of potentially new data is advanced. This has been the 
case. Kohlberg's six-stage moral judgment model is generally accepted 
as the most adequate model to describe the nature of the development of 
the individual’s concept of fairness or justice. 
Three key theoretical concepts have been advanced. Acknowledgment 
of these concepts was demonstrated to be a prerequisite to an acceptance 
of the moral development approach. These three concepts are the notions 
of structural wholes, invariant sequencing, and hierarchical 
integrations. They were introduced and described briefly. Finally 
equilibrium maintenance was advanced as the stimulus that accounts for 
the dynamics of moral growth. 
The intention in these sections has been to describe the development 
and present status of the Kohl bergian approach as an enhancement and 
enrichment of Piaget's empirical and theoretical findings in the area of 
cognitive and moral development. Kohlberg's approach has been useful to 
scholars by providing a defensible, researchable framework in which to 
investigate an ever-widening spectrum of research areas. Those inter¬ 
ested in more detailed explanations of the concepts outlined here can 
find complete, primary source, theoretical, and empirical descriptions in 
Piaget's 196b and 1960 works, in Kohlberg's 1968 thesis, and in Rest's 
1979 pub Iication. 
Section 3: Review of recent literature on the cognitive developmental 
approach to moral judgment 
Introduction. The Kohlbergian approach to cognitive developmental 
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moral judgment began with his 1938 dissertation. Since that time it has 
enjoyed continued growth and expansion. Many of studies have investi¬ 
gated moral judgment using variants, adaptations, and direct 
applications of Kohlberg's cognitive developmental model. Many of these 
studies have addressed the cognitive developmental moral judgment link 
with some other aspect of psychology or sociology. Some of these 
aspects are: socialization (Kohlberg, 1969), prisoners (Kohlberg, 
Hickey, & Scharf, 1972), capital punishment (Kohlberg & Elfenbein, 
1975), and most notably, studies of moral education. Much of this and 
other research have either primarily or secondarily sought to gain 
descriptive and normative data, while at the same time attempting to 
validate or demonstrate basic components of the theoretical model. 
Another large segment of this body of literature has been critical 
and, although sporadic, it has generated an acrimonious debate among 
moral judgment scholars. The degree of passion shown and the defensive 
attitudes clearly exhibited are unusual in scholarly debate. An example 
is an exchange in the "Letters to the Editor" column in the 
Personnel and Guidance Journal. In that journal (December 1981), 
Hogan, a leading personality theorist, declared that interest in 
Kohlberg's work indicates that "we may be indeed nearing the end of 
science and beginning the long slide back into witchcraft and totenism. 
His remarks were countered in a subsequent issue (March 1982) by one of 
the most influential supporters of the Kohlberg approach. James Rest 
began his reply by questioning whether or not critics of Kohlberg have 
"adequately mastered the theoretical issues involved" (p. 387). He goes 
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on to make the claim that the cognitive development approach is elegant 
scholarship. "LIJ ••• invite anyone to show another research area in 
all of personality and social development that is in a stronger position 
than the Kohlbergian morality research in terms of power of findings, 
replication by different researchers on different samples, tr i anguI at ion 
by many lines of evidence/theoretical richness and elaboration and 
practicaI im pIicat ions and applications" (p. 387). He claims that over 
2000 studies have been done on Kohlberg's developmental foundation. 
The following sections look at some of these 2000 studies. 
Considered in detail are those included in the two categories men¬ 
tioned above: (a) those that seek descriptive data while attempting to 
validate methodology and basic components of the theoretical model and 
(b) those that address critiques of that methodology and theoretical 
mode I. 
Validation studies: Introduction. Cognitive developmental moral 
judgment research can be grouped into several headings that affect one 
or more basic theory concepts. Studies in these areas have been used to 
validate those theory concepts. The material below shows the research 
area paired with the theory concept that it seeks to validate. 
VaIidation of 
Research 
1. Longitudinal Studies of moral . 
judgment. 
2. Cross Cultural Studies of moral 
judgment. 
Theory Concepts 
Theoretical Concept 
 To validate stage and 
sequence concepts. 
. To validate cl aim of 
uni versa Iity of moral 
deveIopment. 
3b 
3. Intervention Studies to effect . To validate the 
moral development change. cognitive conflict 
(equiIibration) 
concept. 
As a research area, cognitive developmental moral judgment considers 
very basic issues. The subareas of interest above are most often 
researched in an effort to validate or otherwise describe theoretical 
constructs. Others exist, but it is well beyond the scope of the 
present study to report on all of these. The three above are included 
because they provide the data which have been used as a foundation for 
the three most important theoretical constructs: the notions of stage, 
universal invariant sequencing, and developmental movement through 
conflict resolution. 
In the sections that follow, each of these subareas of the cog¬ 
nitive developmental approach to moral judgment are examined. The 
examination of each subarea will describe not only justification for 
claims made about validation of a theoretical concept but also areas of 
weakness in those claims to validity for the approach. Following the 
review of research literature is a section describing criticisms of the 
approach from methodological and theoretical perspectives. The final 
section of this part is a statement on the Kohl berg approach that 
include a description of areas of general agreement in moral judgment 
research and an introduction to the instrument, used in this study, 
which exploits those areas of agreement while avoiding many areas of 
controversy. 
Longitudinal studies in moral judgment. Predictable change over 
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time using the same subjects has been a chief goal in research in the 
cognitive developmental approach to moral judgment. If no change over 
time can be documented, no stages or levels can be suggested. Further, 
if found, that change must be shown to reflect some predictable struc¬ 
ture common to others. If these two qualifications are not met, the 
notion of development through sequential stages cannot be accepted. 
Because longitudinal studies directly address these two analyses, these 
studies have from the beginning been a continuing part of Kohlberg's 
research on cognitive developmental moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1958; 
Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Kohlberg, 1978). These and other studies have 
satisfied Kohlberg that the six-stage model is valid. He states: "The 
claim we make is that anyone who interviewed children about moral 
dilemmas and who followed them longitudinal ly in time wou Id come to our 
six stages and no others" (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 47). 
Others are not so sure. 
Over the years the Kohl bergian research has been characterized by 
at least two distinct phases. These have corresponded with the two 
assessment techniques that the approach has generated. Reports in 
Rest (1979) indicate that five completed studies that utilized the 
early (pre-1978) assessment technique have yielded inconsistent results. 
Although the general trend in these studies is an increase in moral 
judgment level over time, reversals and contradictions appear. For 
example, Kramer (1968) shows that 42% of his subjects demonstrated 
upward movement over three years. Holstein (1972) also shows this 
upward movement (63$) with a three-year pre- and post-test interval. Yet 
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in a similar study with adults, Holstein (1976) was able to show only 
29* upward movement during the same three-year interval. This inconsis¬ 
tency is common with longitudinal studies done using the pre-1978 
assessment technique. These data are summarized in the following table: 
TABLE 1 
Upward and Downward Movement in Kohlbergian Longitudinal Studies 
Study 
1nterva1 
between 
testings 
Age of 
Subjects 
Percentage 
No. of Percentage moving 
cases moving up down 
Ratio of 
Up-to-Down 
movement 
Kramer (1968) 3 years High 24 42 17 2.5 to 1 
School 
3 years Co11ege 19 21 16 1.3 to 1 
Blatt and 1 year 12-13 10 20 60 1.0 to 3 
Koh1 berg years 
(1975) 
Holstein (1976) 3 years High 52 63 6 10.5 to 1 
School 
3 years Adults 97 29 18 1.6 to 1 
Kuhn (1976) 1/2 year 5-8 years 100 44 24 1.8 to 1 
1 year 5-8 years 50 64 10 6.4 to 1 
White, et al. 1 year 8-17 242 47 21 2.2 to 1 
(1978) years 
2 years 8-17 86 87 8 10.9 to 1 
years 
Average: 50.2 17.7 
(Adapted from Rest, 1979, p. 132) 
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Inconsistencies in these studies make their results poor evidence 
for the acceptance of the stage model of moral development. 
Consequently, taken as a group, these studies are part of the basis for 
the criticism leveled at the concepts of stage and invariant sequence 
and at the Kohl berg approach in general. Later studies (i.e., those 
using the post-1978 assessment techniques) are expected by the Harvard 
group to be more conclusive. 
The most widely publicized of these very few new studies (Colby, 
1979) has had very good results. This research has shown upward 
movement over 20 years in almost all of 58 subjects. Only 16 instances 
of backward movement occurred, compared with 133 instances of upward 
movement. Further, no subject skipped a stage. 
Backward movement in the revised conceptualization of cognitive 
developmental moral judgment assessment is considered an expected 
outcome as long as it is consistent with such movement, as demonstrated 
in similar longitudinal studies of Piagetian conservation and formal 
operations. Given this proviso, which nullifies the otherwise detracting 
effects of backward movement, this new assessment technique holds out 
the promise that longitudinal studies can yet be consistent sources of 
evidence for accepting the validity of the stage and sequence concepts. 
Cross cultural studies in moral judgment. The investigation of 
moral judgment development among different cultural groups has received 
some attention. A few such studies have been done, and like most of the 
research in moral development, these studies seek to validate one or 
more of the key theoretical concepts of the approach. In the case of 
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cross cultural studies, the universality of sequential stages is often 
addressed. Moveover, demonstration of this cultural universality of 
stage and sequence offers proof of the validity of the claim that 
cognitive moral reasoning is a free standing cognitive structure — free 
of cultural influence. Demonstration of this claim lends credence to 
the emphasis on qualitative rather than quantitative measurement 
techniques. In short, cross cultural studies can demonstrate these and 
other important concepts as they apply to the cognitive developmental 
approach to moral judgment: 
The concept of stage implies an invariant order or sequence 
of development. Cultural and environmental factors or innate 
capabilities may make one child or group of children reach a 
given step of development at a much earlier point of time than 
another child. All children, however, should still go through 
the same order of steps regardless of environmental teaching 
or lack of teaching. (Kohl berg, 1969, p. 357) 
A few available cross cultural studies corroborate this statement 
— but with qualifications. In Thailand (Blatt, 1969) and in Kenya 
(Edwards, 1977), adults were studied using Kohlberg's methodology. 
Results in each study suggest upward movement along an increasingly 
complex continuum of moral argument. Taken alone, this would indicate 
that preconventionaI, conventional, and principled moral arguments might 
be culturally universal. Yet results of these studies do not show this. 
Upward movement in these studies does generally correlate with matura¬ 
tion. Yet data suggest the higher levels (i.e., Stages 4, 5, and 6) 
were achieved only by highly educated and so-called westernized sub 
jects: for example, those who had attended colleges or universities 
(Edwards, 1977). 
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Explanations of this range from Piaget's early studies, in which he 
argues that individuals in a simple, segmented society become fixated at 
the level of heteronomous obedience (stage 1) to the notion that level 
3 moral judgment is necessary, sufficient, and therefore functional in 
such societies (Edwards, 1977). 
This limitation casts the usefulness of cross cultural studies in 
doubt as demonstrations of the Kohlbergian and Piagetian notions of 
stage, sequence, and universality. Furthermore, these studies have 
generated little conclusive evidence that which clearly demonstrates 
that the content of a culture is not a part of the development of a 
sequential stage model composed of characteristic stages. Again, part 
of the problem has been with the assessment tool. The post-1978 
technique has yet to be widely tested. Its more refined capabilities 
are expected to provide more usable information in this and other areas 
of moral judgment research. Until such time as those data are collected 
and analyzed, cross cultural studies using the Kohlberg approach 
continue to be an open subarea of inquiry in cognitive developmental 
moral judgment. 
Intervention studies. Applications of the cognitive development 
approach to educational settings have taken two directions. These are: 
(a) theory studies, which attempt to document that moral judgment 
progresses through stages along an invariant sequence that can be 
manipulated by interventions that require the resolution of cognitive 
conflict, and (b) appIied studies, which seek to demonstrate a 
deveIopmentaI Iy based intervention strategy where upward movement is the 
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primary goal. 
The first group of intervention studies is of interest here since its 
primary goal is the demonstration of theoretical concepts. The second 
group is of limited interest. Summaries of both groups are presented in 
a table at the end of this section. 
Like many areas of moral investigation, moral education suffered a 
decline in research activity from 1930-1960's. Early work consisted of 
indoctrination and didactic education and enjoyed little measurable 
success. Initial cognitive developmental research reacted against this 
and attempted to remain free from indoctrination and didactic teaching. 
This was done in part because early cognitive developmental theory 
required that all analysis and manipulation should be completely 
uncontaminated by the content of moral judgment. Elegance of design was 
thought to allow for an analysis of pure cognitive structures. 
Furthermore, this content-free research lead to an acceptance of the 
validity and the universality of the three important concepts: stages, 
sequence, and cognitive conflict as the mechanism of change. 
Many research studies have stressed this requirement of content 
freedom. These studies claim to demonstrate the validity of the three 
theoretical concepts mentioned above. Two principles are stressed in 
these studies: 
1. Genuine moral conflict (i.e., uncertainty and disagreement about 
problematic situations) is aroused. No right and wrong answers are 
provided. 
2. Modes of thought "one stage above" the subject's current 
operating stage are presented. 
In one study, Turiel (1974) was able to demonstrate that moral judgment 
change was always upward under these conditions. Moreover, the movement 
was investigated under conditions characterized by cognitive conflict. 
These findings were reached by dividing 6th graders into three groups. 
One group was exposed to adult role-players verbalizing at "one stage 
above," another at "two stages above," and a third at "one stage below." 
Posttesting of the children revealed that those who heard "one stage 
above" information significantly incorporated that stage into their own 
verbalizations. Those who heard "one stage below" arguments understood 
and rejected these. Those who heard "two stages above" arguments did 
not comprehend that level of moral reasoning. Turiel's findings tend to 
corroborate the stage and sequence concept and to begin an explanation 
of the mechanism for change: cognitive conflict resolution. Other 
studies with these goals have dealt with different populations. Primary 
school children similarly studied (Selman & Lieberman, 1975) yielded 
mixed results. Upward movement was described but "teacher effects" 
could not be separated from the design, indicating some problems with 
such research with young children. Blatt & Kohlberg's (1975) study 
produced results more consistent with theoretical expectations. Their 
design was pilot tested on a small group and later replicated with a 
variety of school age populations. As with the study by Turiel (1974), 
developmentally guided classroom discussions of dilemmas were the 
intervention technique. Appropriate control groups were included. 
Results "clearly indicate significant upward change in Exp. 1 moral 
discussion groups, compared with controls .... This upward change is 
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significant not only in comparison to the control group but to a group 
exposed to moral dilemmas but without developmentally guided moral 
discussion" (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975, p. 147). Claims of theory 
integrity are made on the basis that 
1. The developmental guidance is "one stage above" reasoning. 
2. Movement was always upward and no significant reversals 
occurred. 
3. Change occurred when dilemmas were experimentally paired with 
discussion designed to produce cognitive conflict (i.e. 
disequiIibriurn). 
(Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975, p.148) 
Turiel (1974) has had results similar to those described above. In 
his article, findings are carefully tied to the theoretical concepts. 
In particular, Turiel accounts for presumed regression of individuals 
along the moral growth continuum by investigating the assimilation 
component of stage transition. He has done this by analysis of dialogic 
material produced in the discussion of moral dilemmas. Results support 
the stage model of invariant sequential development and indicate that 
cognitive conflict accounts for moral growth. Turiel stated: 
The hypothesis that emerges is that movement from one stage to 
the next is a process of rejection and construction. Through 
an awareness of contradictions and inadequacies, the logic of 
the existing stage is reflected and a new stage is created. 
(Turiel, 1974, p. 28) 
These and other similar studies have sought to use the intervention 
procedure as a vehicle with which to demonstrate key theoretical 
concepts. That effort has produced some clear and some confounded 
results. As a general rule, those studies that strive to achieve sound 
design yield measurable and significant results (e.g., Blatt & 
Kohlberg, 1975). These results can then justifiably be applied to 
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discussions of the validity of theoretical concepts as shown. 
Section 4: Methodological and__theoretical criticisms of the Kohlh.r^n 
Since Kohl berg's early work in 1958, cognitive moral development 
research has taken several forms. The different forms are designed to 
produce data that seek to validate one or more of the various aspects of 
the theoretical framework. Longitudinal studies have addressed the 
stage and sequence concepts. Cross cultural studies have been done to 
validate the claim of universality of six-stage moral development. 
Intervention studies have been done to help define the mechanism that 
accounts for moral change, and research looking at correlations of 
behavior and moral judgment has begun the accumulation of a data base to 
be used in future investigations and applications. Many of these 
studies have been done, and many make claims to clear-cut and positive 
results. Yet, as was mentioned above, these studies and consequently the 
entire approach have not been without detractors. In some very basic 
ways, the approach has been criticized. 
Kurtines and Grief (1974) continue to be the authoritative negative 
reviewers of the Kohlberg approach. Because their article is 
acknowledged by proponents and detractors alike as a nearly complete 
review of the then current articles critical of the Kohlbergian 
approach, and because it is still nearly universally cited in critiques 
and defenses of the approach, it will be treated here in some detail. 
Kurtines and Grief cite what they consider to be serious 
methodological and theoretical flaws in the cognitive developmental 
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approach to moral judgment. They make both general and specific 
criticisms. First, they criticize Kohl berg's scaled moral judgment, 
saying that his dissertation is non-standardized and variable, that 
scoring is overly complex, and that the entire instrument is highly 
subjective. Furthermore, they say that since the characters in the 
stimulus dilemmas are all male, sex-role expectations may confound 
results (pp. 454-456). Additionally, criticisms attack the reliability, 
stability, and several forms of validity of Kohlberg's technique. 
Kurtines and Grief cite Ruma and Moser (1967), who also could find no 
validity for the middle stages. Fodor's (1972) study was also cited as 
one which has failed to discriminate stages to the degree required by 
Kohlberg's six-stage scheme. Kurtines and Grief summarize their general 
criticisms as follows: "First, while Kohlberg's stages are moderately 
effective in discriminating between unsophisticated and sophisticated 
reasoning, there seems to be no evidence that each of the six stages by 
itself has discriminant validity or predictive validity" (p. 460). 
Criticisms of Kohlberg's approach attack the invariant sequence 
concept and the stage model itself. The authors cite results of studies 
done by Kohlberg supporters, Rest (1973), and Turiel (1966) as not 
clear-cut and confounded by unaccounted for psychological effects. 
Analysis of the methodology of these experiments similarly leads 
Kurtines and Grief to the following conclusion: 
Thus, while the data do suggest that there is some shift in 
preference and comprehension ... they do not show that the 
normal course of development ... follows the six stages as 
defined by Kohlberg. 
(Kurtines and Grief, 1974,p. 466) 
The invariant sequencing of stages concept is called into question 
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by Kurtines and Grief by the introduction of the social learning school 
of moral development. Bandura and McDonald (1963) have argued that 
social influence is the chief variable that accounts for moral growth. 
Consequently, since social influence is not ordered in any preset way, 
moral development similarly would not be ordered. 
Another attack on the invariant sequencing notion derives from 
Holstein's (1972) three-year longitudinal study. Holstein could find no 
predictable movement upward but found considerable skipping of stages 
and regression. And finally, in what Rest (1979) has described as a 
"vituperative" critique, Kurtines and Grief cite the work of Hogan 
(1970), which strongly suggests personality links rather than cognitive 
links with preferred moral arguments. 
Since 1974 there have been other challenges to the cognitive 
developmental approach. Some have been theoretical; others have been 
methodological. Those that criticize the basic theory continue to be 
impressed by social learning theory, which claims that the stages of the 
approach reflect only the learned behaviors that typically occur at 
predictable ages. Those that have attacked the Kohlberg assessment 
technique have been mo I Iified by KohI berg's continuaI mod i fication of 
his methodology and his continued pursuit of data supportive of basic 
theoretical concepts. Much of the criticism that has prompted these 
modifications originated with the Kohlberg group's attempts to redefine 
its concepts in the light of new data. Furthermore, much of this 
redefinition has been prompted by the group's agreement with Kurtines 
and Grief's general criticism that the assessment methodology does not 
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reflect the theory. Kohlberg's response to these pressures and to the 
continuing controversy has been a thorough revamping of the assessment 
instrument. Development of the new assessment tool has been, in 
Kohlberg's words "very slow, only arriving at a standardized interview 
and scoring manual with acceptable reliability and validity this year" 
(In Rest, 1979, p. x). A result of this slow process of refinement of 
the assessment method has been that the emphasis of criticism shifted 
from theoretical concerns to issues surrounding the construction of the 
new instrument. Since that instrument, has only recently been 
available, little has been said so far. Certainly, critics are getting 
ready for data from this new instrument, and Kohlberg's new claims for 
its experimental adequacy will be examined in detail. 
These studies will have impact on the theory and methodology of 
cognitive developmental moral judgment. Yet they are not relevant to 
the present research. This study employs an instrument which, although 
a derivative of much of the theory and methodology of the Kohl berg 
approach, has surpassed most of the criticism leveled at that approach. 
This instrument is the Defining Issues Test developed by Rest. A 
description of its development and a review of literature generated by 
and about it constitute Part 4 of this review. 
Summary of criticisms of the Kohl bergian approach. Criticisms of 
the cognitive developmental approach to moral judgment have originated 
in several places, most notably in social learning, behavioral, and 
personality theory. These criticisms were brought together in a 1974 
appraisal of the Kohlbergian approach. This review criticizes both 
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methodological and theoretical issues. The authors cite findings and 
speculations from a variety of theorists, which call into question the 
stage model, the notion of invariant sequence, the prohibition against 
stage skipping, and regression and other key concepts in the scheme. 
The criticism in the review is strong; usefulness of the entire model is 
questioned. The response from Kohlberg and others supportive of his 
approach has been extensive. Most of the critical comments centered 
around the validity of data generated by Kohlberg's 1969 interview 
method. This factor and others have led the Kohlberg group to 
reevaluate that data gathering method. Over the last few years that 
reevaluation has been taking place, and now another instrument is ready 
for scrutiny by the research community. As this new methodology is 
used, the controversy will undoubtedly heat up again. Yet the present 
study will avoid much of this since it uses a derivative of the Kohlberg 
methodology that has been developed specifically to circumvent most of 
the criticisms leveled at that methodology. A description of this 
instrument, its development, and its method of avoiding the theoretical 
and methodological pitfalls of the Kohlbergian methodologies constitute 
Part 4. 
Section 5: Concluding statement on the supportive and critical 
literature on the Kohlbergian cognitive developmental 
approach to moral judgment 
The preceding discussions of research, which seek to validate key 
concepts of the cognitive developmental approach to moral judgment and 
to accumulate a moral judgment data base, have attempted to show that 
the area is an important and current research paradigm. No attempt has 
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been made here to establish the several important dimensions of the 
approach as fact or, for that matter, as widely accepted theory. The 
central justification for this extended discussion of moral judgment 
from the cognitive developmental perspective is that, notwithstanding 
the many problems associated with the approach, a basic agreement has 
been established among investigators of moral judgment. The following 
points are areas of this agreement: 
1. Moral judgment is measurable. 
2. Patterns of moral judgment are observable in populations. 
3. Moral judgment is associated with maturation. 
4. Moral judgment change can be effected. 
5. Moral judgment correlates with many other personality, 
behavioral, and demographic variables. 
Controversy continues to surround the Kohl berg model over questions 
of assessment, the rigid stage concept, the invariance of sequence 
notion, the highest stage usage rule, the link with Piaget's concrete 
and formal operations, sexism, subjectivism, poor scholarship, and many 
other issues. Yet throughout this continuing and often harsh 
controversy, the topic of moral judgment has resurfaced as a legitimate 
and current concern of theoretical and applied investigation in social and 
educational psychology. 
The next part of this review will be a description of an instrument 
that has relied heavily on Kohlbergian conceptualizations of moral 
judgment. The point of departure that makes this instrument and its 
consequent body of literature different from others is the scrupulous 
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and conscious effort that its developers and supporters have made to 
counter the criticisms made of the original research done by the 
Kohl berg group. In the view of those developers and supporters, these 
criticisms have been countered; and the instrument, The Defining Issues 
Test, and the data which it has generated are valid contributions to 
this second phase of cognitive developmental moral judgment research. 
PART 3 
The Defining Issues Test 
Section 1: Introduction 
The Defining Issues Test (more commonly called the DIT) is a direct 
outgrowth of Kohl berg’s and Piaget's work on a cognitive developmental 
approach to moral judgment. The previous sections describing the work 
have been preparatory to a description and elaboration of the DIT. This 
preparation is required because, although theoretical constructs of the 
DIT differ on some important points from Kohl berg's approach and from 
Piaget's original theory, the many commonalities shared by the DIT and 
that approach and theory constitute the foundation of the DIT as a sound 
psychometric instrument. The explanation of the DIT will 
highlight those aspects of the instrument leading to its use as an 
appropriate device to measure the moral judgment of counselors in this 
study of the relationship between counselor moral judgment and counselor 
behavior. 
Part 3 wi I I examine the DIT by addressing the following: 
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Section 2. A description of the Defining Issues Test (DIT) as an 
instrument designed to measure cognitive developmental moral judgment. 
Section 3. An analysis of theoretical and methodological 
differences and commonalities between Rest and Kohlberg. 
Section 4. A review of research that aims to validate the DIT as a 
measure of cognitive developmental moral judgment including an 
examination of research findings that correlate or otherwise relate DIT 
results with other psychological and behavioral variables. 
Section 2. Description of the Defining Issues Test 
The Defining Issues Test is an objectively scored paper and pencil 
measure of individual moral judgment. The test is administered in the 
following way. First the subject reads a short dilemma such as the 
"Heinz and the Drug" dilemma originally developed by Kohlberg and 
mentioned earlier in this text. This dilemma describes a situation in 
which a man’s wife is dying of cancer, and the only cure is a particular 
drug the man cannot afford. The moral question posed is: Should the 
husband steal the drug in order to save the life of his wife? After 
reading the dilemma, the subject is presented with 12 statements that 
express various considerations or questions about the right or moral 
choice. The subject's task is to decide which of these considerations 
are very important and which are not. Specifically, the subject rates 
each question on a scale of "great importance" to "no importance.' Then 
the subject is asked to rank the four most important of these ratings. 
There are six such dilemmas. A sample dilemma with its opportunities 
for ratings and rankings can be found on page 56. (The complete 
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questionnaire is found in Appendix A). 
Information about a subject's moral judgment is produced from this 
procedure because the questions reflect the six stages of the Kohlberg 
developmental hierarchy. The first statement (in the example) 
represents an argument characteristic of Stage 4 moral judgment, the 
law and order orientation. The second question derives from Level 3, 
interpersonal concordance orientation. The subject reads the 12 
questions, rating the importance of each in turn. Presumably each 
subject will attach the most importance to the questions which he/she 
understands best as appropriate to the dilemma under consideration. For 
example, the subject who reads and understands I tern 5, "What values are 
going to be the basis for governing how people act toward each other?" 
is highly advanced. This item reflects moral judgment that incorporates 
law, social contact, familial love, and self-interest. It requires that 
the subject establish a priority for these conflicting claims by 
considering basic values and principles. Less advanced subjects will 
read but not comprehend these and consequently will not rate this 
question as high as other more comprehensible items. Rest's concept 
of the instrument's measurement goals is summarized as follows: 
In short, the DIT is supposed to work as a developmental 
measure of moral judgment by the dual process of comprehension 
and preference: less developed subjects don't pick the high 
stage items because they don't comprehend them; more developed 
subjects don't pick the lower stage items because they are 
viewed as too simplistic. (Adapted from Rest 1979, p.93-94) 
The subject rates and ranks six such dilemmas. Information generated 
include scores reflecting usage at each of the six stages. Unlike the 
Kohlberg assessment technique, no stage is singled out as dominant or 
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exceptional. In effect, with the Rest instrument there is no stage 
typing. Raw scores indicate the number of times a subject chooses stage 
specific behavior. Percentages of these raw scores reflect relative 
preference for these stages. Aggregate scores give an indication of 
preference for principled reasoning. These aggregate scores are the 
indexes commonly used as descriptors of a subject's moral judgment in 
correlation and other studies. An explanation of the scoring mechanism 
is given in the next chapter. 
Sample Dilemma From the Defining Issues Test. 
HEINZ AND THE DRUG 
In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug 
that doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town 
had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten 
times what the drug cost to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a 
small dose of the drug. The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to bor¬ 
row the money, but he could only get together about $ 1,000, which is half of what it cost. 
He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay 
later. But the druggist said, “No, I discovered the drug and I’m going to make money from 
it." So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking into the man’s store to steal 
the drug for his wife. 
Should Heinz steal the drug? (Check one) 
_Should steal it _Can’t decide _Should not steal it 
IMPORTANCE: 
Great Much Some Little No 
1. Whether a community’s laws are going to be upheld. 
2. Isn’t it only natural for a loving husband to care so 
much for his wife that he’d steal? 
3. Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar or 
going to jail for the chance that stealing the drug 
might help? 
4. Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or has con¬ 
siderable influence with professional wrestlers. 
5. Whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this 
solely to help someone else. 
6. Whether the druggist’s rights to his invention have 
to be respected. 
7. Whether the essence of living is more encompassing 
than the termination of dying, socially and indivi¬ 
dually. 
8. What values are going to be the basis for governing 
how people act towards each other. 
9. Whether the druggist is going to be allowed to hide 
behind a worthless law which only protects the rich 
anyhow. 
10. Whether the law in this case is getting in the way 
of the most basic claim of any member of society. 
11. Whether the druggist deserves to be robbed for be¬ 
ing so greedy and cruel. 
12. Would stealing in such a case bring about more to¬ 
tal good for the whole society or not. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most important_ Second most important 
Third most important- Fourth most important 
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Sg-ction 3;_The foundation of the PIT in Kohlberq and Piaget: Key 
theoretical differences leading to the choice of the Rest 
theory and instrument in the present study. 
As mentioned above, The Defining Issues Test is a cognitive 
development oriented assessment of moral judgment. As described in the 
preceding section, it has been constructed to measure recognition and 
stated preference for moral arguments at the various stages outlined by 
Piaget and later researched by Kohlberg. It is a simple, practical, 
objectively scored recognition test of preferred moral arguments. 
Since the Rest test completely adopts the Kohlberg hierarchy of 
stages, and since the moral arguments employed in the test area, in part 
derived from Kohl berg's assessment technique, one may be tempted to 
conclude that the Rest instrument is, at best, a summary of Kohlberg's 
oral dialogic technique into a standardized and objectively scored paper 
and pencil format. Although this is true on a superficial level, 
important theoretical changes have been a part of the development of the 
DIT. These include changes in the basic concepts of stage, stage 
typing, and content versus structure and indexing (i.e., what is to be 
measured and how is it to be measured) as a determinant of moral 
development. These changes serve the dual function of simplifying the 
approach and answering many of the specific criticisms of the Kohlberg 
approach outlined earlier. 
Over the years, the Kohlberg formulation has received wide 
criticism over these issues of stage, stage typing, and 
content/structure. The following brief description of each one will 
show that modifications made to these concepts in the Rest formulation 
5b 
greatly diminish the effect of those criticisms when they are leveled at 
the corresponding concepts that underly the DIT. 
St_age and Stage Typing. To Kohl berg, each stage is a discrete step 
in developmental movement. It is always forward and an individual 
employs moral arguments characteristic of only one stage in all aspects 
of his/her life. "The stages form a clustered whole. There is a 
general factor of moral stage crosscutting all dilemmas, verbal and 
behavioral" (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 186). And furthermore, "Individuals 
should be consistently at a stage unless they are in transition to the 
next stage (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 47). Invariant sequence is also a claim 
in Kohl berg's approach. "Fifteen year longitudinal data on 50 American 
males in the age period 10-15 to 20-30 demonstrates movement is always 
forward and always step-by-step" (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 186). 
More extensive explanations of these concepts have already been 
made. Simply put, to Kohlberg, one is either in a stage, in transition, 
or in the next higher stage. There is no other option. The following 
figure depicts this: 
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FIGURE 1 
THE KOHLBERG STAGE CONCEPT IN MORAL JUDGMENT 
Graphic presentation of the Kohlberg stage model. 
(Rest, 1979, p. 52) 
Rest disagrees with what he calls the simple stage model. His 
notion of stage is far more fluid. First, he disregards claims of the 
structured wholes of stages and allows that an individual can manifest 
many patterns of thinking (i.e., stages) at any given time. His 
justification for this departure from orthodox Piagetian and Kohl bergian 
theory is as follows: 
The prevalent reaction of moral judgment research is to 
acknowledge these discrepancies, (inconsistency of stage usage 
and invariance of sequence) but to accept them as "decalage," 
"measurement error," or the sorry state of social science in 
general. An alternate response is to re-examine our basic 
developmental model and accept some complications in the model 
for the sake of a better empirical fit. 
(Rest, 1979, p. 63) 
Rest suggests the following modifications: 
1. Rather than rigidly stage typing an individual, determine 
to what extent and under what conditions... a person 
manifestLsJ the various types of organizations of thinking." 
2. Define developmental as probabilistic rather than fixed. 
That is, consider that during transitions a person's 
probability of expressing a particular pattern is an 
appropriate measure. 
3. Reject the step-by-step notion in the face of the pervasive 
stage mixture displayed by much cognitive developmental 
research. 
(Adapted from Rest, 1979, pp. 63-64) 
Once accepted, these three qualifications make for a less rigid and 
consequently wider concept of stage. A graphic representation of this 
wider stage concept follows: 
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FIGURE 2 
THE REST STAGE CONCEPT IN MORAL JUDGMENT RESEARCH 
Graphic presentation of the Rest stage model 
(Rest, 1979, p. 66) 
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On qualitative versus quantitative assessment and indexing 
A second important area of theory based difference between Rest and 
Kohl berg occurs over the question of quantitative measures versus 
qualitative measures. As pointed out earlier, Kohlberg adheres to the 
latter assessment goal. That is, he looks only at what is happening in a 
moral judgment. Rest maintains that in addition to this qualitative 
analysis, a quantitative one must simultaneously be made. This is a key 
difference, which has wide theoretical and methodological ramifications. 
For the purposes of this study, the central one of these ramifications is 
the matter of indexing moral judgment. 
Any assessment tool must first specify what is to be assessed. 
Secondly, it must specify how that chosen variable is to be measured. 
Thirdly, it must specify how the measurements are to be counted so as to 
arrive at some kind of general measure or score. Rest and Kohlberg 
essentially agree on the first two specifications. They agree that 
patterns of thinking are to be measured and that production or 
recognition of those patterns under controlled conditions is the method 
of measurement. They differ in the disposition of those measurements. 
Where Kohlberg is concerned solely with specific patterns of thinking, 
measurable along the six-stage continuum, Rest is concerned not only 
with this (the existence of stage specific patterns) but also with the 
degree of use of these stage specific patterns. In short, Kohl berg's 
emphasis on qualitative analysis, coupled with the notion that people 
can operate from only one stage at a time leads to indexing moral 
judgment by stage typing an individual. That is, a person is in one 
stage or another or in transition (see Figure 1). Rest's avoidance of 
these rules provides for an assessment which allows an individual to be, for 
instance, in one stage 40$ of the time, another 25$ of the time,and a 
third 35$ of the time. Kohlberg claims that Rest's data are confounded 
(Kohlberg, 1976) because they include quantitative measures. Rest 
claims that Kohlberg's avoidance of quantitative measures implies an 
avoidance of research data that (a) clearly show that subjects' stage 
typing varies with test/retest over short periods of time, (b). show a 
considerable lack of single stage predominance 
The preceding discussion makes it clear that the Rest formulation 
describes cognitive developmental moral judgment in a way consistent 
with both research data and an intuitive appreciation of this cognitive 
function. For this and other reasons, the Rest theoretical basis and 
instrument have been chosen over the Kohlberg theory and method as 
foundation and data gathering instrument in the present study. The next 
section serves to bolster this decision by reviewing research that 
aims to validate the DIT as an instrument measuring cognitive 
developmental moral judgment. Additionally, the next section 
includes an examination of research findings that correlate or otherwise 
relate DIT results with other psychological and behavioral variables. 
Section 4: Studies done to validate theoretical constructs of the 
defining issues test and to accumulate empirical findings 
I ntroduction. Establishing the validity of the DIT has been 
approached from several different angles. These approaches have 
attempted to demonstrate different types of validity. Yet the 
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confidence that validity studies usually claim, in the case of the L)IT, 
is somewhat lacking because the instrument purports to measure a mental 
construct rather than a directly observable phenomenon. Therefore, no 
direct validity can be demonstrated. Rather, for moral judgment, 
validity must be inferred by a wide-angled validity strategy, which 
relies on many tests to build a case for the acceptance of an instrument 
as a true measure of moral judgment. The following sections reviews the 
validity strategy applied to the Defining Issues Test by Rest, its 
originator, hat strategy includes: (a) criterion group studies, (b) 
convergence/ divergence studies, (c) longitudinal studies, and (d) 
experimentally induced change studies. This research taken as a whole 
accounts for the widely accepted validity of DIT. 
PIT validity as a function of criterion group studies 
Criterion group validation involves grouping subjects according to 
some presumed difference. For example, tests of psychopathology are 
often validated by testing institutionalized persons and persons of 
unquestioned normality. If the groups reliably divide using the test in 
question along the same lines as the original groups, the test is 
considered to be a valid measure of mental health. The first such study 
seeking to validate the DIT contrasted experts in moral judgment with 
others of lesser expertise (Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz & Anderson, 
1974). The experts were seminarians and moral philosophy and political 
science Ph.D.'s. The nonexpert groups consisted of high school and 
college students. Expected findings indicating an upward graduation of 
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moral judgment corresponding to training in moral philosophy were found 
Results are summarized in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
Student Group Averages on Stage Scores 
Student Group 2 3 
Stage 
4 5&6(P) 
Junior high 
n=40 10.7 19.0 32.6 30.3 
Senior high 
n=40 8.7 20.2 27.7 33.8 
Co 11ege 
n=40 5.0 13.4 22.9 50.4 
Seminarians 
n=25 4.2 13.9 16.0 55.5 
Moral Philosophy 
and political 
science Ph.D.s 
n=15 2.0 8.2 17.4 65.2 
(Rest, 1979, p. 109) 
The study was subjected to many statistical analyses and many sub¬ 
groupings. Results indicate that fully 38% of the moral judgment 
variance among the subject population could be accounted for by age and 
education. 
Little doubt exists that age and education levels show differential 
DIT scores. Yet, in student samples, age and education levels are each 
64 
confounded with the other. In one study with adults aged 24-74, cited 
by Rest (1979), Dortzbach (1975) found that moral judgment appears to 
decline with subject age and increase with subject education level. 
Since the age decreases can be completely accounted for by corresponding 
decreases in educational opportunities throughout the lives of these 
subjects, Dortzbach concluded that education level attained is more 
highly related to moral judgment than is age. 
Together, these two sets of studies, those examining active 
development in the school years and those examining the apparent end¬ 
point of development in adults, helped to establish the parameters of 
the variable measured by the DIT. Results also indicate that the 
variable measured by the DIT varies with education in general and with 
moral philosophical education specifically. Further, the growth of that 
variable appears to stop with the cessation of formal education. 
Studies similar to those looking at age and education have linked 
differential DIT scores to acknowledged liberal and conservative regions 
of origin. Rest (1976a, 1976b.) found the same predictable results: Lower 
DIT scores relate positively with conservative locale. Furthermore, 
Husted (1978) who Rest (1979) cites found that foreign trained (Indian) 
pediatric residents had lower DIT scores than did American trained 
pediatric residents. Similarly, Ismail (1976) found that presumably 
conservative Saudi students at an American university scored 
significantly lower than correspondingly educated and aged American 
students. These and other studies further establish the criterion group 
validity of the DIT as a measure of moral judgment. Data gathered in 
Rest's validation effort also indicates the range of moral judgment 
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among these populations and begins to define the relationships between 
moral judgment as measured by the DIT and such other variables as age, 
education, training and locale of origin. 
Convergent/divergent validity of the DIT. Validity of the UIT as a 
measure of moral judgment is enhanced when high correlations are found 
with other measures of theoretically similar variables and when low 
correlations are found with theoretically dissimilar variables. What 
the DIT then measures for the former is continuous cognitive development 
and for the latter, discrete social or individual status. This section 
will show the DIT be valid as its results converge with (a) tests of 
moral comprehension, (b) the Kohl berg assessment techniques, (c) 
validity on the DIT as a function of longitudinal studies, and (d) 
experimental measures of behavior. Validity will be strengthened by the 
demonstration of DIT results that are divergent from results of certain 
tests of attitudes and general intelligence. 
Test of moral comprehension. Alston (1971) has criticized Rest and 
Kohl berg for tapping a preference for a particular moral argument rather 
than a capacity to produce or recognize those arguments. In an effort 
to counter these criticisms—and thereby strengthen the validity of the 
DIT as an instrument that measures an individual's capacity to think in 
stage specific ways—Rest and his supporters have done studies that link 
moral judgment with cognitive comprehension. Results indicate that 
subjects who have lower moral judgment scores tend to be subjects with 
lower moral comprehension. Similarly, subjects with high moral 
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comprehension tend to have high DIT scores (Rest, 1979). Rest, et al. 
(1974) and Rest (1976a) have developed a test of moral comprehension to 
accomplish these pairings. In this test a short description of a moral 
argument is presented. Then four statements are presented that purport 
to be i nterpretations of the original moral argument. Subjects are 
asked to rank the interpretations from best to worst. Comprehension of 
the argument and the correct interpretation is either matched or not 
matched. The subject's ability to understand the argument is scored. 
Rest (1979) summarizes data from nine studies using the L)IT and the Rest 
Moral Comprehension Test. Average correlation is r=.51, suggesting 
evidence that moral judgment and moral comprehension are closely 
connected. 
A further question regarding this connection comes from Mischel and 
Mischel (1976). They also raise the preference issue and suggest that a 
study should be done asking respondents to give the "best moral 
reasoning that they are capable of generating" (p. 88). Rest (1979) 
reports on research already completed at that time, which had done just 
that. McGeorge (1975) instructed subjects to take the DIT pretending 
to be a person with no sense of justice. These subjects could decrease 
their scores from earlier nonexperimentaI administrations, but subjects 
told to take the DIT employing high principles of justice could not 
increase their scores. McGeorge concluded that moral judgment reflects 
cognitive capacity rather than simple preference for particular moral 
arguments. Empirical findings generated from these studies suggest that 
tests of moral comprehension, specialized cognitive abilities, or 
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cognitive capacity in general may have predictive value for moral 
judgment as a variable. 
Validation of the PIT as a function of its convergence with 
experimental measures of behavior. Of particular interest to the 
present study of counselor trainee moral judgment and behavior is the 
validity of the instrument, as determined by its ability to produce 
results that converge with results reached using experimental measures 
of behavior. Clearly, without some demonstrated connection between 
reported preference for moral arguments and behavior linked with those 
arguments, the measure would be very limited in this study. 
Rest approaches this complex topic with caution and outlines many 
problems that attend relating measures of moral reasoning with behavior. 
These include: 
1. The differential ability among individuaIs to perceive moraI 
precepts in a situation. 
2. The problem that some people are less rational than others and 
operate more from a conditioned response mode than from 
reflective thought. 
3. The fact that some people tend to mimic ideal arguments that 
play no role in their choice of action. 
4. The fact that some people lie about their moral judgment and 
espouse high principles while behaving according to lower 
levels of moral development. 
5. The fact that people sometimes panic under stress and cannot 
decide on actions that would have reflected their moral 
judgment level. 
6. Differences in ego strength that can account for differences in 
action among similar moral reasoners. 
7. The effect of interference from other personal values such as 
pride, greed, ambition, and loyalty. (Rest, 1979, pp. 170-180) 
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After outlining this formidable array of problems associated with 
linking moral judgment and action, Rest (1979) concludes: "It is a 
wonder that any studies have found any significant correlations between 
moral judgment and behavior." (Rest, 1979, p. 180) 
One study (Jacobs, 1977) demonstrated differential promise-keeping 
behavior as a function of moral judgment level. As theoretically 
predicted in this study, conventional subjects (i.e., those who had 
tested out as high in Stages 3 and 4) showed promise keeping behavior 
more related to the situation than was the promise keeping behavior of 
those tested as principled. Leming (1978) studied cheating and its 
relationship to DIT score and reported that DIT scores rise as 
cheating behavior decreases. The Leming study included high and low 
supervision conditions and found similar significant results in the high 
supervision condition but not significant results in the low supervision 
condition. Sheehan (1979) studied medical doctors' professional 
performance in residency programs and their DIT score. Spectacular 
findings indicate that a scrupulously fair supervisor's appraisal of 
these doctors (N=257) correlate at r=.68, p§.0001 with DIT stage scores. 
These results alone indicate that counselor performance and DIT scores, 
such as those in the present study are a highly researchable pairing. 
Yet, as indicated earlier, such positive results are rare. Rest 
(1979) reports on one early behavior study that shows some of the 
problems involved. McColgan, (1975) studied prisoners. He began with 
the expectation that criminals would demonstrate low DIT scores. Rest 
reports low confidence in results, however, because of serious design 
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flaws. These included the disproportionate number of subjects from 
disadvantaged backgrounds normally found in prisons and the unknown 
effects of incarceration itself. Separation of behavior and cognitive 
variables Rest concludes continues to be problematic. 
Rest (1979) cites an effort to achieve better results. McColgan 
(1977) found a group of predelinquent youths who had not been imprisoned 
but who still manifested significant antisocial behavior. In this 
study, DIT score was found to correlate significantly with predelin¬ 
quency as opposed to age, sex, and sociologically matched controls. A 
3-year followup of these experimental subjects was done by Marston 
(1978). Behavior ratings were obtained from assistant principals and 
the DIT was readministered. Marston found that original DIT scores 
still correlated with behavior. 
The DIT, then, had been shown to be an instrument that can 
moderately discriminate among people manifesting behaviors thought to be 
reflective of moral development. Their behaviors have included promise 
keeping, cheating, professional activity, and criminal behavior. Given 
the cautions detailed by Rest mentioned above, these results seem to 
indicate that more research can confidently be done in this area. One 
value from these further investigations may be predictions of behavior 
(e.g., counselor behavior) from DIT scores. Another may be the 
accumulation of further evidence supporting the claim that the DIT does 
in fact measure moral judgment. 
Divergence studies. In the preceding discussion the DIT was shown 
to measure a construct similar to that measured by other moral judgment 
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linked variables. The studies that have done this have demonstrated 
that the DIT does measure a cognitive construct related to moral 
judgment. But questions persist: Does the DIT yield unique 
information? Could other tests yield similar information? More 
specifically, the question arises, Is it possible that the DIT measures 
liberal social attitudes, or more basicaI Iy, general intelligence? The 
former, liberal social attitudes, is particularly important to 
proponents because it has been the basis for criticism. Rest (1979) 
cites one study (Coder, 1975), which addresses liberalism and moral 
development. In that study no clear relationship could be found between 
the two variables. The lack of a relationship prompts the conclusion 
that the DIT does not tap into the same cognitive domain that generates 
a person’s liberal or conservative attitudes. 
The link between general intelligence and moral judgment presents 
another problem. Moral development is presumed to be an aspect of 
general cognitive development. Rest's claim that the DIT measures 
something different from IQ is based on several studies. Rest's 
(1977) study of the electoral preference in the 1976 Presidential 
election provided evidence for this claim by omitting IQ. 
Election attitudes were still predictable from DIT scores. In the 
McColgan study of antisocial behavior cited earlier, results were still 
significant once IQ was factored out. Therefore, although clearly 
linked in some basic way with general cognitive ability, the DIT does 
not appear to measure that construct alone. As the Coder study has 
demonstrated, the construct measured by the DIT cannot be reduced to a 
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measure of the IiberaI/conservative continuum. The DIT, then, measures 
something that is "distinct from both but serves as a bridge between 
them" (Rest, 1979, p. 202). 
Validity of the L) IT as a function of longitudinal studies. 
Longitudinal studies provide the most direct evidence of moral judgment 
development postulated by any developmental theory. This direct 
evidence is difficult to achieve in DIT research for two reasons, One is 
practical. The other is methodological. The DIT was developed in 1972 
and has not been in general use long enough for real longitudinal 
studies to have been made. The DIT requires that subjects read the 
material. The requirement limits the lower age of subjects to 13 or 14 
years. By that year the subjects have already passed through their most 
dynamic moral growth periods. Given these limitations, few longitudinal 
studies of DIT score change have been attempted. 
Rest (1979) reports preliminary data from three testings: 1972, 
1974, and 1976. Indications are that increase in higher stage usage and 
decrease in lower stage usage occur over time. Subjects did not change 
uniformly, however. Subgroup breakdown indicates that group patterns of 
change are age related; the younger subgroups achieve more moral 
development than do the older subgroups. The following table shows that 
change over two years is significant (dark arrow), most often with the 
14-16 year old group and least often with the 18-20 year old group. 
Change occurs for the older subjects but is not significant (light 
arrows). 
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TABLE 3 
Subgroup Stage Changes Over Two Years 
Group Ages n 2 3 4 P 
Ja + b 14-16 
1 
50 1 t + ♦ ♦ 
Ja 16-18 
1 
31 1 
i 
Sa + b 17-19 
l 
38 1 
i ^ it | ♦ 
Sa 19-21 
1 
23 1 — — — — 
W 18-20 
1 
21 1 
1 
(Rest, 1979, P.129) 
These data suggest that a deceleration of moral development occurs as 
subjects mature. Reasons for this phenomenon have generated 
considerable speculation. College attendance, generational effects, 
testing effects, and sampling bias have been considered. Yet no 
definitive conclusions have been reached. Another study has also failed 
to shed light on this issue (McGeorge, 1977). In this study 
nonsignificant gains in moral development were reported. The short 
(two-year) interval and adult subjects militated against clear-cut 
results. Clearly, DIT research in longitudinal analysis requires more 
theoretical and methodological study. At this time, neither clearly valid 
nor consistent results have been achieved through this type of research. 
Careful attention to demographic data of subjects and consequent 
construction of matched groups should remedy this weakness in the body 
of research. The ease of administration, scoring, and data manipulation 
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offered by the DIT should encourage these improvements. 
Validity of the PIT as a function of studies of experimentally 
induced change in moral development; findings generated from those 
studies. Experimental studies with appropriate controls, subjects, and 
treatment conditions are of real interest for the scientific 
demonstration of validity. Experimentally induced change, or 
intervention studies using the DIT, foI lows one of a few traditional 
designs: dilemma discussion, modeling of higher stage reasoning, and 
general educational or psychological (including moral) growth. 
The most convincing evidence that change can occur as a result of 
intervention is provided by the Panowitsch (1975) study, extensively 
discussed in Rest (1979). In this study appropriate controls, follow-up 
and research design were optimized, producing significant results. 
Subjects were college students enrolled in an applied ethics class or in 
a logic class. Pretesting and posttesting of the DIT and the 
Cornell Critical Thinking Test were administered. This second test 
measures an individual's ability to think logically and clearly. 
Results indicate that the applied ethics students rose significantly in 
moral judgment but not in logical thinking ability and the logic 
students rose in logical thinking ability but not in moral judgment. 
These results are summarized in the following table. 
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TABLE 4 
Averages on Pretest and Posttest of the DIT and CCTT 
in the Ethics and Logic Class 
DIT CCTT 
Pre 
_t test 
Post Significance Pre Post 
_t test 
Significance 
Ethics class 41.6 46.5 p§.03 43.8 44.7 NS 
Logic class 40.1 40.5 NS 44.8 47.5 p§ .04 
The Panowitch study is to date the best available evidence that 
moral growth can be effected by experimental intervention. Yet these 
results are not sufficient for moral education to be clearly understood; 
important questions remain unanswered. A key question is: What are the 
natural experiences associated with moral judgment change? 
Biggs, Schomberg and Brown (1977) seek to answer 
this question. They found that college students who knew more about 
I iterary, artistic, academ i c/conceptua I, and conternporary/cu I tura I items 
scored significantly higher in principled moral judgment than did other 
students. In his own research in this area, Rest (1979) found that 
formal instruction and real life responsibilities were "important" 
significantly more often by high change subjects. These results were not 
replicated in a subsequent followup study, however. 
In the absence of "hard data" accounting for the natural or 
experimental events associated with moral judgment change, Rest (1979) 
has speculated on the following conditions of such change: 
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1. Discussion with others of moral issues. 
2. Exposure to higher level thinking. 
3. Recognition of the conflicts and inadequacies of one's patterns 
of moral thought. 
4. The assumption of the responsibility both to take care of others 
and thereby to assume their perspective or integrate it with 
one's own. 
5. The press of important life decisions. 
6. The experience of personal tragedy or of being touched by the 
tragedy of others. 
7. Broadening experiences such as travel, relocation, reading. 
8. Meeting new people who have a very different perspective. 
(Adapted from Rest, 1979, p.222) 
Clearly this list is not exhaustive. Life experiences that can account 
for moral development change probably occur in other areas of life. 
Summary of PIT validity as a function of convergence or divergence 
with other measures. In this section, studies that seek to validate the 
DIT as an instrument for measuring moral judgment have been reviewed. 
Many of these studies have also produced useful data on the nature of 
moral judgment. Much of this data is also presented. As a whole, these 
studies provide a validation strategy for the DIT, a strategy that has 
encompassed several tests for validity. These include: (a) criterion 
group validity, (b) convergence/divergence validity, (c) longitudinal 
validity, and (d) validity through experimentally induced change. 
In the first of these tests for validity, criterion groups defined 
by expertness, religion, age, locale, I iberal/conservative attitudes, 
and education were examined. Education in general and education in 
moral philosophy in particular were the variables most closely 
correlated with DIT score. Validity was implied since moral judgment is 
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theoretically and intuitively linked with reason and logic. Both of 
these are cognitive constructs that education attempts to develop. 
The second test for validity in this section looked at convergence 
and divergence of the DIT with other measures associated with cognitive 
developmental moral judgment. Tests of moral comprehension, and 
experimental measures of behavior were reviewed. In these studies moral 
comprehension was most highly correlated with DIT score. Limitations 
with research employing behavioral measures were outlined. However 
problematic, these two areas of inquiry still have provided meaningful 
results that point the way toward further investigation. 
The third test of validity involved longitudinal studies using the 
DIT. Problems with this line of investigation were defined and studies 
were cited and reviewed. Results are not conclusive, and the few 
studies that have been done have serious methodological flaws. The line 
of inquiry was shown, however, to be one that has a real potential to 
yield meaningful data, given attention to design considerations and more 
time. 
The fourth test for validity involved attempts to induce change in 
moral growth as a function of interventions that theoretically induce 
this change. Studies were cited, and strengths and weaknesses were 
reviewed. Generally, results are not conclusive, again because of 
design flaws. One study was cited as illustrative of a properly 
designed research effort in intervention and moral development. Results 
from that study indicate that expected change can occur in moral 
judgment when conditions stimulating that change are optimized. 
As a group, these tests for validity suggest that the DIT does 
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measure a cognitive construct related to moral judgment. In addition, 
these studies have added a great amount of data about moral judgment and 
its development. These data not only answer many questions but serve to 
open and refine many new areas of moral judgment investigation. 
Summary of part 3 
Part 3 introduced the Defining Issues Test to the present research 
in order to describe it as a valid and useful instrument with which to 
investigate moral judgment. This has been accomplished first by a 
description of the instrument as an objective and reliable measurement 
tool, which enjoys ease of adminstration, scoring, and data manipula¬ 
tion. Next the theoretical framework of the DIT was compared and 
contrasted with the Kohl berg assessment technique. Strengths of the 
instrument were highlighted as a function of this comparison. The last 
section of this part reviewed many studies that sought to validate the 
DIT as an instrument that truly measures moral judgment. 
This review has demonstrated that a great variety of research has 
been done using the DIT. In addition, the DIT has been shown to be 
workable, theoretically sound, and broadly valid. 
PART 4 
The Microskills Taxonomy of counselor skills 
Section 1: Introduction 
Counselor behavior has long been a private activity, closed to 
scrutiny. In the past ten years, however, counselor behavior has been 
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subject to 0 variety of analyses. The increased interest in the 
activity of counseling has occurred as the need for counselor training 
has grown and widened. The Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills is 
one current response to this need. The present Microskills Taxonomy is 
the end product of research aimed at producing an operational definition 
of effective counseling and of developing ways to train effective 
counselors. These goals are reached in the Microskills Taxonomy by an 
explanation of the behaviors and ski I Is employed by counselors, which, 
when used appropriately, can maximize effective counseling. 
Section 2: Historical summary of skills training methods 
In the past, counselor behavior was expected to develop as a result 
of the trainee's intellectual and experiential involvment with the 
theory and the therapeutic model. Until the early 1950's this theory 
and model were confined to psychoanalysis, the training for which 
included such orthodox concepts as achieving insight and overcoming 
transference. The introduction of the client-centered model of 
psychotherapy changed the structure of that training considerably. 
Training in the client-centered model included theory as did the earlier 
approach; however, trainees were also expected to develop an 
understanding of appropriate and inappropriate counseling behaviors by 
including recorded interviews that presented effective and noneffective 
counseling interviews. Students listened, critiqued, and learned from 
these samples. Yet counselors were still not trained in the specific 
behaviors that would maximize client improvement. Training was still 
very broad; although feeling states were singled out and taught, 
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behaviors were not. Radical as this departure from the psychoanalytic 
approach to training was, the client-centered method fell short because 
it failed to identify, train, and evaluate specific behaviors that could 
be called counselor skills. 
This shortcoming was partly remedied by Truax and Carkhuff (1967), 
who developed an experiential/didactic model of training. Their method 
attempts to train students in warmth, empathy, and genuineness—three 
qualities found to be necessary conditions for successful counseling 
(Rogers, 1951). In their treatment method, students are taught to 
identify the three qualities mentioned above from audio tapes of 
counseling sessions. Students then make their own audio tapes and 
attempt to inject the three qualities into their counseling experiences. 
Along with this didactic and experiential learning, teachers and 
supervisors relate to the students in a warm, empathic, and personal 
context. The procedures have been improved to include refined 
definitions of the three qualities (Carkhuff & Berenson, 1976). 
This process of greater specificity in the definition of effective 
counseling has been carried out by several others. Outstanding are 
those who have incorporated the complete and more immediate information 
feedback al lowed by video technology (Kagan & Krathwohl, 1967; 
Kagan, 1975). As innovative as these models of training have been, they 
still rely on trainee produced stimuli for training and supervision. No 
models of effective counseling were included in these training programs. 
Trainees therefore were not provided with sample behavior which when 
practiced could be incorporated into their own counseling behavior. 
This inclusion was accomplished in the training program, which has 
been responsible for the development of the Microskills Taxonomy of 
Counselor Skills. That training program, Microcounseling, and the 
development of the taxonomy are discussed next. 
Section 3: The Microcounseling method of counselor training: The basis 
for the Microskills Taxonomy 
Early research (Rogers, 1957) has demonstrated that examination of 
the counseling or therapeutic relationship can result in a better 
understanding of what constitutes effective work. The Microcounseling 
training procedure has taken this perspective one step further by the 
specification of individual counselor behaviors that account for 
effective counseling. In essence Microcounseling demonstrates that the 
complex activity of counseling can be seen from a perspective that 
allows that activity to be broken down into its components without any 
loss in effectiveness (Ivey, 1971; Ivey and Authier, 1978). Many 
studies have shown this perspective in a variety of settings. Ivey, 
Normington, Miller, Morrill & Haas 1968), in an early study, 
demonstrated that beginning counselors exposed to this separate skills 
training showed significant change in the usage of the skills. Work 
that has followed this beginning has expanded the separate skills 
approach to training by refining basic skills and by defining more 
complex and sophisticated skills and dimensions of effective counseling. 
The most recent description of effective counseling as defined by the 
Microcounseling approach is by Ivey and Gluckstern (1974a, 1974b, 1976a, 
1976b) and by Ivey and Authier (1978). In this latest research, the 
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microcounseling paradigm expresses much of the artistic, intuitive, and 
coalescing forces of traditional training programs; at the same time it 
enjoys the clarity, simplicity, and elegance of the separate skills 
approach. 
In this latest version of microcounseling, students are presented 
with sophistocated video tapes that model highly effective counseling. 
In these video tapes, ski I Is are shown which include complex behavior 
and affect. This dual level is possible because the Microcounseling 
system incorporates two domains: (a) the quantifiable behavior skills, 
which behaviorally account for effective counseling and (b) the 
qualitative dimensions of those skills, which account for affective 
aspects also associated with effective counseling. This dual analysis 
of behavioral and affective aspects makes the process more nearly 
complete than previous training models have been. The following 
material illustrates the two domains that constitute the Microskills 
T axonomy. 
THE TAXONOMY OF MICROTRAINING 
QUANTITATIVE ANO QUALITATIVE SKILLS 
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A. Basic attending and self-expression skills. Underlying all attending 
and influencing skills are culturally appropriate patterns of eye 
contact, body language, and verbal following behavior. 
B. The microtraining skills. 
Attending skills: 
CLOSED QUESTIONS. Most often begin with "do," "is," and "are" and 
can be answered by the he I pee with only a few words. 
OPEN QUESTIONS. Typically begin with "what," "how," "why," or 
"could" and allow the helpee more room for self-exploration. 
MINIMAL ENCOURAGE. Selective attention to and repetition back to the 
helpee of exact words or phrases. May also be represented by "Tell 
me more..." or "Uh-huh." 
PARAPHRASE. Gives back to the helpee the essence of past verbal 
statements. Selective attention to key content of helpee 
verbalizations. 
REFLECTION OF FEELING. Selective attention to key affective or 
emotional aspects of helpee behavior. 
SUMMARIZATION. Similar to paraphrase and reflection of feeling but 
represents a longer time period and gives back to client several 
strands of thinking. 
InfIuencing skills. 
DIRECTIONS. Telling the helper or helpees what to do. 
EXPRESSION OF CONTENT. Giving advice, sharing information, making 
suggestions, giving opinions. 
EXPRESSION OF FEELING. Sharing personal or other people's affective 
states in the interview. 
INFLUENCING SUMMARY. Stating the main themes of the helper's 
statements over a period of time. 
SELF-DISCLOSURE. The helper's "I" statement. What the helper 
thinks, feels, or has experienced pertinent to the counseling 
interview. 
INTERPRETATION. Renaming or relabeling the helpee's behavior or 
verbalizations with new words from a new frame of reference. 
C. Focus dimensions. The main theme or subject of the helpee or 
helper's sentence often determines what either individual will speak 
on next. 
HELPEE. The helper's statement focuses on the client. May be 
demonstrated by the helper using the client's name or the personal 
pronoun "you." In the case of the helpee, this focus is generally 
manifested by an "I" statement. 
HELPER. The helper makes an "I" statement, or the helpee may focus 
on the helper through "you" or the helper's name. 
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THE TAXONOMY OF MICROTRAINING 
QUANTITATIVE AND DUAL I TAT IVE SKILLS (continued) 
DYAD (GROUP). The predominant theme is an "l-you" focus with both 
helper and helpee ideas or their own relationship being examined. In 
group counseling, the words "group" or "we" will appear. 
OTHERS. The subject of the sentence is some other individual not 
present. 
TOPIC. The subject of the sentence is a special topic or problem 
such as job search, tests, and abortion. 
CULTURAL-ENVIRONMENTAL-CONTEXT. The subject or main theme of 
statements focuses on the surrounding culture or environment. "This is 
a situational problem" or "Women often have this concern." 
D. Qualitative dimensions. It is also possible to rate helper (and 
helpee) statements for the quality of response. M icrotraining has 
attempted to provide single skill units for several underlying 
facilitative dimensions of helping. 
CONCRETENESS. The statement may be vague and inconclusive or 
concrete and specific. 
IMMEDIACY. Statements may be rated for tense—past, present, or 
future. 
RESPECT. Enhancing statements about the self or others are 
considered to represent respect, while negative statements or "put- 
downs" indicate an absence of this dimension. 
CONFRONTATION. Discrepancies in the self or between self and others 
are noted. 
GENUINENESS. There is an absence of mixed verbal and nonverbal 
messages. In particularly effective communication, verbal and 
nonverbal movement synchrony between helper and helpee may be noted. 
POSITIVE REGARD. Selective attention to positive aspects of self or 
others and or demonstrated belief that people can change and manage 
their own Iives. 
(Adapted from Ivey <£ Authier, 1978, pp. 66-67) 
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Section 4: Research attendant to the Microcounselinq encroach to 
counselor education relevant to this study - 
Research investigating the Microcounseling approach to counselor 
training has been conducted on many fronts. For the purposes of this 
study of counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior, two research 
areas will be reviewed: (a) investigation of the behavioral and 
affective aspects of the counseling process for the purpose of skill 
identificat ion and skill refinement and (b) studies of persona Iity and 
demographic correlates with the Microcounseling training model and with 
individual skills. Those interested in other research areas such as 
skills transfer and extensions of the training process should consult 
the second edition of Microcounseling (Ivey and Authier, 1978). Chapter 
13 of that text provides comprehensive review of literature to that 
date. Since many of the studies done in this area are not readily 
available, that work remains the most comprehensive source of this 
information. 
Research aimed at identifying and refining counselor skills. The 
identification of the various microskills associated with effective 
counseling is a process of increasing specificity. The process begins 
with a conceptual notion suggesting a skill and proceeds through a 
series of tests and steps. These prove out the skill as one appropriate 
for inclusion in the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. The 
conceptual notion derives from either observation or earlier research. 
The proving out steps further define and refine the skill for the 
purpose of inclusion into the training format and the Microskills 
T axonomy. 
. Early work introducing the Microcounseling format to counselor 
training (lvey, et al. 1968) reported on three skills: attending 
behavior, reflection of feeling, and summarization of feeling. The 
process by which these skills were developed has been established as the 
appropriate process for the development of subsequent skill. First the 
skill must meet two important tests. First, the skill must be 
behavioral. That is, it must be objectively identifiable. Second, the 
skill must be transferable. 
Once identified, the process of refining and developing the skill 
tor use in the training program begins. First a counseling interaction 
video tape is produced in which the skill is deliberately omitted. This 
interaction is then analyzed; negative behaviors are identified and 
positive behaviors are suggested. From this analysis, a positive tape is 
produced that models the skill in question. Both the negative tape 
demonstrating the effects produced with the absence of the skill and the 
positive tape showing the impact of the skill are used in the training 
program. All 11 skills employed in the present study of counselor 
moral judgment and counselor behavior are products of the process of 
skill development which was or i g i na I I y out I i ned in the introductory 
research by Ivey and his associates. 
In this introductory research (Ivey, et al, 1968), three skills were 
presented. The first of these, called attending behavior, was a 
constellation of three basic sub-skills: eye contact, physical 
posture, and verbal following. These three behaviors were shown to 
contribute to client comfort and trust by optimizing the following: (a) 
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the maintenance of neither too little nor too much eye contact between 
the client and the counselor, (b) presenting a relaxed yet attentive 
body posture and, (c) counselor avoidance of "topic jumps” (|.e., 
changing the subject of the interview). 
Also found in this introductory research was a skill, which when 
used appropriately, would reflect the emotional components of the 
client's conversation. This skill, called reflection of feeling, 
provided an opportunity for mutual trust to develop between the 
counselor and the client and began the development of a sense of 
understanding between the two. 
The third skill introduced by this early research was 
summarization. This behavior is the skillful selection of information 
shared by the client and the representation of that information to the 
client in such a way as to call attention to certain themes, patterns, 
or the like. In this way, summarization, as defined by Ivey, is a 
powerful skill designed to direct the attention of the client to 
specific areas, to help clarify those areas, and perhaps to suggest a 
new perspective on the concerns discussed. 
Extensions of this early work have isolated and developed many 
additional skills. Two of these are open and closed questions. These 
skills were first investigated by the Microskills research team, 
Phillips, Lockhart, and Moreland (1969b). These researchers were 
primarily interested in the value of open questions. They found that 
such questions gave the client the opportunity to expand and deepen a 
response. Closed questions were found to limit the client's response 
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options and were therefore more likely to reflect the counselor's 
perspective. Recent speculation (Ivey and Authier, 1978; Ivey, 1980) 
has explored the positive use of closed questions as a skill designed to 
achieve affirmation, negation and client commitment. 
The skill minimal encourage was isolated from client/counselor 
interaction by the same research team, Phillips, Lockhart, and Moreland 
(1969a). This ski I I was found to serve the dual purpose of encouraging 
and supporting the client to keep talking while at the same time to 
offer the counselor the opportunity to reinforce desired client behavior 
or cognitions. 
During this same period, Ivey and his associates (Ivey et al., 
1969) were developing a skill called paraphrasing. This skill 
consists of a restatement of the content of a client statement. Its 
intent is clarification and direction of the interaction. It also can 
serve to highlight cognitive rather than affective areas of discussion. 
This last point is its primary distinction from reflection of feeling, 
one of the original microcounseling skills. 
The general area of influencing skills was opened up by Gluckstern 
(1972, 1973) with the introduction of the skills, expression of 
content and expression of feeling. Her work studied client behavior. 
Sherrard (1973) and later Hearn (1976) developed the skill applied to 
counselors. These skills provide more influencing power to the 
counselor. They increase the likelihood that either feelings or content 
will predominate in the interaction. Consequently these two skills 
provide the counselor with the option to direct the course of the 
interview intentionally. 
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Self-disclosure as a microskill evolved from the basic notions and 
research of many who have studied essential elements of effective 
counseling. These include Rogers (1951) who emphasized the value of 
counselor authenticity and Carkhuff (1972) who presented the well-known 
prescription for honesty within the helping dyad. Basic theoretical 
work directly related to this study (London, 1964; Lowe, 1976) suggest 
that this skill reflects a counselor's basic value position. These 
researchers claim that these basic value positions affect the 
counselor's behavior, from the selection of a theoretical and applied 
model to the actual nature of the counseling interaction. They further 
claim that, although highly underresearched, various forms of self- 
disclosure carry great impact when consciously used as intervention 
tools in applied psychology. 
Specific microcounseling applications of self-disclosure have found 
it to be a useful skill with populations of teachers (Rollins, 1970) and 
with college students (Sherrard, 1973). As analyzed by the 
Microcounseling system, self-disclosure supports trust, intimacy, and 
rapport between the counselor and the client. Examples of this skill 
are counselor statements that begin with "I" as well as nonverbal 
actions such as sharing a client's emotional response. 
Directions as a skill was introduced in the second edition of 
Microcounseling (Ivey and Authier, 1978). In this text, directions was 
parceled out as a skill separate from expressions of content. 
Directions means telling the client what to do. Sherrard (1973) 
accomplished the isolation of this skill. He found that the behavior of 
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telling the client what to do was operative In four distinct group 
counseling modes. Development of the skill was done by Ivey and 
GIuckstern (1976b). They found that to be a positive skill, the 
direction must be given with appropriate eye contact, body language, and 
verbalization; that it must be clear and concrete; and that it must 
provide a way in which the counselor can check out that the client 
understands the direction. 
Although little researched, the last of the skills incorporated in 
this study, I nterpretation, is clearly an important influencing skill. 
Originally isolated for Microcounseling use by Moreland and Ivey (1969), 
I nterpretation continues to be "the most challenging and complex skill 
within the Microcounseling paradigm" (Ivey & Authier, 1978, p. 113). 
Interpretation is the skill that allows the counselor to influence the 
client by the conscious expression of a new frame of reference. Within 
the Microcounseling training program, this new frame of reference is not 
bound by any specific psychotherapy or counseling model. The form of 
the skill is trained while the content is left to the trainee. Through 
this procedure, skillful intrepretations can be made that originate in 
any of the several schools of counseling. Little research has been done 
on this skill. Future studies will help to define it and to develop 
exercises that enhance its trainabiIity. 
Additional basic research armed at skill identification has taken 
another route: factor analysis. Direct mutual communication, a skill 
not used in the present study, was isolated through this method (Crowley 
& Ivey, 1976). Earlier work (Zimmer & Park, 1967; Zimmer & 
Anderson, 1968) found that rather wide concepts describing qualitative 
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concepts in counseling, such as genuineness and warmth, could be 
behaviorally specified and consequently more readily taught. These and 
other behavior oriented studies have tended to support the basic 
Microcounseling concept that the complex behavior of effective 
counseling can be analyzed for its essential components and that those 
components can then be Isolated, developed, and taught. Through this 
process the desired result, producing more effective counselors, can be 
achieved. 
S±cJ'on 5:_Research aimed at relating Microskills to other variables: 
Studies of personality and demographic correlates with the 
microcounseIinq training model and with individuaI 
counsel ing sk i I Is" “ -- 
Studies that seek to relate counselor behavior as described by the 
Microcounseling approach to other variables are very few. Chiefly they 
are represented by those studies that relate Microcounseling training 
success with one or more trainee characteristics. These studies are of 
interest to the present research because they may provide information 
collateral to the mora I-judgment counselor-behavior link examined 
here. 
Early in the development of the Microcounseling approach the 
connection between the introversion-extroversion continuum and skills 
acquisition was studied (Rennie & Toukmanian, 1974). Little conclusive 
evidence was found that would allow for valid predictions of skill 
acquisition from this basic personality trait. An additional feature of 
this study was the inclusion of high and low structure in the training 
mode. This also failed to discriminate. Neuroticism as a personality 
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variable was similarly studied (Rennie & Toukmanian, 1976). In this 
study the skill, empathy, was acquired to a greater degree among the low 
neurotic subject groups. 
A study investigating a personality trait similar to those of the 
above studies investigated the dependency-independency continuum (Kloba 
& Zimpfer, 1976). This study used high school students and focused on 
the microskill called open ended questions and comments. The only 
significant relationship found was that the more independent trainees used 
more open ended comments significantly more often than did their more 
dependent counterparts. Trainer status, also a variable, was shown to 
be related to increased open ended comments. The design of this 
research was flawed, however, in that it incorporated no pretest of the 
usage of the variable. 
Ambiguity tolerance, long thought to be an impediment to learning 
in general and in this case to skill acquisition, was isolated and 
studied employing the microtraining model (Chassnoff, 1976). Reports 
indicate that video-based training appears to incorporate factors that 
may lessen the effects of low tolerance to ambiguity. Also studied in 
this research was modeling behavior. Similar findings were suggested. 
Control aspects of the study were not optimized, however, again casting 
any specific findings into doubt. 
Although, as has been indicated, these few studies investigating 
links between microcounseling skills and personality variables have been 
methodologically flawed, they do constitute the beginning of this phase 
of microcounseling research. The research reported in this thesis 
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extends this area of investigation by attempting to uncover 
relationships that may exist between counseling behavior as defined by 
the Microcounseling approach and moral judgment. 
Section 6; The Microskills Taxonomy as used in this study 
As has been stated before, the essence of the Microcounseling 
Taxonomy of Counselor Skills is the separate skills approach. This 
approach affords the trainee the opportunity to master one skill at a 
time before attempting to assimilate the entire range of counselor 
skills into their practice of applied psychology. An additional benefit 
of the separate skills approach is that effective couse ling can be 
structured to occur at low levels of mastery in the Taxonomy. 
Proponents claim that once the basic attending and influencing skills 
are learned, trainees can provide effective counseling to clients who 
present concerns appropriate to this level of mastery (Ivey, 1971; Ivey 
& Authier, 1978). The present research incorporates these two 
conditions by analyzing the use of only the attending and influencing 
skills and structuring the interview requirements to include appropriate 
client material. Having met these conditions, effective counseling 
occurs in the following way: The first of the two skill groups, 
attending skills, serves to invite the client to talk or otherwise open 
up and offer concrete as well as affective information. This not only 
provides information to the counselor and ventilation for the client but 
serves to stimulate trust. The second group of skills, influencing 
skills, consists of those counselor behaviors used to intervene in the 
life of the client for the purpose of developing new awarenesses, 
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perspectives, and/or actions. Use of these skills in conjunction with 
the attending skills can account for enhanced clarity of concerns, 
expanded perception of options, and most of the other expected goals of 
counseling. In this study the attending skills are counted both 
individually and as an aggregate representing attending behavior. This 
individual and aggregate frequency tabulation is similarly performed for 
the influencing skills. 
Additionally this study looks at the focus dimension of these 
skills identified using the Microcounseling Taxonomy. Essentially, the 
focus refers to the stated or implied subject of the sentence that the 
counselor communicates. In this study that dimension is limited to a 
count of He Ipee-focused skills. These are counselor statements or 
questions that focus on the client rather than on the counselor, the 
interaction, the context, or any of the other possible focus options 
available in the Taxonomy. 
The Taxonomy, then, provides this study with a framework from which 
to analyze basic effective counselor behavior. Since this analysis is 
limited to a strict count of discrete behavior, it is largely immune to 
the subjective contaminations often associated with descriptions of 
human activity. This research expects that simplicity and elegance in 
design favor clarity in a research area that has historically yielded 
unclear results. 
Summary 
The preceding discussion of the Microcounseling Taxonomy of 
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Counselor Skills has sought to introduce the instrument to the present 
study. A brief historical overview of counselor training was presented 
to demonstrate the development of the training program from which the 
instrument is derived. In this overview the impact on counselor 
education of several technological advancements was mentioned. This 
impact has culminated in the present microcounseling program, which 
utilizes video modeling and prepared samples of effective counseling 
behavior. Research that has examined this behavior and has isolated the 
several counseling skills that constitute the resultant taxonomy was 
reviewed. Also reviewed were studies that, like the present study, seek 
to relate counselor behavior to one or more personality or demographic 
variables. The lack of extensive study in this area of counselor 
behavior research was mentioned. Following this review of relevant 
microcounseling studies, a description of the use of the Microcounseling 
Taxonomy in the present study was given. This included a restatement of 
the basis of the Taxonomy and its potential for use at low levels of 
counselor expertise. Additionally, the skill groups and the focus 
dimension employed in this study were specified. 
This section has attempted to show that the Microcounseling 
Taxonomy of Counselor Skills is a theoretically sound, valid, and useful 
instrument to use in this study. 
Summary of Chapter II and concluding statements 
The preceding review of studies in the area of cognitive 
developmental moral judgment and counselor behavior has included 
historical summaries and descriptions of the work of the foremost 
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theoreticians prominent in the two areas. Covered in depth were the 
theoretical foundations of cognitive developmental moral judgment, as 
outlined by Piaget, Kohl berg, and Rest. Also covered were some general 
problems associated with that theoretical foundation and some specific 
problems concerning methods of assessing moral development in 
individuals. Prominent supporters and detractors were cited. Following 
these sections were descriptions of the Defining Issues Test and 
explanations of several differences and similarities that exist between 
that test and Kohlberg's formulations and demonstrations of the validity 
of the DIT as a measure of cognitive moral judgment. A large number of 
studies and resultant data were presented to describe correlations of 
cognitive moral judgment with other cognitive and behavioral variables. 
These extensive discussions have allowed for the acceptance of the DIT 
as an instrument that benefits from a recognized historical and 
scholarly tradition. This discussion has demonstrated that the DIT 
enjoys a consciously justified validity, which makes it an appropriate 
instrument in this study of counselor moral judgment and counselor 
behavior. 
The present chapter also sought to describe the Microcounseling 
Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. This instrument was similarly shown to be 
the end result of defensible research efforts whose source is drawn from 
a rich historical tradition. Mentioned in that tradition were Rogers, 
Kagan, Carkhuff and Ivey. The Microcounseling training program was 
outlined, and the development and usefulness of the taxonomy derived 
from that training program were described. As with the Defining Issues 
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Test, the Microcounseling Taxonomy of Counselor Skills was shown to be a 
valid, reliable and practical instrument for its intended use to 
describe and define counselor behavior. 
The extensive discussions that constitute this chapter and are 
summarized above are required in this report because of the tenuous 
nature of the variables investigated in this study. In short, both 
moral judgment and counselor behavior are difficult to quantify. The 
instruments described in this review succeed in this effort within their 
respective domains. This individual success suggests their joint use in 
this sfudy of moral judgment and counselor behavior. 
Conclusive results in moral judgment research and in counseling 
research are truly rare. This study, like most others which look at 
these variables, seeks to uncover those rare conclusive results. Yet 
another dimension exists here. In addition to the academic interest 
inherent in any correI ationaI study, there exists here another interest. 
In addition to "what is," this study seeks to consider "what should be." 
In the first case, should conclusive results emanate from this research, 
they will be examined and discussed. Should the opposite occur, one 
must wonder why this has occurred given the sensitivity of the measure¬ 
ment instruments. Certainly, design flaws and methodological errors can 
occur. Yet, if these are kept to a minimum, is it not true that 
negative results may also have pervasive implications? Specifically, 
one may ask, "If we consistantly can find no clear relationship between 
counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior, what does this mean for 
the professions of counseling and counselor education?" Furthermore, if 
counselor moral judgment cannot be revealed through an analysis of 
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counselor behavior or vice versa, then does moral judgment play no part 
in counseling? Is this a desirable aspect of the counseling 
professions? These and other questions are considered in Chapter V, 
where a discussion of results of the present research will be presented. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Introduction 
In This chapTer, The procedures and rneThods used To uncover 
possible re IaTionships beTween counselor moral judgmenT and counselor 
behavior will be reviewed. Included here will be an overview of The 
sTudy, general premise and hypoTheses, selecTion of subjecTs, 
insTrumenTaTion, daTa col lecTion and coding, and a descripTion of The 
analysis of The daTa. 
Overview of The sTudy 
This sTudy was designed To invesTigaTe The relaTionships ThaT may 
exisT beTween The moral judgmenT of counselor Trainees and The behavior 
ThaT Those Trainees exhibiT in an analogue counseling inTerview. The 
sTudy is ouTlined below. 
1. ForTy volunTeer subecTs were chosen from a class of 82 counselor 
Trainees. 
2. The Defining Issues TesT (DIT) was presenTed To These subjecTs 
as a noncrediT Take-home projecT. 
3. The DIT quesTionnaires were collecTed wiThin Three weeks and 
Then machine scored. 
4. As a parT of The regular classwork, each sTudenT prepared an 
audio Tape and TranscripTion of a five minuTe acTual or role-played 
counseling session wiTh The counselor Trainee acting as counselor. 
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Copies of these transcriptions for the 40 DIT participants were collected 
5. The transcript data were coded using the Microskills Taxonomy of 
Counselor Skills, thereby obtaining descriptive information about 
individual counselor trainee behavior. 
6. Statistical analysis of the microskill data describing counselor 
behavor and the DIT data describing moral judgment were completed. 
General premise and hypotheses 
The operational problems outlined in Chapter 2, Section 1 
describing a fundamental lack of knowledge about counselor moral 
judgment and its effect on counseling behavior indicate a need for an 
orderly investigation of these variables and their potential interface. 
The previous descriptions of moral judgment as currently understood 
within the developmental context and a method of analyzing counselor 
activity using the Mickroskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills point to a 
framework of investigation. With this framework one general premise 
arises: Counselor trainers with higher moral judgment scores will 
employ patterns of counseling skill usage in a counseling situation 
different from those with lower moral judgment scores. The general 
premise will be tested in this study by an analysis of counselor trainee 
moral judgment and accompanying counselor behavior. The following null 
hypotheses have been generated to accomplish this: 
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Hypothesis 1: There Is no significant difference In the number of 
different microskills used by counselors who have scored higher or lower 
on the Defining Issues Test. 
The skills involved in this and the other tests of the general 
premise will be the six basic attending skills and the five basic 
influencing skills. The former are closed questions, open questions, 
minimal encourages, paraphrase, ref lections of feeling, and summaries. 
The latter are directions, expressions of content, expressions of 
feeling, self-disclosure and interpretations. The score which will be 
related to moral judgment will be the number of different skills used by 
the counselor. The range will therefore be 0-11. This score will 
reflect general usage or variety of response mode. 
0 
Hypotheses 2: There is no significant difference in attending 
skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
The skills used in this test of the general premise will be six 
attending skills taken as an aggregate measure. The range will, 
therefore, depend on counselor usage. This score reflects the 
counselor's tendency to use the more basic skill group in the time 
limited counseling interview. 
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Hypothesis 3: There is no significant difference in influencing 
skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
The skills used in this test of the general premise will be the 
five influencing skills as an aggregate measure. Similar to the above 
test, the range will depend on counselor usage. Thus this score 
reflects the counselor's tendency to use the more advanced skill group 
in the counseling situation. 
Hypothesis 4: There is no significant difference in the focus 
dimension between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
As was pointed out earlier, the M icroskiI Is Taxonomy of Counselor 
skills provides for qualitative dimensions as well as for quantifiable 
skills of the counseling process. Among the former are "Focus" options. 
These relate to the topic of the interview at any given moment. The 
following options are provided for: Helpee, Helper, dyad, others, topic, 
and cultural environmental context. The score that will be related to 
moral judgment in the study will be the total number of "helpee" focused 
responses. That is, the total number of times that the counselor 
responded in such a way as to bring to or maintain the focus of the 
interaction on the client. Such responses are considered to facilitate 
the client's self-focus, are desirable, and are therefore indicative of 
effective counseling. 
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Hypothesis 5: There is no significant difference in specific 
microskills usage between those who have scored higher or lower on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
This test wi I I examine the possibiIity that one or more specific 
skills of the 11 skills employed in this study may be related to moral 
judgment as measured by the DIT. 
Hypothesis 6: There is no significant difference in overa I I 
qua Iity of counseling between those counselors who have scored higher or 
lower on the Defining Issues Test. 
A procedure, explained later under "instrumentation", will be 
developed that will allow an overall quality score to be computed. This 
score will be independent of the Ivey Taxonomy. The quality score will 
be related to DIT score to seek a relationship between counselor 
activity and moral judgment. 
Hypothesis 7: There are no sex differences or age differences or 
level of counseling experience differences between those counselors who 
have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test. 
Moral judgment as measured by the DIT has been shown to correlate 
significantly with age and not significantly with sex. This test will 
investigate links between sex and age and moral judgment. As an added 
check, level of counseling experience will be related to moral judgment. 
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Subjects 
Subjects for this study were students enrolled in an introductory 
course in counseling at the University of Massachusetts. The students 
were nearly all degree seeking undergraduates. The course is open only 
to those who express a desire to pursue a career in a helping 
profession. Therefore, students who enrol I are considered for the 
purposes of this study to be counselor trainees at the most basic and 
naive level. 
Forty male and female students volunteered to participate in the 
study. The entire class numbered 82. Age range was from 19 to 40. 
Academic experience in counseling was constant at a low level. Work 
experience in the field varied from none to several years. The 
following table illustrates the sex, age and experience levels of 
participants. 
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TABLE 5 
Table of Sex, Age, and Experience 
SEX FREQUENCY CUM FREQ PERCENT CUM PERCENT 
F 34 34 85.0 85.0 M 6 40 15.0 100.0 
AGE FREQUENCY CUM FREQ PERCENT CUM PERCENT 
19 2 2 5.0 5.0 
20 11 13 27.5 32.5 
21 9 22 22.5 55.0 
22 3 25 7.5 62.5 
23 6 31 15.0 77.5 
24 1 32 2.5 80.0 
28 1 23 2.5 82.5 
29 1 34 2.5 85.0 
30 2 36 2.5 90.0 
32 1 38 2.5 92.5 
33 1 38 2.5 95.0 
35 1 39 2.5 97.5 
40 1 40 2.5 100.0 
EXPERIENCE FREQUENCY CUM FREQ PERCENT CUM PERCENT 
1. No Exp. 9 9 22.5 22.5 
2. Some to 
2 yrs Exp. 20 29 50.0 72.6 
3. More than 
2 yrs Exp. 11 40 27.5 100.0 
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Instrumentation and data collection 
Three measurement instruments were used in this study to gather 
data on counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior: 1. The Defining 
Issues Test (Rest, 1972, 1976), 2. The Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor 
Skills (Ivey et al, 1968, 1978), and 3. The Duality Score, a measure of 
overall quality of counseling developed for this study. Each is 
described below. 
1• The Defining Issues Test 
The Defining Issues Test (DIT) is an instrument that quantifies 
moral judgment and has been discussed at length in Chapter 2 of this 
report. That discussion described the instrument, its administration, 
the similarities and dissimilarities between it and the Kohlberg 
measures, and the development of an argument for the acceptance of its 
validity. 
The DIT is a paper and pencil test designed to reveal and quantify 
the various ways a respondent understands the concept of fairness. Six 
options for that understanding are provided for in the instrument: a. 
egocentricism, b. obedience and avoidance of punishment, c. instrumental 
hedonism and concrete reciprocity, d. fixed rules and maintenance of the 
social order, e. social contract and utilitarian law-making perspective, 
and f. universal ethical principles orientation. The test is 
administered as a survey of personal opinion with a suggested 45 minute 
time limit. It is objectively scored. The DIT's similarity with 
Kohlberg's instruments is chiefly concerned with the developmental basis 
for moral judgment. Important divergences occur both in that 
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developmental concept and In other important theoretical foundations. 
These have been treated earlier in Chapter 2. For reasons explained in 
that chapter, the Rest instrument was chosen over the Kohl berg 
instrument for use in this study. Validity of the DIT has been well 
researched. Studies mentioned earlier accent several approaches to the 
demonstration of the instrument's validity. Among these are criterion 
group validity, convergence/divergence validity, longitudinal validity 
and validity demonstrated through experimentally induced change. 
There are two forms of the DIT, a three-story form and six-story 
form. In the present study, the six story form was used. Both forms 
have been shown to provide investigators with high test-retest 
reliability (Dortzbach, 197b). Similarly, high correlation with other 
cognitive developmental measures indicates acceptable validity 
(Panowitsch, 1975). In the present study, DIT questionnaires were 
computer scored at the Minnesota Moral Research Project. This scoring 
procedure precluded subjective input other than that of the respondent. 
Data collected included moral judgment scores at each of the levels 
mentioned above. This information specified a respondent's relative 
preference for each of the six concepts of fairness. Other scores 
included a score to check for random responding (consistency check), a 
score to check for preference for lofty sounding but meaningless moral 
judgment options (M score), and an experimental weighted average score 
(D score). In addition, an aggregate principled reasoning score (P 
score) was computed. This P score consisted of the sum of Stage 5 and 6 
responses. In this study, this principled reasoning score, expressed as 
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a percentage of total possible responses, was used as the quantitative 
measure of a respondent's moral judgment. That score, the P%, became 
the numerical definition of moral development that was later related to 
counselor behavior. As wiI I be shown in the statistical analysis, the 
distribution of P% scores was expressed in two ways; just as a mean 
split in order to define High moral judgment and Low moral judgment and 
second as a continuous variable from lowest to highest P%. 
2. The Quality Score (OS) 
A measure of overall quality of counseling was developed for this 
study. This measure, the quality score or QS, was derived in the 
following way. One short segment was excerpted from each counseling 
transcript. Each segment was of similar length and was excerpted from 
the middle of the complete transcript. In this way a collection of 
counselor behavior samples was obtained which was free of opening 
remarks and closing summaries. These were considered more indicative of 
counseling quality than any other random or chosen segment of the 
transcribed interview. These middle segments were then retranscr i bed 
onto sort cards. The cards were then presented to ten independent 
raters, who ranked the middle segments into four categories: Poor, 
Good, Better, and Best. The qualitative rankings were then given 
numerical weight (1 lowest, 4 highest) and the weights summed for each 
subject's segment. An average ranking was achieved by dividing this sum 
by 10, the number of raters. This average ranking was then devided by 4 
to arrive at a OS which indicates that subject's percentage of a perfect 
score; that is, 10 rankings at the 4 or best level, devided by 4. Table 
loa 
24 of Appendix E details these data. 
The independent raters were counselors, psychotherapists or 
counselor educators who had appropriate academic credentials and who had 
practiced their professions for at least two years. The background of 
these raters varied widely. This variation was included by design and 
was intended to blunt the effects of any theoretical bias of any single 
rater. Inter-rater reliability of the ten raters was, therefore not at 
issue. 
3. The Microcounseling Taxonomy of Counselor Skills 
The development of the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills 
(MrcS) has been discussed earlier in this report. The Taxonomy was used 
in this study as a means of getting information about counselor behavior 
in the analogue counseling sessions that were part of this study. 
Research already reviewed here indicates that the Taxonomy is clear, 
leaves little room for confusion about counselor skill identification, 
and therefore has high user reliability. In this study five minute 
counseling session transcripts furnished by the subjects were the source 
from which raw data on counselor behavior was drawn. Individual skills, 
aggregate skills and a focus dimension were identified and tallied. The 
skills were the attending and influencing skills identified separately. 
These skills were also scored in their respective catagories as 
aggregates. From among the focus options in the Taxonomy, the helpee 
focus was selected for identification. The raw data or tallies of these 
Individual and aggregate skills were collected and coded according to a 
procedure that will be out Iined next. These coded data were fhan 
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subjected to statistical analysis in relation to the subjects' moral 
judgment (DIT) scores. 
Data Codinq 
As has been mentioned earlier, both the DIT and the MTCS produce 
quantifiable raw data suitable for statistical manipulation. What 
follows is a description of the procedure followed to code these 
numerical data so that the statistical tests used in this study could be 
computed. 
The DIT. The P% score used in this study is the score derived when 
the P score is expressed as a percentage of opportunities for principled 
judgment responses. This score is reported from the Minnessota Moral 
Research Project score report. No further coding is required. 
The MTCS. Data describing of counseling behavior suitable for 
statistical manipulation were generated in the following way. A 
Microskills Tally Sheet (Appendix G) was developed; it included the 
counselor skills in the MTCS targeted in this study. A tally sheet was 
attached to each subject's counseling session transcript. These were 
presented to a counseling psychologist familiar with the Microskills 
Taxonomy. At the time of the data coding, that psychologist had had 
over three years direct experience with the taxonomy and had taught 
college level counseling courses in Microtraining. The psychologist 
coded each of the transcripts by identifying the targeted skills and 
their focus and by noting them appropr i ate I y on the tally sheet. The 
raw data were converted into percentages. This was done in the 
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following ways. For hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 5 each skill score or skill 
group score was expressed as a percentage of the total number of skills 
used by that counselor. For example, if a counselor used fifty skills 
in total (irrespective of skill type) and 25 of these skills were open 
questions, his open questions score would be 25/50 or 50$. The only 
exception to this procedure was in the case of different microskills 
used. This aggregate skill variable was made into a continuous variable 
by expressing the raw score as a percentage of 11 since that is the 
number of separate and different microskills coded in this study. 
The QS. The number reflective of the Quality Score is an average 
of the quality ratings of ten independent raters expressed as a 
percentage of a perfect score. No further coding was required for 
statistical manipulation designed to correlate the QS with moral 
judgment. 
Demographic Information 
For both age and counseling experience, three groups were 
assembled. For age, the groups were: a. less than 21 years; b. 21 years 
to 25 years; and c. more than 25 years. For counselor experience, the 
groups were: a. no experience; b. any experience to two years 
experience; and c. more than two years experience. This information was 
found in the registration materials required for the counselor training 
course from which the subjects were drawn. 
Ill 
Analysis of the data 
Analysis of the data generated by these methods and procedures was 
statistical; tests appropriate to the nature of the data were computed. 
These were the coefficient of correlation for the data expressed as 
continuous variables, the t test when one variable was continuous and 
the other descrete and the chi square test when both variables were 
catagoricaI. The correlation coefficient for the two variables was 
computed with the pearson r statistic. For the moral judgment variable, 
the P% score from the Defining Issues Test was used. This is computed 
in the following way. There are 60 opportunities for choice of moral 
arguments in the long form of the DIT. The P% score indicates what 
percentage of these sixty opportunities the subject chose levels 5 or 6 
(i.e., principled) arguments. Theoretical range of the P% score is of 
course 0-100%. Actual scores over diverse populations range from 10%- 
70%. No further manipulation is required. 
Expression of the counselor behavior variable as continuous data 
followed a pattern similar to that used by the Minnesota group in 
defining the P% score. For the aggregate skill groups (i.e., attending 
skills and influencing skills), the focus dimension and the individual 
skills the number of skills demonstrated by each subject was divided by 
each subject's total of skills used. This is the sum of that 
counselor's attending skills usage and influencing skills usage. For 
example, if a subject used a total of 60 attending and influencing 
skills and 20 of these were coded as attending skills, then that 
subject's attending skills score was 33.3%. In the care of Hypothesis 
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1, different microskills used, the subject's raw score was the number of 
different types of skills used in the counseling session. That score 
can range from 1 to 11. When the subject's different microskills used 
score is divided by 11, a percentage results which indicates to what 
extent the counselor used the entire range of skills coded in this 
study. As explained earlier, quality score data were described as 
continuous data by expressing the actual average ranking for each 
subject as a percentage of a perfect average ranking of 4. 
For the _t test moral judgment scores were expressed as Hi DIT 
and Lo DIT using the P% score explained above. This was accomplished 
by the computation of the mean P% score for the sample population and 
the assignment of Hi DIT to those subjects whose scores fell above 
that mean and Lo DIT to those whose scores fell below. Results of the 
tests relating moral judgment and counselor behavior are presented in 
Chapter IV. 
Summary of Chapter III, Methods 
In this section the methods and procedures employed in this study 
of counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior have been described. 
An overview of the study was presented as were the general premise and 
hypotheses to be tested. The subjects of the experiment were described. 
The three psychometric instruments used in this study were further 
defined, and their use here was outlined. These instruments are the 
Defining Issues Test, the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills and 
the Quality Score. Methods of collection, coding, and analysis of the 
data generated by these instruments were then reported. The results of 
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the hypothesis testing and the discussion of these results will be 
presented in Chapters IV and V respectively. 
chapter iv 
RESULTS 
Introduction 
This study began by asking the following questions: 
1. Do counselor trainees who differ in their level of moral 
judgment conduct themselves differently in an analogue counseling 
interview? 
2. Are there any reliable relationships between demonstrated moral 
judgment and counseling style? 
Analysis of the theoretical and methodological framework in which these 
questions could be answered led to the statement of the following 
premise: Counselor trainees with higher moral judgment scores will 
employ patterns of counseling skill usage in a counseling situation 
different from those with lower moral judgment scores. Drawing out that 
general premise into researchable questions led to the seven (7) null 
hypotheses listed earlier. These hypotheses were tested as reported in 
the preceding chapter. Results of those tests of the seven null 
hypotheses are presented in this chapter. The following chapter will 
review these results and offer discussion concerning their general and 
specific implications and limitations. 
1 1 4 
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Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference in the number of 
different microskills used by counselors who have scored higher or lower 
on the Defining Issues Test. 
Two procedures were used with data derived from this hypothesis. First, 
the two sets of data were treated as continuous variables and analyzed 
for their coefficient of correlation. Second, the moral judgment scores 
were expressed as "high scores" if they fell above the sample mean and 
"low scores" if they fell below. These high and low category scores and 
the accompanying microskills usage scores were subjected to a t test. 
In neither case was a significant relationship found. The correlation 
coefficient was computed to be r=.08, p=.58. The t_ test similarly was 
not conclusive. The jf value in that test proved to be 1.21, p=.70.. 
Because of these low correIations, the null hypothesis could not be 
rejected. A table of these data can be found in Appendic C. 
Hypothesis 2: There will be no significant difference in attending 
skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
As with the first hypothesis, two tests were computed. Again, they were 
the coefficient of correlation and the t_ test. To accommodate these two 
tests the data were expressed as continuous or discrete as appropriate. 
The coefficient of correlation of these data was computed to be 
r=.28, p=.2fa. The t test computed with these data expressed as high 
and low moral judgment and attending skills usage yielded similar 
results. This test produced an t value of 1.68, p=.29. These data, 
although not statistically significant, may describe a weak positive 
directional trend toward a relationship between attending skills used 
and moral judgment score attained. Rest (1979) indicates that such 
indications of a trend can sometimes be strengthened by improving the 
research design and experimental procedures. Additional research with 
attending ski I Is and moral judgment employing more control led methods 
and a larger sample may yield moral conclusive results. A table of 
these data can be found in Appendix C. 
Hypothesis 3: There will be no significant difference in influencing 
skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
The coefficient of correlation and the _t test were computed on the 
data in the same manner as in the preceding hypotheses; that is, the 
data sets were treated as continuous or as discrete variables as 
appropriate. With this hypothesis, the coefficient of correlation 
between influencing skill usage and DIT score proved to be -.17, p=.27. 
The t test done on these data, expressed as high and low DIT scores and 
influencing skill usage, did not, however, yield results even within the 
expanded range of interest mentioned in hypothesis 2. With this test, 
the t value was 1.51, p=.40. Given these two results, rejection of the 
null hypothesis is clearly inappropriate. A table of these data can be 
found in Appendix C. 
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Hypothesis 4: There will be no significant difference in the use of the 
focus dimension between counselors who have scored higher or lower on 
the Defining Issues Test. 
Both a coefficient of correlation and a t test were computed. 
Results of the former indicate that the coefficient of correlation 
between the two variables is .35. This correlation is significant at 
p=.02. This correlation is within the conventional confidence interval 
of 5$ chance occurrence, indicating that counselors who score higher on 
the Defining Issues Test will tend to use more helpee focused 
microski I Is and that those who score lower will tend to use fewer. With 
this test, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
Similar significance was not found when the DIT data were expressed 
categorically as "high" and "low" DIT scores. The microskills usage was 
expressed continuously as before. With this test, no significance was 
achieved. The t_ value proved to be 1.21, p=.67. With this _t test, the 
null hypothesis was not rejected. Discussion of these conflicting 
results will be presented in the next chapter of this report. A table 
of these data is presented in Appendix C. 
Hypothesis 5: There will be no significant difference in specific 
microski I Is usage between those who have scored higher or lower on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
The coefficient of correlation and the t test were computed on 
usage of each of eleven specific microskills and on moral judgment. The 
specific microskills used were open questions, closed questions, minimal 
encourages, paraphrase, reflection of feelings, summaries, directions, 
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expressions of content, expressions of feeling, self-disclosure, and 
interpretation. Moral judgment was defined as the P% score on the 
Defining Issues Test. As can be seen from Table 6, only the skill 
paraphrase approaches significance when related to moral judgment. 
Self-disclosure achieves significance on the t test but is negatively 
correlated with moral judgment when subjected to the coefficient of 
correlation procedure. This contradictory result may center around 
sampling error and will be addressed in the next chapter. A directional 
trend as defined earlier may appear with the use of reflection of 
feelings, p - .27. Expression of content, expressions of feeling, 
paraphrase interpretation, and self-disclosure all have conflicting 
results when the two tests are seen together. Correspond i ng I y, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
TABLE 6 
Single skill correlation with the DIT 
Correlation Coefficient _t test with 
with P% score Hi DIT & Lo DIT 
£f ±= £f 
closed questions .04 .77 1.63 .32 
open questions .01 .94 1.06 .87 
minimal encourages .06 .68 1.54 .40 
paraphrases .28 .07 1.38 .47 
reflections of feeling .14 .36 1.65 .27 
summaries .14 .31 1.31 .58 
directions .11 .46 1 .56 .32 
expressions of content -.13 .41 1.72 .27 
expressions of feeling -.18 .24 1.33 .56 
self disclosure -.21 .18 7.85 .01 
interpretations .01 .92 1.99 .13 
A table describing the data from which the above resuIts were obtained 
is located in Appendix C. 
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For Hypothesis 5, an additional test of relationship was computed 
in order to expand the general limits of the parameter analysis used in 
this report. In this test the 11 microskills were collapsed into two 
catagorical groups. These were the attending skills and the influencing 
skills. A 2x2 chi square analysis was computed using these two skill 
groups. Hi DIT and Lo DIT. The following matrix illustrates this 
analysis. 
ATTEND ING INFLUENCING 
Hi DIT 
1 
1 
1 
1 
374 
1 
1 
1 
1 
45 
1 
1 
1 
1 
419 
Lo DIT 
1 
1 
1 
1 
437 
1 
1 
1 
1 
105 
1 
1 
1 
1 
542 
811 150 961 
This analysis produced a chi square of 13.39, significant at greater 
than the .01 level of significance. This result indicates an 
association between high and low moral judgment and differential use of 
attending skills and influencing skills. 
Hypothesis 6: There will be no significant difference in overall 
quality of counseling between those counselors who have scored higher or 
lower on the Defining Issues Test. 
Previous research (Sheehan, 1979) has demonstrated that 
supervisors' reports of quality practice are significantly related to 
moral judgment score among pediatric residents. The hypothesis 
explored here investigates a similar pairing. In this case, the quality 
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of each counselor's counseling interventions is determined by 10 
independent raters, and the moral judgment of those counselors is deter¬ 
mined by the Defining Issues Test. The expectation here is that 
counseling quality relates directly to counselor moral judgment. 
Statistical analysis of the data by pearson r correlation coeficient did 
not provide any confident predictability of counseling quality, from 
moral judgment (p-.67). Further analysis by t_ test simi larly found no 
significant relationship +=-1.24, p=.22. Analysis by scatterplot (see 
Appendix B) shows groupings that might suggest a trend in the direction 
of a direct relationship. Future research investigating this link 
between counseling quality and counselor moral judgment may enhance this 
speclative finding. For the purposes of this report, however, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. A table of the Quality Score data is 
found in Appendix D. 
Flypothesis 7: There will be no sex differences or age differences or 
level of counseling experience difference between those counselors who 
have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test. 
These data were subjected to a t test to determine possible 
relationships between the variables. Results are presented in the 
fol low ing tab le. 
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TABLE 7 
Sex, age and experi ience correlations with the DIT 
t= £1 
Sex 1 .54 
.67 
Age 
.153 
.05* 
Experience 
.25 
.78 
* Since significant results have not occurred in this experiment, the 
significance of this result must be viewed with suspicion and may be an 
artifact of the statistical procedure and itself a result of chance 
significance. This notion is further indicated - due to the 
preponderance of subjects 19-22 years old. 
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Summary of Chapter IV Results 
The tests of the seven hypotheses yield mixed and at times contra¬ 
dictory results. No significant relationships were found between moral 
judgment as demonstrated by the Defining Issues Test and specific 
counselor behavior as described by the Microcounseling Taxonomy of 
Counselor Skills. Findings from the experiment indicate only that 
directional trends toward such a relationship may exist between the two 
variables measured. Two exceptions did occur: There appears to be a 
relationship between the use of helpee focused skills and counselor 
moral judgment. The relationship is evidenced when the data are 
subjected to the correlation coefficient statistic. When analyzed using 
the +_ test however, these variables do not prove to be related. The 
statistical significance of the relationship in this case may be a 
chance occurrence itself. Further study of the variable will determine 
which explanation is more accurate. 
The other exception is the positive relationship between moral 
judgment and age. This relationship has been demonstrated in the past 
(Rest, 1979; Kohl berg, 1973; Colby, 1979) but its demonstration in the 
present experiment is suspect since the age spread of the subject 
population is very narrow. This relationship, too, may be due to 
chance. The following chapter will discuss these findings in greater 
detail, address limitations of this research, and suggest modifications 
for future rep Iications. 
As expected by research already mentioned (Rest, 1979), sex is not 
a factor related to moral judgment. Counseling experience level does 
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not appear to be related to moral judgment. From these results, the 
null hypothesis is rejected insofar as the relationship between age and 
moral judgment is concerned but not insofar as sex and counseling 
experience is concerned. 
Graphic representation of the results of this experiment in the 
form of scatter plots are presented in Appendix 8. These scatter plots 
display a trend toward a relationship between moral judgment and 
counselor behavior in several pairings of the variables. 
Collapsing specific data into catagories yielded one significant 
result. This procedure necessitated a nonparametric analysis. Results 
of that analysis indicate that some association exists between Hi and Lo 
moral judgment and the differential usage of attending and influencing 
skills. No further information is afforded by this analysis. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
The general premise of This Thesis from which The seven hypoTheses 
were drawn was sTaTed earlier in The following Terms: Counselor 
Trainees wiTh higher moral judgmenT scores will employ paTTerns of 
counseling skill usage in a counseling siTuaTion differenT from Those 
wiTh lower moral judgmenT scores. To faciliTaTe discussion and To make 
The resulTs of This sTudy more meaningful in counseling and counselor 
educaTion, This premise will be sTaTed more specifically as follows: 
Counselor Trainees who are more advanced along The moral developmenT 
conTinuum will coincidenTaI Iy be more advanced as counseling 
pracTiTioners. OperaTionaI Iy, The Two variables of This more specific 
premise will be defined as follows: 
1. AdvancemenT along The moral developmenT conTinuum equaTes wiTh 
greaTer use of principled moral reasoning as measured by The Defining 
Issues TesT. 
2. AdvancemenT as a counseling pracTiTioner equaTes wiTh a greaTer 
varieTy of skills used, use of skills considered more advanced by 
Trainers, more use of helpee focused skills, higher raTing by 
independenT raTers and greaTer level of experience. 
Ideally, a clear posiTive significanT concordance beTween These Two 
variables would have been The resulT of The experimenTal manipulaTion 
described earlier. Clearly This concordance was noT demonsTraTed by The 
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results presented in the previous chapter. The present chapter will 
discuss the meaning and implication of those results from the perspective 
of what was expected and what actually occurred. 
Presented first will be a summary of the findings. Following that 
summary will be a discussion of those findings, including problems in 
the research that may have precluded conclusive results from surfacing. 
A discussion of implications that emanate from the research follows. 
Recommendations resulting from these implications will conclude the 
chapter. A summary of the entire study will be presented as the final 
chapter. 
Summary of findings 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 
1. No relationship was found between moral judgment and 
different microskills used. 
2. No relationship was found between moral judgment and 
attending skills usage. 
3. No relationship was found between moral judgment and 
influencing skills usage. 
4. A significant relationship was found between moral 
judgment and the use of helpee focused skills when 
subjected to the correlation coefficient; no significant 
relationship was found between the variables when 
subjected to the t_ test. 
5. No single skill is significantly related to moral 
judgment. Only paraphrase approaches significance in its 
relationship to moral judgment. Chi square analysis 
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indicates a significant association between Hi DIT and Lo 
UIT and the attending skills and the influencing skills 
when these skills are presented as catagories attending 
skills and influencing skills rather than as the 11 
separate skills. 
Hypothesis 6. No significant relationship was found between the quality 
score and moral judgment. 
Hypothesis 7. Moral judgment is related to the age of the counselor 
trainees but not to their sex or level of experience. 
Discussion of the findings 
Research seeking to relate moral judgment and behavior of any kind 
has inherent in it a host of problems. Some of these problems were 
outlined in Chapter 2. The research reported on in this thesis faces 
these same problems. Furthermore, this research faces another set of 
problems associated with describing and quantifying the complex behavior 
of counseling. The data reported in the previous chapter and summarized 
in this chapter indicate perhaps that both of these sets of problems 
have come together to allow for less than conclusive results. 
Additionally, instrumentation and structure present certain limitations. 
The Microcounseling Taxonomy used here, for example, has three important 
limitations as a test for describing counselor behavior: a. as used here 
the instrument is a quantification tool and generally delimits 
qualitative information, b. the instrument gathers information through 
the use of written transcripts and consequently does not incorporate 
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vocal Inflection, emotional components, and most nonverbal data, and 
c. the instrument contains a finite number of skills catagories and 
disallows the creative development of novel skills. The DIT is 
similarly limited for measuring moral judgment because it relies on 
self-reports of proposed action, relies on reading ability and makes no 
allowances for responses that result from imitation of moral argument 
rather than from true understanding. 
Three additonal limitations are structural: a. the sample is narrow 
regarding sex age and experience and small in number, b. the trainees 
demonstrate a low level of clinical ability; sophisticated counselor 
skills are therefore poorly represented in the data, and c. the 
interviews varied widely regarding content. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, however, certain conclusions can 
be drawn. A discussion of each of the seven hypothesis tests will be 
presented next. 
Hypothesis 1: There will be no significant difference in the manner of 
different microskills used by counselors who have scored higher or lower 
on the Defining Issues Test. 
It is well known by educators and practicioners in applied 
psychology that variety of response mode can be a characteristic of 
successful counseling. Without that variety, many believe, the inter¬ 
action becomes stale, predictable and can lose therapeutic impact. The 
first hypothesis of this thesis was directed at investigating this 
characteristic as it might be related to moral judgment. As was stated 
above, results of testing the hypothesis do not indicate any significant 
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relationship between the two variables. 
Significant results were expected based on the belief that higher 
quality (I .e., more varied) counseling would be practiced by those 
trainees who were more advanced in moral judgment. Research with pedia¬ 
tric residents (Sheehan, 1979) found this quality/moral judgment link to 
be clear and highly significant. Similar findings were expected to 
result among counselor trainees. 
Problems that may have been responsible for the difficulty and the 
present failure to find a variety of response mode/moral judgment links, 
if in fact such links exist, may be the result of internal experimental 
flaws. Two likely prospects for these flaws are sample characteristics 
and the nature of the interviews from which the counselor behavior was 
drawn. In a replication of this study, more advanced trainees should be 
used. If subjects were counselor interns rather than novice counselors 
the sample population would more closely resemble Sheehan's sample. 
Similarly, conclusive results may be more readiIy obtainab Ie if longer, 
more clinical interviews were coded. 
Hypothesis 2: There will be no significant difference in attending 
skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
In this hypothesis, attending skills were parceled out of the skills 
sample for each subject. The resultant attending skills score was then 
related to the moral judgment score. The parceling out process was 
justified because in certain circumstances, attending skills alone can 
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account for quality counseling. These circumstances include initial 
Interview and low-to-moderate emotional level in the concerns presented 
(Ivey, 1979, personal communication). These characteristics were 
present in the interviews used in this study. Hence, the expected 
result of relating attending skills and moral judgment score was that 
increased attending skills usage would para I lei moral judgment score. A 
trend in the direction did appear to occur in the data. Yet no 
significant relationship was found. 
An enhancement of the relationship might occur if more experienced 
trainees constituted the sample. Similarly, more conclusive findings 
might result if longer, more clinically oriented interviews were coded. 
Hypothesis 3: There will be no significant difference in influencing 
skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
According to the theory and practice of the Microcounseling 
training system, increased influencing skills usage indicates more 
advanced counseling behavior. The link between influencing skills usage 
and moral judgment was expected to be significant. Theoretical 
speculations of the general premise might predict that a weak but 
significant relationship could exist between attending skills usage and 
moral judgment while a stronger significant relationship could exist 
between influencing skills usage and moral judgment. This speculation 
is predicated on the idea that trainees more advanced in counseling 
skills usage (i.e., those using more of the higher order influencing 
skills) could coincidentally be more advanced along the moral judgment 
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continuum. If so, this finding would conform to results in the study of 
pediatric residents cited above. However, in the case of a relationship 
between moral judgment and influencing skills usage, no relationship was 
found. It can be concluded that no relationship exists or that the 
internal experimental flaws mentioned earlier are operant in this 
hypothesis testing. If the latter conclusion holds, an explanation of 
the lack of any demonstrated relationship between these two 
theoretically related variables follows the same path as explanations 
for weak results given earlier. These include: 
1. Longer sample interviews are required. 
2. The interviews should be more clinically oriented. 
3. More advanced counselor trainees should participate in the 
study. 
Inclusion of these three changes in the structure of the experiment may 
favor more meaningful results in a test for a relationship between 
influencing skill usage and moral judgment. 
Hypothesis 4: There will be no significant difference in the use of the 
"He I pee" focus dimension between counselors who have scored higher or 
lower on the Defining Issues Test. 
He I pee focused skills are those that refer directly to the client. 
They are thought to assist the client in expressing his/her needs, 
feelings values, and so on. This notion is based on the general 
research in client-centered therapy and in particular in the work of 
Carl Rogers (1951). Extensions within the microtraining system appear 
to bear this out (Ivey & Authier, 1978). Within both the client- 
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centered model and the Microcounseling system, therefore, the use of 
he I Pee focused skills implies that the counselor accepts the validity of 
the client's understanding of the problem presented. Such acceptance 
corresponds roughly to Piaget's theoretical principle of reciprocity. 
That is, the counselor demonstrates, with his/her helpee focused skills 
usage, an appreciation of the client's perception of his/her problems, 
values the client's perception, and legitimizes the client's right to 
those perceptions. This style of interaction characterizes Piaget's 
autonomous stage, Kohlberg's universal ethical principles orientation 
and Rest's stages 5 and 6 as adaptations of the work of both Piaget and 
Kohlberg. The investigation of the helpee focused skills usage 
therefore was expected to provide clear results. Results obtained were 
not clear, however. As mentioned earlier, a significant relationship 
was found between helpee focused skills and moral judgment when the data 
were subjected to the correlation coefficient test but not significant 
when subjected to a _t test. These two results may differ because of the 
two statistics or the actual lack of relationship between the two 
variables. Again, a replication of the study should pay close attention 
to sample characteristics outlined above. Explanation of this and 
similar conflicting results based on the statistics used may involve the 
following: As a test of significance the correlation coefficient is 
more sensitive than the t test since the former uses actual scores while 
the latter weakens its effect by using mean scores. This is known as 
the attenuation-of-range effect. It occurs when a continuous variable is 
dichotomized. In this case the continuous variable of the P% score was 
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dichotomized i nto H i D IT and Lo D IT. Dichotomized data such as these 
yield correlations lower than those found when the entire range of data 
is analyzed. Lower correlations result from the dramatic reduction in 
the variation of the variable inherent in dicotomization. In studies, 
such as this one, that yield wide ranging continuous scores, the corre- 
I at ion coefficient alone may be the better test of significance. 
Hypothesis 5: There will be no significant difference in specific 
microskills usage between those who have scored higher or lower on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
This test was an attempt to see if the use of any specific skill 
could be isolated as a result of high association with moral judgment 
score. This test can be seen as the opposite of the first test, which 
looked at the variety of skills used. No reliable relationships were 
found in the data. Although "paraphrase" correlated significantly with 
moral judgment, the relationship is suspect because "reflection of 
feeling," a very similar skill, did not even approach any meaningful 
relationship. Single skill predominance therefore does not appear to 
relate to moral judgment. 
The additional analysis using the chi square statistic proved more 
fruitful. Results from that test indicate a significant association 
between moral judgment and counselor skills usage when the latter are 
collapsed into the two skill groups attending and influencing skills. 
This result is in accord with the intuitive notion that differential 
usage of counselor skills would indicate differential moral judgment 
score or vice versa. As a non parametric analysis, however, no more 
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information about the relationship is afforded. Yet, the conclusive 
result, however lacking in information about degree or direction of 
association does indicate that the more powerful parametric tests 
otherwised employed in this study may yet provide meaningful results 
after internal refinements to the research design and methodology are 
made. 
Hypothesis 6: There will be no significant difference in overall 
quality of counseling between those counselors who have scored higher or 
lower on the Defining Issues Test. 
This hypothesis explored relationships between overall quality of 
counseling and counselor moral judgment. The hypothesis did not employ 
the Microcounseling Taxonomy of Counselor Skills to define counselor 
behavior. In place of that tool a measure of judging overall quality of 
counseling was devised. This measure analyzed counselor behavior 
through the expert ratings method. A full description of this procedure 
appears in Chapter I I I of this report. The tool was used here in order 
to investigate the possibility that a method of counselor behavior 
analysis different from the separate skills approach used in the other 
hypotheses might provide different results. This different result did 
not occur. No statistically significant relationship was found between 
expert ratings and moral judgment. Since the ratings were completely 
subjective, the explanation for the lack of relationship differs from 
explanations for nonsignificance given earlier. 
Strengths of the method include the following: a. the sample 
134 
interviews were long enough for analysis by the experts, b. although 
quite varied, the interviews allowed for internal comparison, and c. the 
variety of backgrounds in the rater group negates any charge of bias 
that might have been leveled at the Microcounseling approach. 
Weaknesses of the method include the following: a. raters may have 
been unfamiliar with evaluation of counselor behavior from transcripts, 
b. raters may have been unfamiliar with various interviewing styles, and 
c. raters may have become uninterested or fatigued given the volume of 
reading involved. 
Analysis of data from this hypothesis was by pearson r correlation 
coeficient and by t_ test. In neither analysis was a significant 
relationship found between the variables. 
Hypothesis 7: There will be no sex differences or age differences or 
level of counseling experience differences between those counselors who 
have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test. 
The sex of the subject was found to have no apparent relationship 
to moral judgment. This outcome is consistent with theoretical expecta¬ 
tions, since neither moral judgment nor counseling effectiveness has 
been predictable from the sex of the counselor. Future research may 
include age and experienced matched pairs of male and female subjects to 
investigate this more carefully. 
More definitive information has surfaced by pairing age and moral 
judgment. This result is also consistent with previous research and 
theoretical expectations. Yet caution must be exercised with respect to 
this finding. Since the age of the sample population was heavily 
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represented by younger subjects, the sample may be too narrow for 
meaningful analysis. The statistical significance may be a chance 
occurrence. Further study will explore this possibility and may profit 
by finding a sample that includes subjects from the various ages of 
counselors and/or trainees. 
Level of counseling experience was expected to be related to moral 
judgment for two reasons: a. age and experience are usually related and 
b. more experience in counseling practice implies a wider range of 
exposure to diverse moral arguments. These expectations were not 
realized through manipulation of the data available to this study. The 
lack of relationship between experience as a counselor and moral 
judgment may be accounted for by design flaws. These flaws may be 
remedied by incorporating the recommendations mentioned earlier in this 
text. If replications still fail to find the expected relationships and 
if design flaws are ruled out, then the relationship between counselor 
moral judgment and counselor professional behavior must be questioned. 
Implications of this conclusion are presented in Chapter VI of this 
report. This argument centers on questions about the basic raison 
d'etre of counseling as a personal and professional activity and as a 
purposeful and defensible force in society. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY 
Introduction 
The questions associated with the introduction of counselor moral 
values into the therapy process is not new and is now receiving renewed 
attention. The purpose of this study is to investigate the nature of 
relationships that may exist between the moral judgment of counselor 
trainees and the behavior exhibited by those trainees in an analogue 
counseling interview. 
Two considerations have motivated this research. The first is a 
renewed discussion of counselors' values in applied psychology. The 
discusion questions both the advisability and the possibility of 
achieving value freedom in psychotherapeutic interactions. The second 
consideration motivating this research springs from speculations 
surrounding this discussion. These speculations concern the 
advisability and the possibility, not of achieving value freedom in 
counseling, but of achieving its converse — maximizing value advocacy. 
These two sets of questions have a significant recent history. 
London's (1967) and Lowe's (1976) works characterize well written and 
thoughtful examples of a scholarly and dispassionate approach to the 
documentation of the involvement of personal values in psychological 
counseling. Others (Ivey, 1980; Senour, 1982) personalize their approach 
and call for individual action directed to produce wide and pervasive 
effects on clients as well as on social institutions. Still others, 
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(Carkuff, 1972; Sue, 1977; Gordon, 1976) single out particular social 
concerns with a corresponding call for specific advocacy. These 
include, among others, the aims of humanism and the eradication of 
sexism and racism. 
These discussions taken together constitute a renewed dialogue 
focusing on the issues involved with incorporating the personal values 
of the counselor into the practice of counseling. The study summarized 
here is an attempt to begin research in this area at a truly fundamental 
level in a controlled experimental format. Given that goal, two basic 
variables were isolated: a. counselor moral values and b. trainee 
behavior in a demonstration counseling interview. Relationships found 
between these two, it was thought, would help develop a basic 
understanding of the involvement of the personal values of the counselor 
in the counseling interation. 
Background research for this study 
No research has been completed that investigates the relationship 
between the moral values of counselors and the behavior that counselors 
display in counseling interviews. One study (Sheehan, 1979) has looked 
at the relationship between moral judgment — defined as a subject's 
methods of choosing right and wrong — and quality of performance among 
pediatric residents. This study used an instrument known as The 
Defining Issues Test (DIT) to quantify the former of these variables and 
supervisors reports to quantify the latter. Results indicated that 
moral judgment as measured along a continuum defined by the DIT related 
significantly to supervisory reports. 
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The present study is similar to the Sheehan study in that the 
source of moral judgment data was the Defining Issues Test. This test 
is a paper and pencil survey seeking to define the percentages of use of 
moral arguments coded at the three levels and six stages of moral 
judgment postulated by Kohlberg (1958, 1976). These levels and stages 
are: 
Level 1. The PreconventionaI level: The good is what I like and want. 
Stage 1. The punishment and obedience level: Good is rewarded bad is 
punished. 
Stage 2. The instrumental, relativist orientation: Good is equated 
Level 2. The Conventional level: One is actively loyal to one's social 
order. 
Stage 3. The interpersonaI concordance or "good boy" - "nice girl" 
orientation. I do what family and society expect of me in 
order to be good. 
Stage 4. Law and Order: Good is defined as adherence to the fixed 
rules and laws of society. 
Level 3. The PostconventionaI, autonomous or principles level. 
Stage 5. The social contract, legalistic orientation: The good 
(right) is what is constitutionally and democratically 
agreed on. Agreed upon external principles define the good. 
Stage 6. The Universal Ethical Principle Orientation: The right is 
defined by appeal to accepted and self chosen ethical 
principles characterized by universality and consistency. 
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Validity and reliability of the DIT as an instrument for gathering 
these data have been extensively researched (Rest, 1979). Using the 
instrument, the data are presented in a form that allows a base of 
statistical manipulation. Broad vaIidity, reliability, ease of 
manipulation, and other reasons have led to the use of the DIT in this 
study of counselor moral judgment and counselor professional behavior. 
The second variable, counselor professional behavior, was analyzed 
using the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. This instrument 
capitalizes on the theoretical framework basic to the Microcounseling 
Training System (Ivey et al., 1968, 1978). This training paradigm is 
based on the notion that counseling behavior is a subtle interplay of 
observable and definable behavioral bits or counseling skills. The 
tabulation of these skills as they are represented in effective 
counseling constitutes the Microskills Taxonomy of Counselor Skills. 
This taxonomy was used in this study as the method for describing 
counselor trainee behavior. Of the complete taxonomy, the following 11 
skills and the helpee focus dimension were chosen for analysis in the 
present study. 
THE TAXONOMY OF MICROTRAINING 
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE SKILLS 
A. The microtraining skills. 
Attending skills: 
1. CLOSED QUESTIONS. Most often begin with "do," "is," "are" and can 
be answered by the helpee with only a few words. 
2. OPEN QUESTIONS. Typically begin with "what," "how," "why," or 
"could" and allow the helpee more room for self-exploration. 
3. MINIMAL ENCOURAGE. Selective attention to and repetition back to 
the helpee of exact words or phrases. May also be represented by 
"Tell me more..." or "Uh-huh." 
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4. PARAPHRASE. Gives back to the helpee the essence of past verbal 
statements. Selective attention to key content of helpee 
verba Iizations. 
5. REFLECTION OF FEELING. Selective attention to key affective or 
emotional aspects of helpee behavior. 
6. SUMMARIZATION. Similar to paraphrase and reflection of feeling but 
represents a longer time period and gives back to client several 
strands of thinking. 
InfIuencing skills. 
7. DIRECTIONS. Telling the helper or helpees what to do. 
8. EXPRESSION OF CONTENT. Giving advice, sharing information, making 
suggestions, giving opinions. 
9. EXPRESSION OF FEELING. Sharing personal or other people's affective 
state in the interview. 
10. SELF-DISCLOSURE. The helper's "I" statement. What the helper 
thinks, feels, or has experienced pertinent to the counseling 
interview. 
11. INTERPRETATION. Renaming or relabeling the helpee's behavior or 
verbalizations with new words from a new frame of reference. 
B. Focus dimension. The main theme or subject of the helpee or helper's 
sentence often determines what either individual will speak about 
next. 
FIELPEE. The helper's statement focuses on the client. May be 
demonstrated by the helper using the client's name or the personal 
pronoun "you." In the case of the helpee, this focus is generally 
manifested by an "I" statement. 
(Adapted From Ivey & Authier, 1978, pp. 67-68) 
Information gathered about the moral judgment of the counselor trainees 
and those trainees' counseling behavior was then analyzed to uncover 
relationships that may be useful to future researchers as they attempt 
to answer the general and specific questions surrounding the interface 
of counselor values and counseling practice. 
Experimental procedures 
Method. The subjects were 40 male and female undergraduate 
students enrolled in an introductory course in counseling theory and 
practice at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst in the Spring of 
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1980. Subject participation was voluntary. To generate data on these 
subjects' moral judgment level, the Defining Issues Test was presented 
as a take home assignment. Within three weeks their DIT protocols were 
collected and objectively scored by the Minnesota Moral Research Project 
at the University of Minnesota at Minneapolis. Through this procedure 
each subject received a score that revealed the degree to which he/she 
favored moral arguments character ized as principled level (i.e., Stages 
5 and 6 in the Kohlberg formulation) in the stimulus dilemmas. The 
behavioral variable was quantified using the Microskills Taxonomy of 
Counselor Skills. This quantification was accomplished in the following 
way. As a part of the expected work for the introductory course, each 
student prepared an audio tape of a five minute counseling interview. 
Transcripts of these interviews were prepared and collected. The 
transcripts were presented to a professional Microcounseling trainer for 
coding. Coding is straightforward. Each counselor lead is analyzed for 
its identifying type as defined in the taxonomy. These leads are 
semantically specific and clearly defined. Information so gathered then 
provides a descriptive analysis of each subject's counseling behavior. 
This includes a set of scores reflective of each subject's use of the 11 
microskills addressed in this study. 
These 11 skills were analyzed both as attending skills and 
influencing skills and as separate skills. Additionally, the focus of 
the skills was considered. Singled out for study here was the He I pee 
focus option. Helpee focused skills are those that address themselves 
directly to the client rather than to some other person, the counselor, 
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the context, or the environment. 
A further consideration of counselor behavior was made by 
appraising the overall quality of the interview. This was done by ten 
(10) disinterested psychological practitioners. Each read the 
transcripts and rated each one on a four-1 eve I scale of poor to very 
good. Averaged, these ten ratings produced a Quality Score for each 
subject. This also was related to moral judgment. 
Manipulation of the data generated using the OIT, the MTCS, and the 
Quality Score was determined by the seven hypotheses tested in the 
study. These hypotheses resulted from original research speculations 
that brought forth a general premise. The general premise and the 
hypotheses follow: Counselor trainers with higher moral judgment scores 
will employ patterns of counseling skill usage in a counseling situation 
different from those with lower moral judgment scores. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference in the number of 
different microskills used by counselors who have scored higher or lower 
on the Defining Issues Test. 
Hypothesis 2: There is no significant difference in attending 
skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
Hypothesis 3: There is no significant difference in influencing 
skills usage between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
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Hypothesis 4: There is no significant difference in the focus 
dimension between counselors who have scored higher or lower on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
Hypothesis 5: There is no significant difference in specific 
microskiI Is usage between those who have scored higher or lower on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
Hypothesis 6: There is no significant difference in overall 
quality of counseling between those counselors who have scored higher or 
lower on the Defining Issues Test. 
Hypothesis 7: There are no sex differences or age differences or 
level of counseling experience differences between those counselors who 
have scored higher or lower on the Defining Issues Test. 
Analysis of the data was statistical. Relationships between 
counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior were sought using the 
coefficient of correlation and the t_ test. One additional chi square 
analysis was computed, results of these procedures are presented next. 
ResuIts 
Others who have done research on the effects of moral values on 
behavior have cautioned that results can often be disappointing. In 
this study few truly conclusive results were obtained. Only results 
suggestive of various trends and possible directions for future research 
were found. A summary of the results of each hypothesis test is 
presented below. 
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Summary of findings 
Hypothesis 1. No relationship was found between moral judgment and 
different microskills used. 
Hypothesis 2. No relationship was found between moral judgment and 
attending skills usage. 
Hypothesis 3. No relationship was found between moral judgment and 
influencing skills usage. 
Hypothesis 4. A significant relationship was found between moral judgment 
and the use of helpee focused skills when subjected to the correlation 
coefficient; no significant relationship was found between the variables 
when subjected to the _t test. 
Hypothesis 5. No singIe skiI I is significantly related to moral 
judgment. Only paraphrase approaches significance in its relationship 
to moral judgment. Chi square analysis indicates a significant 
association between Hi DIT and Lo DIT and the attending skills and the 
influencing skills when these skills are presented as catagories 
attending skills and influencing skills rather than as the eleven 
separate skills. 
Hypothesis 6. No significant relationship was found between the quality 
score and moral judgment. 
Hypothesis 7. Moral judgment is related to the age of the counselor 
trainees but not to their sex or level of experience. 
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Discussion of findings 
The many difficulties inherent in research that seeks to define 
relationships between moral judgment and behavior have been well 
documented. This study, like others investigating these complex 
relationships, also faces these difficulties. Additionally, this 
investigation faces the simiIarIy troubIesome, well known problems 
surrounding attempts to define counseling behavior. The results 
obtained in this study reflect these problems. Implications drawn from 
these results therefore must follow a suggestive rather than conclusive 
path. 
ImpI?cat ions 
Issues that have motivated this research, coupled with the lack of 
conclusive findings strongly favor broad rather than specific 
implications. The most basic of these centers around the issue of 
defining the reason for the failure to find conclusive relationsips 
between so many pairs of seemingly related variables. Two theoretical 
possibilities exist: a. the research is theoretically and/or 
methodologically flawed and b. no relationship actually exists. The first 
possibility indicates a need for structural changes in the research and 
subsequent replications of the study. Should these replications 
demonstrate a clear concordance between counselor trainee moral judgment 
and counselor trainee behavior, then conclusions and implications can be 
drawn from those data. 
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The second possibility generates a new set of questions and 
implications. These center around very basic issues concerning what 
part, if any, moral judgment and personal values in general should play 
in counseling. In the largest sense these questions and implications 
result from an acceptance of the conclusions that moral judgment and 
professional behavior are not linked in the practice of counseling; they 
also challenge what counseling is as both a professional and a personal 
activity. The "no relationship" explanation brings into sharp focus 
philosophical issues and questions underlying applied psychology. In 
short, this explanation forces psychological theoreticians to ask if the 
lack of relationship is appropriate, desirable, or tolerable. 
The point of view expressed both overtly and as an underlying theme 
of this research is that a lack of a demonstrable relationship between 
counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior is indeed an undesirable 
occurance. Further, it is maintained here that we as professional 
counselors owe our clients, ourselves our profession, and our society 
more than this "no relationship" explanation affords. It is maintained 
here that a meaningful convergence between authentic moral values of 
counselors and the authentic behavior of counselors is a professionally 
sound imperative of training, theory, and practice. 
If, in replications of this study, no reliable relationships 
between counselor moral judgment and counselor behavior can be 
demonstrated, then steps must be taken to assure that a relationship 
will obtain among future professionals. Selection of trainees, 
appropriate moral/values training, and meaningful field placements are 
suggested as avenues for this assurance. FaiIing this effort, 
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counseling may continue to be an activity largely characterized by a 
haphazard and indistinct values structure and may continue to include 
many professionals who remain only bystanders in the march of 
civiIization. 
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Appendix A: The Defining Issues Test 
OPINIONS ABOUT SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
is a,i?yisa;,r:i;;;:;::you win bc askc<i ,o «««, „0^ 
Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. Me is married, has two small children 
earns an average income. The car he buys will be his family’s only car. I, will be used 
mostly to get to work and dr.ve around town, but sometimes for vacation trips also. In try- 
°*C,de :hatC#r l° bUV’ Frank J°nes rcaliated that there were a lot of questions to con- 
siclcr. Below there is a list of some of these questions. 
If you were Frank Jones, how important would each of these questions be in deciding 
what car to buy? 
Instructions for Part A: (Sample Question) 
On the left hand side check one of the spaces by each statement of a consideration. (For in¬ 
stance, if you think that statement #1 is not important in making a decision about buying 
a car, check the space on the right.) 
IMPORTANCE: 
Crcat Much Some Little No 
V 
1. Whether the car dealer was in the same block as 
where Frank lives. (Note that in this sample, the 
person taking the questionnaire did not think this 
was important in making a decision.) 
V 
2. Would a used car bc more economical in the long 
run than' a new car. (Note that a check was put in 
the far left space to indicate the opinion that this 
is an important issue in making a decision about 
buying a car.) 
V 3. Whether the color was green, Frank’s favorite color. 
V 
4. Whether the cubic inch displacement was at least 
200. (Note that if you arc unsure about what "cu¬ 
bic inch displacement" means, then mark it "no 
importance.") 
V 
5. Would a large, roomy car bc better than a compact 
car. 
V 
6. Whether the front connibilies were differential. 
(Note that if a statement sounds like gibberish or 
nonsense to you, mark it “no importance.") 
Instructions for Part B: (Sample Question) 
From the list of questions above, select the most important one of the whole group. Put the 
number of the most important question on the top line below. Do likewise for your 2nd, 
3rd and 4th most important choices. (Note that the top choices in this case will come from 
the statements that were checked on the far left-hand side—statements #2 and #5 were 
thought to be very important. In deciding what is the most important, a person would re-read 
#2 and *5, and then pick one of them as the most important, then put the other one as se¬ 
cond most important," and so on.) 
MOST 2ND MOST IMPORTANT 3RD MOST IMPORTANT 4TII MOST IMPORTANT 
5 2 3 1 
APPENDIX A, (Cont.) 
HEINZ AND THE DRUG 
In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug 
that doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town 
had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten 
times what the drug cost to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a 
small dose of the drug. The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to bor¬ 
row the money, but he could only get together about $1,000, which is half of what it cost. 
He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay 
later. But the druggist said, “No, I discovered the drug and I’m going to make money from 
it. So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking into the man’s store to steal 
the drug for his wife. 
Should Heinz steal the drug? (Check one) 
-Should steal it -Can’t decide _Should not steal it 
IMPORTANCE: 
Great Much Some Little No 
1. Whether a community’s laws are going to be upheld. 
2. Isn't it only natural for a loving husband to care so 
much for his wife that he’d steal? 
3. Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar or 
going to jail for the chance that stealing the drug 
might help? 
4. Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or has con¬ 
siderable influence with professional wrestlers. 
5. Whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this 
solely to help someone else. 
6. Whether the druggist’s rights to his invention have 
to be respected. 
7. Whether the essence of living is more encompassing 
than the termination of dying, socially and indivi¬ 
dually. 
8. What values are going to be the basis for governing 
how people act towards each other. 
9. Whether the druggist is going to be allowed to hide 
behind a worthless law which only protects the rich 
anyhow. 
10. Whether the law in this case is getting in the way 
of the most basic claim of any member of society. 
11. VVhether the druggist deserves to be robbed for be¬ 
ing so greedy and cruel. 
12. Would stealing in such a case bring about more to¬ 
tal good for the whole society or not. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most important_ Second most important 
Third most important_ Fourth most important 
(Cont.) APPENDIX A, 
STUDENT TAKE OVER 
At Harvard University a group of students, called the Students for a Democratic Society 
(SDS), believe that the University should not have an army ROTC program. SDS students 
arc against the war in Viet Nam, and the army training program helps send men to fight in 
Viet Nam. The SDS students demanded that Harvard end the army ROTC training program 
as a university course. This would mean that Harvard students could not get army training as 
part of their regular course work and not get credit for it towards their degrees. 
Agreeing with the SDS students, the Harvard professors voted to end the ROTC program 
as a university course. But the President of the University stated that he wanted to keep the 
army program on campus as a course. The SDS students felt that the President was not going 
to pay attention to the faculty vote or to their demands. 
So, one day last April, two hundred SDS students walked into the university's adminis¬ 
tration building, and told everyone else to get out. They said they were doing this to force 
Harvard to get rid of the army training program as a course. 
Should the students have taken over the administration building? (Check one) 
_Yes, they should take it over_.Can’t decide_No, they shouldn’t take it over 
IMPORTANCE: 
Great Much Some Little No 
1. Are the students doing this to really help other 
people or are they doing it just for kicks? 
2. Do the students have any right to take over property 
that doesn’t belong to them? 
3. Do the students realize that they might be arrested 
and fined, and even expelled from school? 
4. Would taking over the building in the long run 
benefit more people to a greater extent? 
5. Whether the president stayed withing the limits of 
his authority in ignoring the faculty vote. 
6. Will the takeover anger the public and give all stu¬ 
dents a bad name? 
7. Is taking over a building consistent with principles 
of justice? 
8. Would allowing one student take-over encourage 
many other student take-overs? 
9. Did the president bring this misunderstanding on 
himself by being so unreasonable and uncooperative. 
10. Whether running the university ought to be in the 
hands of a few administrators or in the hands of all 
the people. 
11. Are the students following principles which thty 
believe are above the law? 
12. Whether or not university decisions ought to be 
respected by students. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most important_ Second most important 
Third most important_ Fourth most important 
APPENDIX A, (Cont.) 
ESCAPED PRISONER 
A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped 
from prison, moved to a new. area of the country, and took on the name of Thompson. For 
8 years he worked hard, and gradually he saved enough money to buy his own business. He 
was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his own profits to 
charity. Then one day, Mrs. Jones, an old neighbor, recognized him as the man who had es¬ 
caped from prison 8 years before, and whom the police had been looking for. 
Should Mrs. Jones report Mr. Thompson to the police and have him sent back to prison? 
(Check one) 
_Should report him _Can’t decide _Should not report him 
IMPORTANCE: 
Great Much Some Little No 
1. Hasn’t Mr. Thompson been good enough for such a 
long time to prove he isn’t a bad person? 
2. Every time someone escapes punishment for a crime, 
doesn’t that just encourage more crime? 
3. Wouldn’t we be better off without prisons and the 
oppression of our legal systems? 
4. Has Mr. Thompson really paid his debt to society? 
5. Would society be failing what Mr. Thompson should 
fairly expect? 
6. What benefits would prisons be apart from society, 
especially for a charitable man? 
7. How could anyone be so cruel and heartless as to 
send Mr. Thompson to prison? 
8. Would it be fair to all the prisoners who had to serve 
out their full sentences if Mr. Thompson was let off? 
9. Was Mrs. Jones a good friend of Mr. Thompson? 
10. Wouldn’t it be a citizen’s duty to report an escaped 
criminal, regardless of the circumstances? 
11. How would the will of the people and the public 
good best be served? 
12. Would going to prison do any good for Mr. Thomp¬ 
son or protect anybody? 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most important_ Second most important 
Third most important_ Fourth most important 
APPENDIX A, (Cont.) 
THE DOCTOR’S DILEMMA 
A lady was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only about six months 
to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of pain-killer like 
morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in 
her calm periods, she would ask the doctor to give her enough morphine to kill her. She said 
she couldn’t stand the pain and that she was going to die in a few months anyway. 
What should the doctor do? (Check one) 
_He should give the lady an overdose _Can’t decide _Should not give the 
that will make her die overdose 
IMPORTANCE: 
Great Much Some Little No 
1. Whether the woman’s family is in favor of giving 
her the overdose or not. 
2. Is the doctor obligated by the same laws as every¬ 
body else if giving her an overdose would be the 
same as killing her. 
3. Whether people would be much better off without 
society regimenting their lives and even their deaths. 
4. Whether the doctor could make it appear like an 
accident. 
5. Does the state have the right to force continued ex¬ 
istence on those who don’t want to live. 
6. What is the value of death prior to society’s perspec¬ 
tive on personal values. 
7. Whether the doctor has sympathy for the woman’s 
suffering or cares more about what society might 
think. 
8. Is helping to end another’s life ever a responsible 
act of cooperation. 
9. Whether only God should decide when a person’s 
life should end. 
10. What values the doctor has set for himself in his 
own personal code of behavior. 
11. Can society afford to let everybody end their lives 
when they want to. 
12. Can society allow suicides or mercy killing and 
still protect the lives of individuals who want to live. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most important_ Second most important 
Third most important_ F°urth most important 
APPENDIX A, (Cont.) 
WEBSTER 
Mr. Webster was the owner and manager of a gas station. He wanted to hire another me¬ 
chanic to help him, but good mechanics were hard to find. The only person he found who 
seemed to be a good mechanic was Mr. Lee, but he was Chinese. While Mr. Webster himself 
didn’t have anything against Orientals, he was afraid to hire Mr. Lee because many of his 
customers didn’t like Orientals. His customers might take their business elsewhere if Mr. Lee 
was working in the gas station. 
When Mr. Lee asked Mr. Webster if he could have the job, Mr. Webster said that he had 
already hired somebody else. But Mr. Webster really had not hired anybody, because he could 
not find anybody who was a good mechanic besides Mr. Lee. 
What should Mr. Webster have done? (Check one) 
-Should have hired Mr. Lee _Can’t decide _Should not have hired him 
IMPORTANCE: 
Great Much Some Little No 
1. Does the owner of a business have the right to make 
his own business decisions or not? 
2. Whether there is a law that forbids racial discrimi¬ 
nation in hiring for jobs. 
3. Whether Mr. Webster is prejudiced against orientals 
himself or whether he means nothing personal in 
refusing the job. 
4. Whether hiring a good mechanic or paying attention 
to his customers’ wishes would be best for his busi¬ 
ness. 
5. What individual differences ought to be relevant in 
deciding how society’s roles are filled? 
6. Whether the greedy and competitive capitalistic 
system ought to be completely abandoned. 
7. Do a majority of people in Mr. Webster’s society 
feel like his customers or are a majority against pre¬ 
judice? 
8. Whether hiring capable men like Mr. Lee would use 
talents that would otherwise be lost to society. 
9. Would refusing the job to Mr. Lee be consistent with 
Mr. Webster’s own moral beliefs? 
10. Could Mr. Webster be so hard-hearted as to refuse 
the job, knowing how much it means to Mr. Lee? 
11. Whether the Christian commandment to love your 
fellow man applies in this case. 
12. If someone’s in need, shouldn’t he be helped regard¬ 
less of what you get back from him? 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most important_ Second most important 
Third most important_ Fourth most important 
APPENDIX A, (Cent.) 
NEWSPAPER 
Fred, a senior in high school, wanted to publish a mimeographed newspaper for students 
so that he could express many of his opinions. He wanted to speak out against the war in 
Viet Nam and to speak out against some of the school’s rules, like the rule forbidding boys 
to wear long hair. 
When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for permission. The principal 
said it would be all right if before every publication Fred would turn in all his articles for 
the principal’s approval. Fred agreed and turned in several articles for approval. The principal 
approved all of them and Fred published two issues of the paper in the next two weeks. 
But the principal had not expected that Fred’s newspaper would receive so much atten¬ 
tion. Students were so excited by the paper that they began to organize protests against the 
hair regulation and other school rules. Angry parents objected to Fred’s opinions. They 
phoned the principal telling him that the newspaper was unpatriotic and should not be pub¬ 
lished. As a result of the rising excitement, the principal ordered Fred to stop publishing, lie 
gave as a reason that Fred’s activities were disruptive to the operation of the school. 
Should the principal stop the newspaper? (Check one) 
_Should stop it _Can’t decide _Should not stop it 
IMPORTANCE: 
Great Much Some Little No 
1. Is the principal more responsible to students or to 
the parents? 
2. Did the principal give his word that the newspaper 
could be published for a long time, or did he just 
promise to approve the newspaper one issue at a time 
3. Would the students start protesting even more if 
the principal stopped the newspaper? 
4. When the welfare of the school is threatened, docs 
the principal have the right to give orders to stu¬ 
dents? 
5. Does the principal have the freedom of speech to 
say “no” in this case? 
6. If the principal stopped the newspaper would he be 
preventing full discussion of important problems? 
7. Whether the principal’s order would make Fred lose 
faith in the principal. 
8. Whether Fred was really loyal to his school and pa¬ 
triotic to his country. 
9. What effect would stopping the paper have on the 
student’s education in critical thinking and judg¬ 
ments? 
10. Whether Fred was in any way violating the rights 
of others in publishing his own opinions. 
' 
11. Whether the principal should be influenced by some- 
angry parents when it is the principal that knows 
best what is going on in the school. 
12. Whether Fred was using the newspaper to stir up 
hatred and discontent. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important. 
Most important_ Second most important, 
Third most important- Fourth most important 
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Figure 12 
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Figure 13 
SIFJ5ISC 
0.500 
0.275 
0.250 
0.225 
0.200 
0.175 
0.150 
0.125 
0.100 
0.075 
0.050 
0.025 
0.000 
I 
I 
I 
♦ 
I 
I 
I 
4 
t 
I 
I 
♦ 
I 
I 
I 
4 
I 
I 
I 
♦ 
I 
I 
I 
* 
I 
I 
I 
4 
I 
I 
I 
4 
I 
I 
I 
4 
I 
I 
I 
4 
I 
I 
I 
4 
I 
I 
I 
4 * 
-4 4' 
20 25 
A 
A A 
BAA BAB A AA B A C 
PR SCORE 
Scat+erplot of Self Disclosures and P% Score 
Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc 
174 
APPENDIX B (Cont.) 
Figure 14 
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Figure 15 
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Figure 16 
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Figure 17 
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AGE I 
I 
I 
I 
40 ♦ 
I 
39 ♦ 
I 
38 ♦ 
I 
37 ♦ 
I 
36 ♦ 
I 
35 ♦ 
I 
34 ♦ 
I 
33 ♦ 
I 
32 ♦ 
I 
31 ♦ 
I 
30 4 
I 
29 ♦ 
I 
28 ♦ 
I 
27 ♦ 
I 
26 ♦ 
I 
25 ♦ 
I 
24 ♦ 
I 
23 ♦ 
I 
22 ♦ 
I 
21 ♦ 
I 
*20 ♦ 
I 
19 ♦ 
I 
I 
I 
20 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A A 
A 
A 
A A A A A 
A A 
baa a 
AAA AAA A AA 
A A 
A 
A A A 
25 
------- 
30 35 <*0 <*5 50 
SCOPE 
---- 
55 60 65 
A 
A 
A 
70 75 80 
Scatterplot of Age and P% Score 
Legend: A = 1 observation, B = 2 observations, etc 
180 
APPENDIX B (Cont.) 
Figure 20 
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Figure 21 
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DIT Scores Paired wi+h Aggregate and individual Skill Usage Scores 
TABLE 8 
DIT Scores and Different Microskills Used. 
ID P% No. of Different 
Ski 1 Is Used 
No. of Skills 
Available 
% Ski 1 Is 
Available 
1 43.3 10 11 0.91 2 43.3 8 11 0.73 3 65 5 11 0.45 4 41 .7 3 11 0.27 
6 33.3 5 11 0.45 
7 23.3 5 11 0.45 
9 45.5 6 11 0.55 
11 40 6 11 0.55 
12 55 8 11 0.73 
13 41 7 11 0.64 
14 53.3 4 11 0.36 
13 36.7 5 11 0.45 
16 48.3 5 11 0.45 
18 38.3 6 11 0.55 
19 51 .7 8 11 0.73 
21 33.3 6 11 0.55 
24 75 6 11 0.55 
25 41 .7 7 11 0.64 
26 51 .7 4 11 0.36 
27 61 .7 4 11 0.36 
28 50 7 11 0.64 
29 51 .7 5 11 0.45 
31 75 4 11 0.36 
32 56.7 2 11 0.18 
34 48.3 5 11 0.45 
35 45.8 9 11 0.82 
49 51 .7 6 11 0.55 
41 63.3 7 11 0.64 
42 40 5 11 0.45 
43 33.3 3 11 0.27 
44 46.7 8 11 0.73 
45 45 7 11 0.64 
46 71 .7 7 11 0.64 
48 31 .7 7 11 0.64 
49 66.7 8 11 0.73 
52 33.3 7 11 0.64 
53 63.3 10 11 0.91 
54 61 .7 8 11 0.73 
55 35 3 11 0.27 
56 38.3 3 11 0.27 
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DIT Score and Attending Skills Used 
(Hyothesis 2) 
TABLE 9 
ID P% No. of Attending 
Ski 1 Is Used 
Total Number 
of Ski1s Used 
% of Total 
Usage 
1 43.3 15 28 0.54 
2 43.3 18 26 0.69 
3 65 18 18 1 .00 
4 41 .7 16 16 1 .00 
6 33.3 43 58 0.74 
7 23.3 38 42 0.90 
9 45.5 10 11 0.91 
11 40 11 17 0.65 
12 55 13 21 0.62 
13 41 19 29 0.66 
14 53.3 12 13 0.92 
15 36.7 22 22 1 .00 
16 48.3 21 22 0.95 
18 38.3 21 21 1 .00 
19 51 .7 32 23 1 .39 
21 33.3 15 20 0.75 
24 75 76 15 5.07 
25 41 .7 26 82 0.32 
26 51 .7 10 29 0.34 
27 61 .7 16 10 1 .60 
28 50 18 16 1 .13 
29 51 .7 17 23 0.74 
31 75 22 18 1 .22 
32 56.7 18 22 0.82 
34 48.3 18 18 1 .00 
35 45.8 10 11 0.91 
49 51 .7 20 29 0.69 
41 63.3 15 18 0.83 
42 40 12 18 0.67 
43 33.3 23 23 1 .00 
44 46.7 12 12 1 .00 
45 45 13 16 0.81 
46 71 .7 18 19 0.95 
48 31 .7 23 26 0.88 
49 66.7 25 26 0.96 
52 33.3 19 25 0.76 
53 63.3 33 34 0.97 
54 61 .7 15 18 0.83 
55 35 23 26 0.88 
56 38.3 10 10 1 .00 
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DIT Scores and Influencing Skills Used 
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TABLE 10 
(Hypothesis 3) 
ID P% No. of Inluencing Total Number % of Total 
ii ii ii ii it ii ii n ii ii ii n
 
ii
 
n
 
ii
 
ii
 
ii
 
ii
 
n
 
Skills Used of Skills Used Usage 
1 43.3 13 28 0.46 
2 43.3 8 26 0.31 
3 65 0 18 0.00 
4 41 .7 0 16 0.00 
6 33.3 15 58 0.26 
7 23.3 4 42 0.10 
9 45.5 1 11 0.09 
11 40 6 17 0.35 
12 55 9 21 0.43 
13 41 10 29 0.34 
14 53.3 1 13 0.08 
15 36.7 0 22 0.00 
16 48.3 1 22 0.05 
18 38.3 0 21 0.00 
19 51 .7 4 23 0.17 
21 33.3 5 20 0.25 
24 75 2 15 0.13 
25 41 .7 6 82 0.07 
26 51 .7 3 29 0.10 
27 61 .7 0 10 0.00 
28 50 0 16 0.00 
29 51 .7 5 23 0.22 
31 75 2 18 0.11 
32 56.7 0 22 0.00 
34 48.3 0 18 0.00 
35 45.8 3 11 0.27 
49 51 .7 9 29 0.31 
41 63.3 3 18 0.17 
42 40 6 18 0.33 
43 33.3 0 23 0.00 
44 46.7 0 12 0.00 
45 45 3 16 0.19 
46 71 .7 1 19 0.05 
48 31 .7 3 26 0.12 
49 66.7 1 26 0.04 
52 33.3 6 25 0.24 
53 63.3 1 34 0.03 
54 61 .7 3 18 0.17 
55 35 3 26 0.12 
56 38.3 0 10 0.00 
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DIT Scores and Helpee Focused Skills Used 
TABLE 11 
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Hypothesis 4 
ID P% No. of Helpee 
Focused Skills Used 
Total Number 
Skills Used 
% of Total 
Usage 
1 43.3 8 28 0.29 
2 43.3 12 26 0.46 
3 65 11 18 0.61 
4 41 .7 1 16 0.06 
6 33.3 8 58 0.14 
7 23.3 6 42 0.14 
9 45.5 10 11 0.91 
11 40 5 17 0.29 
12 55 4 21 0.19 
13 41 3 29 0.10 
14 53.3 1 13 0.08 
15 36.7 3 22 0.14 
16 48.3 9 22 0.41 
18 38.3 4 21 0.19 
19 51 .7 15 23 0.65 
21 33.3 9 20 0.45 
24 75 12 15 0.80 
25 41 .7 16 82 0.20 
26 51 .7 15 29 0.52 
27 61 .7 13 10 1 .30 
28 50 7 16 0.44 
29 51 .7 7 23 0.30 
31 75 8 18 0.44 
32 56.7 16 22 0.73 
34 48.3 8 18 0.44 
35 45.8 5 11 0.45 
49 51 .7 0 29 0.00 
41 63.3 8 18 0.44 
42 40 11 18 0.61 
43 33.3 6 23 0.26 
44 46.7 5 12 0.42 
45 45 8 16 0.50 
46 71 .7 10 19 0.53 
48 31 .7 17 26 0.65 
49 66.7 19 26 0.73 
52 33.3 15 25 0.60 
53 63.3 26 34 0.76 
54 61 .7 4 18 0.22 
55 35 8 26 0.31 
56 38.3 3 10 0.30 
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TABLE 12 
DIT Scores and Open Questions 
(Hypothesis 5) 
ID P% No. of Open Total Number % of Total 
ii
 
ii
 
it
 
n
 
ii
 
ii
 
ii
 
n
 
ii
 
n
 
it
 
n
 
it
 
n
 
ii
 
n
 
ii
 
n
 
ii
 
n
 
Questions Used Skills Used Usage 
1 43.3 5 28 0.18 2 43.3 3 26 0.12 3 65 6 18 0.33 
4 41 .7 0 16 0.00 
6 33.3 13 58 0.22 
7 23.3 11 42 0.26 
9 45.5 4 11 0.36 
11 40 6 17 0.35 
12 55 3 21 0.14 
13 41 8 29 0.28 
14 53.3 3 13 0.23 
15 36.7 6 22 0.27 
16 48.3 10 22 0.45 
18 38.3 4 21 0.19 
19 51 .7 7 23 0.30 
21 33.3 6 20 0.30 
24 75 6 15 0.40 
25 41 .7 16 82 0.20 
26 51 .7 3 29 0.10 
27 61 .7 2 10 0.20 
28 50 5 16 0.31 
29 51 .7 1 23 0.04 
31 75 0 18 0.00 
32 56.7 4 22 0.18 
34 48.3 0 18 0.00 
35 45.8 6 11 0.55 
49 51 .7 2 29 0.07 
41 63.3 5 18 0.28 
42 40 5 18 0.28 
43 33.3 6 23 0.26 
44 46.7 5 12 0.42 
45 45 6 16 0.38 
46 71 .7 3 19 0.16 
48 31 .7 11 26 0.42 
49 66.7 9 26 0.35 
52 33.3 9 25 0.36 
53 63.3 5 34 0.15 
54 61 .7 3 18 0.17 
55 35 5 26 0.19 
56 38.3 4 10 0.40 
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TABLE 13 
DIT Scores and Closed Questions 
ID P% No. of Closed Total Number % of Total 
ii
 
ii
 n ii ii ii it
 
ii
 
ti
 
ii
 
ii
 
ii
 
n
 
ii
 
n
 
ii
 
n
 
ii
 
Questions Used Skills Used Usage 
1 43.3 5 28 0.18 2 43.3 7 26 0.27 3 65 7 18 0.39 
4 41 .7 13 16 0.81 6 33.3 12 58 0.21 
7 23.3 13 42 0.31 
9 45.5 3 11 0.27 
11 40 2 17 0.12 
12 55 5 21 0.24 
13 41 6 29 0.21 
14 53.3 2 13 0.15 
1 5 36.7 2 22 0.09 
16 48.3 6 22 0.27 
18 38.3 5 21 0.24 
19 51 .7 10 23 0.43 
21 33.3 5 20 0.25 
24 75 5 15 0.33 
25 41 .7 37 82 0.45 
26 51 .7 15 29 0.52 
27 61 .7 3 10 0.30 
28 50 5 16 0.31 
29 51 .7 12 23 0.52 
31 75 5 18 0.28 
32 56.7 7 22 0.32 
34 48.3 11 18 0.61 
35 45.8 3 11 0.27 
49 51 .7 6 29 0.21 
41 63.3 6 18 0.33 
42 40 1 18 0.06 
43 33.3 4 23 0.17 
44 46.7 5 12 0.42 
45 45 1 16 0.06 
46 71'.7 0 19 0.00 
48 31 .7 8 26 0.31 
49 66.7 4 26 0.15 
52 33.3 2 25 0.08 
53 63.3 19 34 0.56 
54 61 .7 2 18 0.11 
55 35 4 26 0.15 
56 38.3 6 10 0.60 
ID 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
7 
9 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
18 
19 
21 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
31 
32 
34 
35 
49 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
48 
49 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
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TABLE 14 
DIT Scores and Minimal Encourages 
p% No. of Minimal 
Encourages Used 
Total Number % of Total 
Skills Used Usage 
43.3 3 28 0.11 
43.3 3 26 0.12 
65 1 18 0.06 
41 .7 1 16 0.06 
33.3 0 58 0.00 
23.3 13 42 0.31 
45.5 1 11 0.09 
40 0 17 0.00 
55 0 21 0.00 
41 0 29 0.00 
53.3 7 13 0.54 
36.7 12 22 0.55 
48.3 1 22 0.05 
38.3 10 21 0.48 
51 .7 2 23 0.09 
33.3 0 20 0.00 
75 4 15 0.27 
41 .7 6 82 0.07 
51 .7 0 29 0.00 
61 .7 2 10 0.20 
50 5 16 0.31 
51 .7 3 23 0.13 
75 0 18 0.00 
56.7 4 22 0.18 
48.3 0 18 0.00 
45.8 6 11 0.55 
51 .7 2 29 0.07 
63.3 1 18 0.06 
40 2 18 0.11 
33.3 9 23 0.39 
46.7 2 12 0.17 
45 1 16 0.06 
71 .7 6 19 0.32 
31 .7 0 26 0.00 
66.7 2 26 0.08 
33.3 4 25 0.16 
63.3 6 34 0.18 
61 .7 1 18 0.06 
35 5 26 0.19 
38.3 4 10 0.40 
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TABLE 15 
DIT Scores and Paraphrase Usage 
Hypothesis 5 
ID P% No. of Paraphases Total Number % of Total 
Used Skills Used Usage 
— — i i i i i i ii ii ii ii ii ii ii ii ii n ii ii ii ii ii n ii n ii ii n ii ii ii ii ii n ii ii ii ii n ii ii ii ii n ii 
1 43.3 0 28 0.00 
2 43.3 5 26 0.19 
3 65 2 18 0.11 
4 41 .7 2 16 0.13 
6 33.3 0 58 0.00 
7 23.3 1 42 0.02 
9 45.5 1 11 0.09 
11 40 2 17 0.12 
12 55 1 21 0.05 
13 41 1 29 0.03 
14 53.3 0 13 0.00 
15 36.7 1 22 0.05 
16 48.3 4 22 0.18 
18 38.3 2 21 0.10 
19 51 .7 6 23 0.26 
21 33.3 3 20 0.15 
24 75 1 15 0.07 
25 41 .7 7 82 0.09 
26 51 .7 5 29 0.17 
27 61 .7 3 10 0.30 
28 50 1 16 0.06 
29 51 .7 2 23 0.09 
31 75 3 18 0.17 
32 56.7 2 22 0.09 
34 48.3 0 18 0.00 
35 45.8 0 11 0.00 
49 51 .7 7 29 0.24 
41 63.3 2 18 0.11 
42 40 3 18 0.17 
43 33.3 33 23 1 .43 
44 46.7 0 12 0.00 
45 45 3 16 0.19 
46 71 .7 5 19 0.26 
48 31 .7 2 26 0.08 
49 66.7 5 26 0.19 
52 33.3 3 25 0.12 
53 63.3 1 34 0.03 
54 61 .7 5 18 0.28 
55 35 7 26 0.27 
56 38.3 0 10 
0.00 
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TABLE 16 
DIT Scores and Interpretations Usage 
(Hypothesis 5) 
ID P% No. of 1nterpretat1ons Total Number % of Total 
Used Skills Used Usage 
1 43.3 1 28 0.04 
2 43.3 0 26 0.00 
3 65 0 18 0.00 
4 41 .7 0 16 0.00 
6 33.3 0 58 0.00 
7 23.3 0 42 0.00 
9 45.5 0 11 0.00 
11 40 0 17 0.00 
12 55 0 21 0.00 
13 41 0 29 0.00 
14 53.3 0 13 0.00 
15 36.7 0 22 0.00 
16 48.3 0 22 0.00 
18 38.3 0 21 0.00 
19 51 .7 3 23 0.13 
21 33.3 0 20 0.00 
24 75 0 15 0.00 
25 41 .7 0 82 0.00 
26 51 .7 0 29 0.00 
27 61 .7 0 10 0.00 
28 50 0 16 0.00 
29 51 .7 2 23 0.09 
31 75 0 18 0.00 
32 56.7 0 22 0.00 
34 48.3 0 18 0.00 
35 45.8 1 11 0.09 
49 51 .7 0 29 0.00 
41 63.3 0 18 0.00 
42 40 0 18 0.00 
43 33.3 0 23 0.00 
44 46.7 0 12 0.00 
45 45 0 16 0.00 
46 71 .7 0 19 0.00 
48 31 .7 0 26 0.00 
49 66.7 0 26 0.00 
52 33.3 0 25 0.00 
53 63.3 0 34 0.00 
54 61 .7 0 18 0.00 
55 35 0 26 0.00 
56 38.3 0 10 0.00 
ID 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
7 
9 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
18 
19 
21 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
31 
32 
34 
35 
39 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
48 
49 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
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TABLE 17 
DIT Scores and Disclosures Usage 
(Hypothesis 5) 
p% No. of Self 
Disclosured Used 
Total Number % of Total 
Skills Used Usage 
43.3 7 28 0.25 
43.3 4 26 0.15 
65 0 18 0.00 
41 .7 0 16 0.00 
33.3 9 58 0.16 
23.3 0 42 0.00 
45.5 1 11 0.09 
40 1 17 0.06 
55 2 21 0.10 
41 1 29 0.03 
53.3 0 13 0.00 
36.7 0 22 0.00 
48.3 0 22 0.00 
38.3 0 21 0.00 
51 .7 0 23 0.00 
33.3 0 20 0.00 
75 0 15 0.00 
41 .7 0 82 0.00 
51 .7 0 29 0.00 
61 .7 0 10 0.00 
50 0 16 0.00 
51 .7 0 23 0.00 
75 0 18 0.00 
56.7 0 22 0.00 
48.3 0 18 0.00 
45.8 0 11 0.00 
51 .7 1 29 0.03 
63.3 0 18 0.00 
40 0 18 0.00 
33.3 0 23 0.00 
46.7 0 12 0.00 
45 0 16 0.00 
71 .7 0 19 0.00 
31 .7 0 26 0.00 
66.7 0 26 0.00 
33.3 2 25 0.08 
63.3 0 34 0.00 
61 .7 0 18 0.00 
35 0 26 0.00 
38.3 0 10 0.00 
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TABLE 18 
ID 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
7 
9 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
18 
19 
21 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
31 
32 
34 
35 
39 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
48 
49 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
DIT Scores and Expression of Feeling Usage 
P$ No. of Expressions Total Number 
of Feeling Used Skills Used 
43.3 
43.3 
65 
41 .7 
33.3 
23.3 
45.5 
40 
55 
41 
53.3 
36.7 
48.3 
38.3 
51 .7 
33.3 
75 
41 .7 
51 .7 
61 .7 
50 
51 .7 
75 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
3 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
0 
0 
1 
0 
28 
26 
18 
16 
58 
42 
11 
17 
21 
29 
13 
22 
22 
21 
23 
20 
15 
82 
29 
10 
16 
23 
18 
56.7 
48.3 
45.8 
51 .7 
63.3 
40 
33.3 
46.7 
45 
71 .7 
31 .7 
66.7 
33.3 
63.3 
61 .7 
35 
38.3 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
4 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
0 
3 
0 
0 
1 
1 
22 
18 
11 
29 
18 
18 
23 
12 
16 
19 
26 
26 
25 
34 
18 
26 
10 
% of Total 
Usage 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.14 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.04 
0.05 
0.07 
0.04 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.14 
0.00 
0.22 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 
0.12 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.10 
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TABLE 19 
DIT Scores and Expression of Content Usage 
ID P% 
(Hypothesis 5) 
No. of Expressions Total Number % of Total 
ii ii ii ii n
 
ii
 
ii
 
n
 
ii
 
ii
 
ii
 
ii
 
:i
 
ii
 
it
 
n
 
it
 
ii
 
of Content Used Skills Used Usage 
1 43.3 3 28 0.11 
2 43.3 3 26 0.12 
3 65 0 18 0.00 
4 41 .7 4 16 0.25 
6 33.3 6 58 0.10 
7 23.3 4 42 0.10 
9 45.5 0 11 0.00 
11 40 5 17 0.29 
12 55 4 21 0.19 
13 41 6 29 0.21 
14 53.3 1 13 0.08 
15 36.7 0 22 0.00 
16 48.3 0 22 0.00 
18 38.3 0 21 0.00 
19 51 .7 0 23 0.00 
21 33.3 4 20 0.20 
24 75 1 15 0.07 
25 41 .7 3 82 0.04 
26 51 .7 1 29 0.03 
27 61 .7 0 10 0.00 
28 50 0 16 0.00 
29 51 .7 2 23 0.09 
31 75 0 18 0.00 
32 56.7 0 22 0.00 
34 48.3 0 18 0.00 
35 45.8 2 11 0.18 
39 51 .7 2 29 0.07 
41 63.3 3 18 0.17 
42 40 2 18 0.11 
43 33.3 0 23 0.00 
44 46.7 0 12 0.00 
45 45 1 16 0.06 
46 71 .7 1 19 0.05 
48 31 .7 1 26 0.04 
49 66.7 1 26 0.04 
52 33.3 1 25 0.04 
53 63.3 1 34 0.03 
54 61 .7 3 18 0.17 
55 35 2 26 0.08 
56 38.3 0 10 0.00 
APPENDIX C (Cont.) W4 
TABLE 20 
DIT Scores and Directions Usage 
(Hypothesis 5) 
ID ?% No. of 
Directions Used 
Total Number % of Total 
Skills Used Usage 
1 43.3 1 28 0.04 
2 43.3 1 26 0.04 
3 65 0 18 0.00 
4 41 .7 0 16 0.00 
6 33.3 0 58 0.00 
7 23.3 0 42 0.00 
9 45.5 0 11 0.00 
11 40 0 17 0.00 
12 55 0 21 0.00 
13 41 0 29 0.00 
14 53.3 0 13 0.00 
15 36.7 0 22 0.00 
16 48.3 0 22 0.00 
18 38.3 0 21 0.00 
19 51 .7 0 23 0.00 
21 33.3 0 20 0.00 
24 75 0 15 0.00 
25 41 .7 0 82 0.00 
26 51 .7 0 29 0.00 
27 61 .7 0 10 0.00 
28 50 0 16 0.00 
29 51 .7 0 23 0.00 
31 75 1 18 0.06 
32 56.7 0 22 0.00 
34 48.3 0 18 0.00 
35 45.8 0 11 0.00 
39 51 .7 2 29 0.07 
41 63.3 0 18 0.00 
42 40 0 18 0.00 
43 33.3 0 23 0.00 
44 46.7 0 12 0.00 
45 45 1 16 0.06 
46 71 .7 0 19 0.00 
48 31 .7 0 26 0.00 
49 66.7 0 26 0.00 
52 33.3 0 25 0.00 
53 63.3 0 34 0.00 
54 61 .7 0 18 0.00 
55 35 0 26 0.00 
56 38.3 0 10 
0.00 
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TABLE 21 
DIT Scores and Summaries Usage 
ID P% No. of Total Number % of Total 
ii ii ii n ii ii ii ii ii ii ii
 
ii
 
n
 
ii
 
n
 
ii
 
n
 
ii
 
ii
 
ii
 
n
 
ii
 
Summaries Used Skills Used Usage 
1 43.3 1 28 0.04 
2 43.3 1 26 0.04 
3 65 0 18 0.00 
4 41 .7 0 16 0.00 
6 33.3 11 58 0.19 
7 23.3 0 42 0.00 
9 45.5 0 11 0.00 
11 40 0 17 0.00 
12 55 1 21 0.05 
13 41 2 29 0.07 
14 53.3 0 13 0.00 
15 36.7 0 22 0.00 
16 48.3 0 22 0.00 
18 38.3 0 21 0.00 
19 51 .7 4 23 0.17 
21 33.3 1 20 0.05 
24 75 1 15 0.07 
25 41 .7 0 82 0.00 
26 51 .7 1 29 0.03 
27 61 .7 0 10 0.00 
28 50 0 16 0.00 
29 51 .7 0 23 0.00 
31 75 0 18 0.00 
32 56.7 0 22 0.00 
34 48.3 0 18 0.00 
35 45.8 0 11 0.00 
39 51 .7 0 29 0.00 
41 63.3 0 18 0.00 
42 40 1 18 0.06 
43 33.3 1 23 0.04 
44 46.7 0 12 0.00 
45 45 2 16 0.13 
46 71 .7 3 19 0.16 
48 31 .7 1 26 0.04 
49 66.7 4 26 0.15 
52 33.3 1 25 0.04 
53 63.3 1 34 
0.03 
54 61 .7 2 18 0.11 
55 35 1 26 
0.04 
56 38.3 0 10 
0.00 
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TABLE 22 
DIT Scores and Ref 1ect1ons of Feeling Usage 
ID No. of Ref lection Total Number % of Total 
Of Feeling Used Skills Used Usage n
 
ii
 
ii
 
n
 
ii
 
n
 
ii
 
it
 
n
 
ii
 
ii
 n n n n n ii ii n ii n n ii ii = = = : ii ii ii ii ii ii n ii n ii ii ii ii ii n n ii ii ii ii ii ii ii ii ii ii ii ii ii ii _ 
1 43.3 1 28 0.04 
2 43.3 1 26 0.04 
3 65 2 18 0.1 1 
4 41 .7 0 16 0.00 
6 33.3 8 58 0.14 
7 23.3 0 42 0.00 
9 45.5 2 11 0.18 
11 40 1 17 0.06 
12 55 0 21 0.00 
13 41 2 29 0.07 
14 53.3 0 13 0.00 
15 36.7 1 22 0.05 
16 48.3 0 22 0.00 
18 38.3 0 21 0.00 
19 51 .7 4 23 0.17 
21 33.3 0 20 0.00 
24 75 0 15 0.00 
25 41 .7 0 82 0.00 
26 51 .7 2 29 0.07 
27 61 .7 0 10 0.00 
28 50 0 16 0.00 
29 51 .7 0 23 0.00 
31 75 0 18 0.00 
32 56.7 0 22 0.00 
34 48.3 0 18 0.00 
35 45.8 0 11 0.00 
39 51 .7 0 29 0.00 
41 63.3 0 18 0.00 
42 40 1 18 0.06 
43 33.3 1 23 0.04 
44 46.7 0 12 0.00 
45 45 2 16 0.13 
46 71 .7 3 19 0.16 
48 31 .7 1 26 0.04 
49 66.7 4 26 0.15 
52 33.3 1 25 0.04 
53 63.3 1 34 0.03 
54 61 .7 2 18 0.11 
55 35 1 26 0.04 
56 38.3 0 10 0.00 
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TABLE 23 
DIT Score and Quality Score 
J_D P|_ QS 
1 43.3 42.5 
2 43.3 47.5 
3 65.0 50.0 
4 41 .7 37.5 
6 33.3 65.0 
7 23.3 52.5 
9 45.5 80.0 
11 40.0 77.5 
12 55.0 77.5 
13 41 .0 70.0 
14 53.3 52.5 
15 36.7 57.5 
16 48.3 52.5 
18 38.3 62.5 
19 51 .7 00.0 
21 33.3 60.0 
24 75.0 80.0 
25 41 .7 50.0 
26 51 .7 97.5 
27 61 .7 55.0 
28 50.0 67.5 
29 51 .7 57.5 
31 75.0 62.5 
32 56.7 57.5 
34 48.3 47.5 
35 45.8 65.0 
39 51 .7 90.0 
41 63.3 67.5 
42 40.0 95.0 
43 33.3 67.5 
44 46.7 47.5 
45 45.0 62.5 
46 71 .7 57.5 
48 31 .7 50.0 
49 66.7 70.0 
52 33.3 50.0 
53 63.3 57.5 
54 61 .7 77.5 
55 35.0 42.5 
56 38.3 50.0 
ID 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
7 
9 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
18 
19 
21 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
31 
32 
34 
35 
39 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
48 
49 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
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Tab Ie 24 
Results of Ratings For Quality Score 
RATER ID 
K T M P TE D C KA PA E 
2 111113 4 2 1 
2 14 14 1 12 2 1 
1 424333444 
2 1112 2 2 1 2 1 
3221 243333 
2211332232 
3443334143 
3433234234 
2333443144 
3222424342 
2 2 1 4 1 12 4 3 1 
222331 2223 
21 23224221 
23334231 22 
4444444444 
31 2321 3342 
3243433433 
113 12 2 4 2 2 2 
4344444444 
222231 3421 
21 32423424 
2 112 2 3 3 4 4 1 
2332323133 
3 2 4 1 12 1 4 3 1 
2 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 3 1 
1 322233 3 32 
4332444444 
2133333333 
3444444344 
242 3 442322 
1 1 4 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 
2322332332 
1 2 2 11 4 2 4 4 2 
2122232321 
3212422144 
2 12 2 3 2 3 13 1 
3122323421 
2334243341 
2 12 12 12 2 3 1 
2 3 2 12 2 3 13 1 
AVERAGE 
TOTAL RANK QS 
17 1 .7 42.5 
19 1 .9 47.5 
32 3.2 50.0 
15 1 .5 37.5 
26 2.6 65.0 
21 2.1 52.5 
32 3.2 80.0 
31 3.1 77.5 
31 3.1 77.5 
28 2.8 70.0 
21 2.1 52.5 
23 2.3 57.5 
21 2.1 52.5 
25 2.5 62.5 
40 4.0 100.0 
24 2.4 60.0 
32 3.2 80.0 
20 2.0 50.0 
39 3.9 97.5 
22 2.2 55.0 
27 2.7 67.5 
23 2.3 57.5 
25 2.5 62.5 
23 2.3 57.5 
19 1 .9 47.5 
26 2.6 65.0 
36 3.6 90.0 
27 2.7 67.5 
38 3.8 95.0 
27 2.7 67.5 
19 1 .9 47.5 
25 2.5 62.5 
23 2.3 57.5 
20 2.0 50.0 
25 2.5 70.0 
20 2.0 50.0 
23 2.3 57.5 
29 2.9 77.5 
17 1 .7 42.5 
20 2.0 50.0 
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Table 25 
MEAN, STANDARD DEVI AT ION AND RANGE FOR ALL VARIABLES 
VARIABLE N MEAN STD DEV MINIMUM MAX 1 MUM 
Closed Question 40 28.49 17.20 0 81 .25 
Open Question 40 25.81 11 .92 0 45.45 
Minimal Encourages 40 14.86 16.33 0 54.54 
Paraphrase 40 11.17 8.61 0 30.00 
Reflection of Feeling 40 4.48 5.58 0 18.18 
Summaries 40 2.83 4.10 0 18.96 
Directions 40 0.64 1 .79 0 6.89 
Expression of Content 40 6.61 7.49 0 29.41 
Expression of Feeling 40 3.44 5.23 0 22.22 
Self Disclosure 40 2.38 5.47 0 25.00 
1nterpretations 40 0.74 2.36 0 9.09 
Different Microskills Used 40 55.00 17.70 18.18 90.90 
Helpee Focused Skills Used 40 39.10 21 .66 0 90.90 
Attending Skills Used 40 86.85 13.03 53.57 100.00 
Influencing Skills Used 40 13.71 13.45 0 46.42 
Quality Score 40 59.37 14.55 37.50 100.00 
P% Score 40 48.30 12.66 23.30 75.00 
Note: All values (except N) 
presented in Table 26 
indicate percent of use 
• 
i. Raw data are 
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Microski I Is Tally Sheet 
Counselor Name _ lD// 
tt Closed Questions. 
tt Open Questions. 
ft Minimal Encourages. 
tt Paraphrases. 
tt Reflections of Feelings. 
tt Summaries. 
tt Directions. 
tt Expressions of Content. . 
tt Expressions of Feeling.. 
It Self Disclosures.. 
tt Interpretations. . 
tt Different Microskills Used.. 
tt "Helpee" Focused Counselor Leads. . 
QUALITY SCORE.. 
Demographic Data 
Sex: Male _ Female _ 
Age: 18-22 _ 23-28 _ 29-60 _ 
Experience: None _ Some to 2 years _ More than 2 years - 
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APPENDIX H 
Table 26, Listing of The Microski I Is Usage Raw Data 
ID#. 1 2 3 4 ft 7 11 
Closed Questions 
Open Questions 
Minimal Encourages 
Paraphrases 
Reflections of Feeling 
Summaries 
Directions 
Expressions of Content 
Expressions of Feeling 
Self Disclosures 
5 
5 
3 
0 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
7 
7 
3 
3 
5 
1 
1 
1 
3 
0 
4 
7 
6 
1 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
13 
0 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
12 
13 
0 
0 
8 
11 
0 
6 
0 
9 
13 
11 
13 
1 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
0 
3 
4 
1 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 
6 
0 
2 
1 
0 
0 
5 
0 
1 
1nterpretations 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Different Microskills Used 10 8 5 3 5 5 6 6 
Helpee Focused Skills 8 12 11 1 8 6 10 5 
Attending Skills Used 15 18 18 16 43 38 10 11 
Influencing Skills Used 13 8 0 0 15 4 1 6 
Tota1 Skills Used 28 26 18 16 58 42 11 17 
Sex M F F M F F F F 
Age 20 22 21 21 21 21 30 20 
Experience 1 3 2 1 2 2 3 2 
Qua 1ity Score 1 .7 1 .9 3.2 1 .5 2.6 2.1 3.3 3. 
P% Score 43.3 43.3 65.0 41 .7 33.3 23.3 45.5 40, 
RAW DATA ID#. 13 14 15 16 18 21 25 26 
Closed Questions 6 2 2 6 5 5 37 15 
Open Questions 8 3 6 10 4 6 16 3 
Minimal Encourages 0 7 12 1 10 0 6 0 
Paraphrases 1 0 1 4 2 3 7 5 
Reflections of Feeling 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Summaries 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Directions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expressions of Content 
Expressions of Feeling 
Self Disclosures 
Interpretations 
Different Microskills Used 
He I pee Focused Skills 
Attending Skills Used 
Influencing Skills Used 
Total Skills Used 
Sex 
Age 
Experience 
Qua Iity Score 
P% Score 
6 
3 
1 
0 
8 
1 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
1 
0 
0 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
4 
1 
0 
0 
6 
3 
3 
0 
0 
6 
1 
2 
0 
0 
7 
3 1 3 9 4 9 16 15 
19 12 22 21 21 15 76 26 
10 1 0 1 0 5 6 3 
29 13 22 22 21 20 82 29 
F F F F F F M F 
20 40 23 20 21 21 23 19 
2 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 
3.1 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.5 2.4 2.0 3 
41 53.3 36.7 48.3 38.3 33.5 41 .7 51 
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Table 26, Listing of The Microskills Usage Raw Data 
RAW DATA ID#. 27 28 19 29 12 24 31 32 
Closed Questions 3 5 10 12 5 5 5 7 
Open Questions 2 5 7 1 3 6 8 y 
Minimal Encourages 2 5 2 3 0 4 0 4 
Paraphrases 3 1 6 2 1 1 3 2 
Reflections of Feeling 0 0 4 0 3 0 0 0 
Summaries 0 0 3 0 1 1 1 0 
Directions 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Expressions of Content 0 0 0 2 4 1 0 0 
Expressions of Feeling 0 0 1 1 3 1 0 0 
Self Disclosures 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
1nterpretations 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 
Different Microskills Used 4 4 8 7 8 7 5 4 
Helpee Focused Skills 3 7 15 17 14 12 8 16 
Attending Skills Used 10 16 32 18 13 13 17 22 
Influencing Skills Used 0 0 4 5 9 2 2 0 
Tota1 Skills Used 10 16 36 23 21 15 18 22 
Sex F F F F F F F F 
Age 21 35 23 31 19 20 28 20 
Experience 2 1 3 3 1 2 2 2 
Qua 1ity Score 2.2 2.7 4.0 2. 3 3.1 3.2 2.5 2, 
P% Score 61 .7 50.0 51 .7 51 . 75 5.0 75.0 75.0 56, 
RAW DATA ID#. 34 35 39 41 42 43 44 45 
Closed Questions 11 3 6 6 1 4 5 1 
Open Questions 7 1 2 5 5 6 5 6 
Minimal Encourages 0 6 2 1 2 9 2 1 
Paraphrases 0 0 7 2 3 3 0 3 
Reflections of Feeling 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Summaries 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 
Directions 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 
Expressions of Content 
Expressions of Feeling 
Self Disclosures 
Interpretations 
Different Microskills Used 
He I pee Focused Skills 
Attending Skills Used 
Influencing Skills Used 
Total Skills Used 
Sex 
Age 
Experience 
Qua Iity Score 
?% Score 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
18 
18 
0 
18 
F 
21 
1 
2 
0 
0 
1 
5 
5 
10 
3 
11 
M 
33 
3 
2 
4 
1 
0 
9 
0 
20 
9 
29 
F 
24 
3 
3 
0 
0 
0 
6 
8 
15 
3 
15 
M 
21 
2 
2 
4 
0 
0 
7 
11 
12 
6 
12 
F 
23 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
6 
23 
0 
23 
F 
22 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
5 
12 
0 
12 
F 
20 
2 
1 
1 
0 
0 
8 
8 
13 
3 
16 
F 
23 
3 
1.9 2.6 3.6 
48.3 45.8 51.7 
2.7 3.8 2.7 
63.6 40.0 33.3 
1.9 2.5 
46.7 45.0 
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Table 26, Listing of The Microskills Usage Raw Data 
RAW DATA ID#. 46 48 49 52 53 54 55 56 
Closed Questions 0 
Open Questions 3 
Minimal Encourages 6 
Paraphrases 5 
Reflections of Feeling 3 
Summaries 1 
Directions 0 
Expressions of Content 1 
Expressions of Feeling 0 
Self Disciosures 0 
Interpretations 0 
Different Microskills Used 7 
Helpee Focused Skills 10 
Attending Skills Used 18 
Influencing Skills Used 1 
TotaI Skills Used 19 
Sex F 
Age 22 
Experience 3 
Qua Iity Score 2.3 
P% Score 71 .7 
8 4 2 19 2 4 6 
11 9 9 5 3 5 4 
0 2 4 6 1 5 0 
2 5 3 1 5 7 0 
1 4 1 1 2 1 0 
1 1 0 1 2 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 3 2 0 
2 0 3 0 0 1 1 
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 7 8 7 10 8 3 
17 19 15 20 4 8 3 
23 25 19 33 15 23 10 
3 1 6 1 3 3 0 
26 26 25 34 18 26 10 
F F M F F F F 
20 23 20 29 30 20 20 
3 1 1 1 3 2 2 
2.0 2.5 2.0 2.3 2.9 1 .7 2 
31 .7 66.7 33.3 63.3 61 .7 35.0 38 

